Background Briefing

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Department of Defense Procurement Requests      

Most of the Pentagon’s requests in the FY 2006 budget, which the rest of this paper will discuss, call for the retrofitting of old technology or procurement of newer technology.  While designed to increase military effectiveness, the modernization of the U.S. cluster munition arsenal has the potential to reduce the negative humanitarian impact of these weapons.  The changes are far from a panacea, however.  The large stockpile of unreliable and inaccurate cluster munitions remains, new technology must be tested and evaluated, and targeting changes must accompany technological improvements.

Army Procurement Requests

Rocket and Missile Systems

In the FY 2006 budget, the Army requests $124.8 million for 1,026 rockets for the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS).24  FY 2006 is the fourth year of a gradually increasing, ten-year program to procure 140,004 of such rockets, which are designed to replace the “aging M26A1/A2 [MLRS rocket] inventory.”25  These rockets, often used for counter-battery fire, are launched from MLRS or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers.  The new rockets are precision guided, with inertial and global positioning system (GPS) guidance systems.  As a result, they are more likely to hit their target and troops will need to use fewer of them.  

DoD says the GMLRS guidance system, “in combination with the improved fuzing, reduces the total hazardous duds by 95 percent or more from standard M26 MLRS missions” and its “impact area is 85 percent smaller.”26  Its M101 submunition, product of a cooperative program undertaken with France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, however, only reduces the dud rate to 2.5 percent unless it has a self-destruct device.27   According to the budget documents, some, although DoD does not reveal how many, of the rockets will carry a unitary warhead instead of submunitions, thus reducing Army reliance on cluster munitions. 

Such technological developments are significant because the hundreds of older MLRS rockets used in Iraq were major killers of civilians.  The Army relied heavily on the MLRS because Iraqi artillery had a longer range than the regular U.S. artillery.  The only available warhead for the MLRS, however, contained submunitions.  In order to take out a single artillery piece in a civilian neighborhood, U.S. ground troops would launch a standard volley of six rockets containing about 4,000 DPICMs with a 16 percent dud rate that spread over an area with a 0.6-mile radius. The humanitarian impact was devastating, and duds endangered both soldiers and civilians.  Military officers ranging from field commanders to senior CENTCOM officials called for a unitary alternative. 

The GMLRS, especially in its 200-pound unitary form, addresses some of those concerns.  The Budget Justification Sheet, however, does not specify how many of each type of warhead (unitary or submunition) will be procured, important information that should be made public.  Because of its area effect, the version with submunitions will still excessively endanger civilians, especially if used in populated areas.  The Budget Justification Sheet also does not say which type of submunition will be used.  The DoD Report to Congress says that it will be a M101 DPICM with an improved M239 submunition fuze, but it does not specify if it will have a self-destruct mechanism.28   At a minimum, the 404 DPICMs in each GMLRS rocket should be replaced or retrofitted to reduce the dud rate. 

In another budget line, the Army has asked for $58.5 million for 45 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) missiles.29  These missiles are launched from an MLRS or HIMARS and usually carry 300 or 950 spherical submunitions.  U.S. ground forces used at least 330 of these in Iraq in 2003, and they caused a number of civilian casualties.  As with last year’s request, however, this request is for the Block 1A Quick Reaction Unitary (QRU) model, a unitary alternative to the submunition model.  It also includes a GPS guidance system to increase accuracy.

In addition to the GMLRS rockets and ATACMS missiles, the Army seeks money for different launcher systems.  It requests $20.8 million for production support and fielding of the relatively new M270A1 MLRS launcher and $19.8 million for modification to the same.30  The Army states this launcher will allow for “faster target engagement on time-sensitive” targets.31  The Army wants $183.3 million to procure thirty-five HIMARS and $8 million to make modifications to existing units.32  The HIMARS is a lightweight version of the MLRS that launches six instead of twelve rockets or one instead of two missiles.  These line items, all part of multiyear programs, do not require procurement of cluster munitions but are worth noting because they are often used to launch them.  The Army has also requested $114.3 million in Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) for GMLRS rockets and HIMARS launchers.33

  • The Department of Defense should specify how many of each type of GMLRS rocket it wants to procure and what kind of submunitions they will contain.

  • Congress should condition approval for rocket and missile launchers on their being used only with unitary warheads and submunitions with less than a 1 percent dud rate.

    Submunition Retrofitting

    The Army has requested $5 million, plus $5.1 million in FY 2007, to retrofit with self-destruct devices 375,000 submunitions in 5,000 155mm projectiles.34  The 155mm “Recap” program is designed to reduce the dud rate.  It applies to M864 Basebled Extended Range-DPICM (ER-DPICM) artillery projectiles, each of which contains a combination of seventy-two M42 and M46 submunitions.  According to Army figures from 2000, these submunitions have a dud rate of 14 percent before retrofitting;35 the DoD Report to Congress says the rate is 3 percent.  The reasons for the lower estimate are not known, but in any event, 3 percent is too high.36  The Army’s Budget Justification Sheet does not specify an expected dud rate after retrofitting although the DoD Report to Congress says it will be less than 1 percent.37  The requested $5 million is significantly lower than last year’s request for $42.2 million to retrofit 820,800 submunitions in 11,400 155mm artillery projectiles.38  This year’s Budget Justification Sheet also reveals that only $17.9 million was ultimately approved for FY 2005.

    During major hostilities in Iraq in 2003, submunitions killed or injured hundreds of civilians, and DPICMs were by far the worst offenders.  The Budget Justification Sheet states that the 155mm Recap program will “greatly reduce hazardous duds on the battlefield as evidenced with the use of DPICM during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom.”39 

    While this retrofitting program should help reduce the danger of duds in future conflicts, it will not address the other major concerns regarding cluster munitions: the wide footprint and the lack of accuracy.  Thus, it will not reduce the immediate danger of these weapons during strikes, especially in populated areas.  A self-destruct mechanism does not change the area effect characteristic which leads to civilian deaths during attacks.  Moreover, the retrofitting program does not account for all of the DPICMs in the U.S. arsenal.40  The Army, for example, did not request FY 2006 money to retrofit 105mm M915 artillery shells with DPICMs,41 although it awarded a contract in February 2003 for the manufacture of 500,000 self-destruct fuzes for these projectiles.42

    • The Department of Defense should destroy or retrofit all DPICMs that are not modified under this program.
    • These retrofits and other non-precision-guided submunitions should never be used in populated areas. 
    • The Department of Defense should make public the estimated dud rate for the retrofitted submunitions.

    Helicopter-Launched Hydra 

    This year, the Army has asked for no money for helicopter-launched cluster munitions.  Last year, for FY 2005, the Army requested $3.8 million to procure 2,000 Hydra 70 MPSM HE M261 rockets.43  These rockets carry nine M73 submunitions each.  The submunitions, which do not have self-destruct mechanisms, have a 6 percent dud rate according to the DoD Report to Congress44 and under the Cohen policy can no longer be procured.45

    Marine Corps Procurement Requests

    Missile and Rocket Systems

    The Marine Corps seeks funds for GMLRS rockets, but, like last year, the details of this request are unclear.  The Marine Corps Budget Justification Sheet calls for $1.3 million for GMLRS rockets and MLRS practice rockets, but it does not specify how the money will be divided.46  According to Army budget justification documents, the Marines want 648 GMLRS rockets as part of a program that would obtain 3,900 by FY 2011.47  For FY 2006 the Marine Corps also requested $176.8 million for fifteen HIMARS.48  The analysis of these requests is the same as that for the Army’s GMLRS and HIMARS.

    • The Marine Corps should clarify its procurement request, breaking it down by type of rocket and specifying what type of submunitions the GLMRS would carry.
    • Congress should condition approval for the HIMARS launcher on its being used only with unitary warheads or submunitions with less than a 1 percent dud rate.

               

    Air Force Procurement Requests

    Sensor Fuzed Weapons

    The Air Force budget includes one major cluster munition procurement request—the Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW).  It has asked for $120,379 million for 332 SFWs, also called CBU-97s, which incorporate cutting-edge cluster munition technology.49  The SFW has the same canister as the more common CBU-87 or CBU-103, but it contains ten BLU-108 submunitions instead of 202 BLU-97s.  The SFW’s submunitions each contain four hockey-puck-sized, explosive “skeets” with infrared sensors that guide them to armored targets and self-destruct mechanisms to reduce the number of duds.  The Air Force plans to add Wind Corrected Munitions Dispensers (WCMDs) to these CBU-97s to create the guided version of the SFW, the CBU-105.  The procurement request is slightly larger than it was the past two years and will gradually increase to 398 in FY 2011. 

    The United States used the SFW for the first time in Iraq.  The Air Force dropped eighty-eight of them.  They have the potential to reduce the civilian cost of cluster munitions because both their canisters and skeets are guided and because their dud rate should be lower due to the self-destruct mechanisms.  They also target vehicles, which should help avoid an indiscriminate antipersonnel effect.  Initial Air Force reports gave the weapon a positive review.50  The Army introduced a similar artillery-launched weapon in Iraq called the Sense and Destroy Armor Munitions (SADARM), but it did not request additional money to procure SADARMs this year or last.

    CBU-87

    The Air Force has also requested $291,000 for 15 CBU-87 cluster bomb dispensers.51  The Budget Justification Sheet provides no information about this request except that the dispensers will be inert, i.e. without their submunitions.  By themselves, these cluster casings pose no danger.  If they are filled with BLU-97s, which have a dud rate of 4 to 6 percent,52 however, they represent a significant humanitarian risk.  The CBU-87, and its successor the CBU-103, killed dozens of civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo.  The casing, which can be used with a number of different weapon systems, also endangers civilians if it is used to carry scatterable mines. 

       

    • The Department of Defense should provide Congress with more information about this request, and Congress should reject any procurement requests for CBU-87 dispensers to be used for the CBU-87 or CBU-103 cluster bombs or for the CBU-89 or CBU-104 scatterable landmine systems.

    Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser

    In a surprise change of direction, the Air Force budget does not include money to procure the Wind Corrected Munition Dispenser.  The WCMD is a guidance system that attaches at the rear of four munitions—the CBU-103 (Combined Effects Munition), CBU-104 (Gator antipersonnel and antivehicle mines), CBU-105 (Sensor Fuzed Weapon), and CBU-107 (Passive Attack Weapon).  It does not make these cluster bombs precision-guided munitions but increases their accuracy by compensating for wind encountered during the canisters’ fall.  The WCMD was used first in Afghanistan in 2001 and used extensively in Iraq in 2003. 

    Last year, the Air Force asked for $58.67 million to procure 2,507 Wind Corrected Munition Dispensers, and it planned to request money for 500 more this year.53 The FY 2005 request also included, for the first time, production of some units of the extended range WCMD (WCMD-ER) variety, which adds a wing kit that increases the cluster munitions’ standoff range—the distance at which they are fired.  An early sign of a move away from this technology was when the Secretary of Defense slashed funding for the WCMD-ER in December 2004 articulating no reason but showing that it will save $403 million through FY 2011.54  Although it has not made a procurement request this year, the Air Force has asked for $21.7 million to complete development of the WCMD-ER.55

    The WCMD may make it less likely civilians will be hit by a cluster bomb that goes astray (a significant problem in Afghanistan where the older CBU-87 was used widely), but it does not turn cluster bombs into precision munitions that are safe to use in populated areas, nor does it eliminate the duds that endanger civilians after strikes.  The dud rate of the BLU-97 submunition, 202 of which are carried in the CBU-87 and CBU-103, is 4 to 6 percent, according to the DoD Report to Congress; it was demonstrated to be much higher in Kosovo and elsewhere.56  On the one hand, the lack of a procurement request for WCMD this year is a positive step because it ensures that it will not be used with the CBU-103 carrying unreliable BLU-97s, or the CBU-104 carrying unlawful Gator antipersonnel mines.  On the other hand, it suggests that WCMDs may not be available to increase the accuracy of the Sensor Fuzed Weapon and ensure its precision-guided submunitions land in the intended area.

    Navy Procurement Requests

    Joint Standoff Weapons

    Responding to concerns about clusters, the Navy has temporarily ceased procurement of the Joint Standoff Weapon AGM-154A.57  This model, one of three variants of the precision-guided, air-to-ground JSOW, carries 145 BLU-97 submunitions.  The Navy’s FY 2006 Budget Justification says, “JSOW-A production is temporarily deferred for two reasons: Raytheon[’s] ongoing development of an Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) solution to the BLU-97 and the departmental direction to accept risk in weapon quantity below total inventory requirements for area attack munitions.”58 In other words, the Navy awaits a model with a lower dud rate and is willing to risk having low stocks of the weapon while it waits.  Raytheon plans to replace the older, unreliable BLU-97 with a unitary warhead, the BLU-111, that combines blast and fragmentation without the danger of numerous submunition duds.

    Last year the Navy spent $1.43 million for 405 JSOWs, including 216 that would carry more than 31,000 submunitions.59  The Air Force also has procured this weapon in the past but ceased in FY 2005, apparently because it believed the WCMD-ER “better met service needs.”60 


    [24] Department of the Army, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, Fiscal Year 2006/2007 President’s Budget: Missile Procurement, Army, February 2005, Item No. 13, Guided MLRS Rocket, p. 72, http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY06-07/pforms/missiles.pdf (retrieved March 14, 2005).

    [25] Ibid.

    [26] “DoD Report to Congress,” p. 8.

    [27] Ibid., p. 7.

    [28] “DoD Report to Congress,” p. 7.  

    [29] Department of the Army, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, Fiscal Year 2006/2007 President’s Budget: Missile Procurement, Army, February 2005, Item No. 16, Army Tactical Missile System, p. 104, http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY06-07/pforms/missiles.pdf (retrieved March 13, 2005).

    [30] Ibid., Item No. 15, MLRS Launcher Systems, p. 91; ibid., Item No. 22, MLRS Modifications, p. 128.

    [31] Ibid., Item No. 15, MLRS Launcher Systems, p. 91.

    [32] Ibid., Item No. 16, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, p. 96; ibid., Item No. 23, HIMARS Modifications, p. 145.

    [33] Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 2006, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, February 2005, p. 22, http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2006/fy2006_weabook.pdf (retrieved March 13, 2005).

    [34] Department of the Army, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book Fiscal Year 2006/2007 Budget Submission: Procurement of Ammunition, Army, February 2005, Item No. 16, Projectile 155mm DP Basebled M864, p. 350, http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY06-07/pforms/ammo.pdf (retrieved March 13, 2005).

    [35] U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center, Technical Center for Explosives Safety, “Study of Ammunition Dud and Low Order Detonation Rates,” July 2000, p. 9.

    [36] “DoD Report to Congress,” p. 2.

    [37] Ibid., p. 7.

    [38] Department of the Army, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates: Procurement of Ammunition, Army, February 2004, Item No. 16, Projectile 155mm DP Basebled M864, p. 336, http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY05/pforms/ammo.pdf (retrieved April 7, 2004). 

    [39] Ibid. 

    [40] The DPICM is used in several models of cluster munitions.  The Army has not reported what percentage of the DPICMs it used in Iraq came in M864 projectiles.

    [41] Department of the Army, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2006/2007 Budget Submission: Procurement of Ammunition, Army, February 2005, Item No. 15, CTG, Artillery, 105mm: All Types, p. 320.

    [42] U.S. Army Armaments Research and Development Engineering Center, Contract Award Notice DAAE30-03-R-0800, “M234 Self-Destruct Fuze Low Rate Initial Production—Sole Source,” February 6, 2003.

    [43] Department of the Army, Committee Staff Backup Book, Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Amendment for Army Aviation Transformation: Procurement Ammunition, Army, March 2004, Rocket Hydra 70 MPSM HE M261, p. 7, http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/fy05/amended/pform-ammo.pdf (retrieved April 7, 2004).

    [44] “DoD Report to Congress,” p. 2.

    [45] Anthony J. Melita, “A Viewpoint from OSD.”  This presentation lists the Hydra as one of the weapons affected by the Cohen policy, subject to a waiver or modification.

    [46] Department of the Navy, FY 2006/2007 Budget Estimates: Procurement, Marine Corps, February 2005, Item No. 21, HIMARS Rockets, https://164.224.25.30/FY06.nsf/PMC?OPENframeset (retrieved March 13, 2005).

    [47] Department of the Army, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, Fiscal Year 2006/2007 President’s Budget: Missile Procurement, Army, February 2005, Item No. 13, Guided MLRS Rocket, p. 75, http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY06-07/pforms/missiles.pdf (retrieved March 14, 2005).

    [48] Department of the Navy, FY 2006/2007 Budget Estimates: Procurement, Marine Corps, February 2005, Item No. 12, https://164.224.25.30/FY06.nsf/PMC?OPENframeset (retrieved March 13, 2005).

    [49] Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Year 2006/2007 Budget Estimates: Procurement of Ammunition, February 2005, Item No. 6, Sensor Fuzed Weapon, p. 81, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/FMB/pb/2006/afprocurement/Ammunition_Procurement_FY06_PB.pdf (retrieved March 13, 2005).

    [50] Ryan Hansen, “Sensor Fuzed Weapon Combat Debut Forces Troops to Surrender,” AFMC Public Affairs Link, August 18, 2003, http://www.afmc-pub.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/PA/news/archive/2003/Aug/0829-03.htm (retrieved May 6, 2005).  

    [51] Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Year 2006/2007 Budget Estimates: Procurement of Ammunition, February 2005, Item No. 5, p. 79. http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/FMB/pb/2006/afprocurement/Ammunition_Procurement_FY06_PB.pdf (retrieved March 13, 2005).

    [52] “DoD Report to Congress,” p. 4.

    [53] Department of the Air Force, Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Estimates: Procurement of Ammunition, February 2004, Item No. 7, Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser, p. 98, available at http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/FMB/pb/2005/proc.html (retrieved April 7, 2004).

    [54] Department of Defense, Program Budget Decision, December 23, 2004, p. 8.  See also Elizabeth Rees, “Pentagon Terminates Air Force’s Extended-Range WCMD Program,” Inside the Air Force, January 7, 2005.

    [55] Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 2006, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, February 2005, p. 30, http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2006/fy2006_weabook.pdf (retrieved March 13, 2005).

    [56] “DoD Report to Congress,” p. 4.  International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 2001 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001), p. 952.

    [57] Department of the Navy, FY 2006/2007 Budget Estimates: Weapons Procurement, Navy, February 2005, Item No. 07, Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), https://164.224.25.30/FY06.nsf/WPN?openframeset (retrieved March 13, 2005).

    [58] Ibid.

    [59] Department of the Navy, FY 2005 President’s Budget: Weapons Procurement, Navy, February 2004, Item No. 08, Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), https://notes3.secnav.navy.mil/fy05.nsf/WPN?OpenForm&ExpandView (retrieved April 7, 2004).

    [60] U.S. Air Force, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates: Missile Procurement, Air Force, February 2004, Item No. 4, Joint Stand-Off Weapon, p. 2-9­, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/FMB/pb/2005/proc.html (retrieved April 7, 2004); Elizabeth Rees, “Pengaton Terminates Air Force’s Extended-Range WCMD Program,” Inside the Air Force, January 7, 2005.


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