Background Briefing

<<previous  |  index  |  next>>

Army Procurement Requests

Rocket and Missile Systems

The Army requests $112.3 million for 1,026 rockets for the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS).3  FY 2005 is the third year of a gradually increasing, ten-year program to procure 140,004 of such rockets, which are designed to replace the “aging M26 [MLRS rocket] inventory.”  These rockets, often used for counter-battery fire, are launched from MLRS or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers.  GMLRS technology has the potential to reduce the humanitarian harm of cluster munitions in two ways.  First, the new rockets are precision-guided, with inertial and global positioning system (GPS) guidance systems.  As a result, they are more likely to hit their target, and troops will need to use fewer of them.  Second, they provide a unitary alternative for the MLRS, which reduces Army reliance on cluster munitions.  According to the budget documents, some, although not all, of the rockets will carry a unitary warhead instead of submunitions.  Earlier models only delivered submunitions.  The new submunition version is a cooperative program undertaken with France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

Such technological developments are especially significant because the hundreds of older MLRS rockets used in Iraq were major killers of civilians.  The Army relied heavily on the MLRS because Iraqi artillery had a longer range than the regular U.S. artillery.  The only available warhead for the MLRS, however, contained submunitions.  In order to take out a single artillery piece in a civilian neighborhood, U.S. ground troops would launch a standard volley of six rockets containing about 4,000 DPICMs with a sixteen percent dud rate that spread over an area with a .6-mile radius.  The humanitarian impact was devastating, and duds endangered both soldiers and civilians.  Military officers ranging from field commanders to senior CENTCOM officials called for a unitary alternative. 

The GMLRS, especially in its 200-pound unitary form, addresses some of those concerns.  The version with 414 DPICM submunitions, however, will still excessively endanger civilians if used in populated areas and if the DPICMs are not replaced or retrofitted to reduce the dud rate.  Plans for a submunition with “significantly reduced hazardous duds” will not reach “full rate production,” or production for use in combat, until FY 2006.4  The Budget Justification Sheet does not specify how many of each type of warhead (unitary or submunition) will be procured, important information that should be made public. 

In 2001, then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen issued a policy memorandum stating that all submunitions reaching a Milestone 3 production decision in FY 2005 and beyond would have a dud rate of less than one percent (hereinafter the Cohen policy).5  In other words, submunitions that reach full rate production during the first quarter of FY 2005 must meet the new standard.6  Under this policy, GMLRS carrying old DPICMs should not be procured.7  

In another budget line, the Army has asked for $61.5 million for fifty-six Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) missiles.8  These missiles are launched from an MLRS or HIMARS and usually carry 300 or 950 spherical submunitions.  U.S. ground forces used at least 330 of these in Iraq in 2003, and they caused a number of civilian casualties.  This request, however, is for the Block 1A Quick Reaction Unitary (QRU) model, a unitary alternative to the submunition model.  It also includes a GPS guidance system to increase accuracy.  The Army plans to procure a total of 2,741 ATACMSs by FY 2008, 278 of which are QRUs.

In addition to the GMLRS rockets and ATACMS missiles, the Army seeks money for their different launcher systems.  It requests $47.6 million for production support, testing, and fielding of the relatively new M270A1 MLRS launcher and $24 million for modification to the same.9  Its improvements include allowing for “faster engagement on time-sensitive” targets, which could have humanitarian benefits by increasing chances that the intended target is hit.  The Army wants $173.3 million to procure thirty-seven HIMARS and $.5 million to make modifications to existing units.10  It has also requested $97.4 million for related RDT&E.11  The HIMARS is a lightweight version of the MLRS that launches six instead of twelve rockets or one instead of two missiles.  These line items, all part of multiyear programs, do not require procurement of cluster munitions but are worth noting because they are often used to launch them.

  • Congress should reject procurement requests for GMLRS rockets with old submunitions.

  • The Department of Defense should specify how many of each type of GMLRS rockets it wants to procure and what kind of submunitions they will contain.

  • Congress should condition approval for rocket and missile launchers on their being used only with unitary warheads.

    Helicopter-Launched Hydra

    The Army has requested $3.8 million to procure 2,000 Hydra 70 MPSM HE M261 rockets.12  These helicopter-launched rockets carry nine M73 submunitions each.  The one-year request was added as part of the Department of the Army’s Budget Amendment for Army Aviation Transformation.  The Army procured 6,000 of these weapons in FY 2003 but none in FY 2004.  No future procurement requests are planned.  Unlike most of the other budget items discussed, this version of the Hydra does not include any new technology.  Its submunitions, which do not have self-destruct mechanisms, have a four percent dud rate, according to Department of Defense figures.13  Hydra submunitions caused a number of civilian casualties in Iraq.  Under the Cohen policy mentioned above, they should no longer be procured.14 

  • Congress should reject procurement requests for all Hydras with submunitions.

    Submunition Retrofitting

    The Army has requested $42.2 million to retrofit 820,800 submunitions in 11,400 155mm artillery projectiles with self-destruct devices.15  The 155mm “Recap” program is designed to reduce the dud rate.  It applies to M864 Basebled Extended Range-DPICM (ER-DPICM) artillery projectiles, each of which contains a combination of seventy-two M42 and M46 submunitions.  According to Army figures, these submunitions have a dud rate of fourteen percent before retrofitting.16  The Army’s Budget Justification Sheet does not specify a new expected dud rate, information that should be made public.  The FY 2005 budget request, part of a five-year program, is a significant increase over previous years ($18.2 million in FY 2004 and $9.1 million in FY 2003).  For the next two years requests are estimated to be $44 and $44.5 million, respectively.

    During the major hostilities in Iraq in 2003, submunitions killed or injured hundreds of civilians, and DPICMs were by far the worst offenders.  The Budget Justification Sheet states that the 155mm Recap program will “greatly reduce hazardous duds on the battlefield as evidenced with the use of DPICM during Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom.” 

    While this retrofitting program should help reduce the danger of duds in future conflicts, it will not address the other major concerns regarding cluster munitions: the wide footprint and the lack of accuracy.  Thus, it will not reduce the immediate danger of these weapons during strikes, especially in populated areas.  Moreover, the retrofitting program does not account for all of the DPICMs in the U.S. arsenal.17  The Army, for example, did not request FY 2005 money to retrofit 105mm M915 artillery shells with DPICMs18 although it awarded a contract in February 2003 to manufacture 500,000 self-destruct fuzes for these projectiles.19

  • The Department of Defense should destroy or retrofit all DPICMs that are not modified under this program.

  • These retrofits and other non-precision-guided submunitions should never be used in populated areas. 

  • The Department of Defense should make public the estimated dud rate for the retrofitted submunitions.



    [3] Department of the Army, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Estimates: Missile Procurement, Army, February 2004, Item No. 12, Guided MLRS Rocket, p. 74, http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY05/pforms/missiles.pdf (retrieved April 7, 2004).

    [4] Army RDT&E Budget Item Justification, Item No. 177, MLRS Product Improvement Program, pp. 410, 431, http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2005/Army/0603778A.pdf (retrieved June 3, 2004).

    [5] Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DoD Policy on Submunition Reliability (U), January 10, 2001.

    [6] Ibid.  See also Anthony J. Melita, “A Viewpoint from OSD,” briefing at National Defense Industrial Association, 45th Annual Fuze Conference, April 2001, p. 9.

    [7] Anthony J. Melita, “A Viewpoint from OSD.”  This presentation lists the GMLRS with M77 submunitions as one of the weapons affected by the Cohen policy, subject to a waiver or modification.

    [8] Department of the Army, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Estimates: Missile Procurement, Army, February 2004, Item No. 16, Army Tactical Missile System, p. 104, http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY05/pforms/missiles.pdf (retrieved April 7, 2004).

    [9] Ibid., Item No. 14, MLRS Launcher Systems, p. 89; ibid., Item No. 20, MLRS Modifications, p. 148.

    [10] Ibid., Item No. 15, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, p. 95; ibid., Item No. 21, HIMARS Modifications, p. 161.

    [11] Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 2005, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, February 2004, p. 25, www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2005/fy2005_weabook.pdf (retrieved April 7, 2004).   

    [12] Department of the Army, Committee Staff Backup Book, Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Amendment for Army Aviation Transformation: Procurement Ammunition, Army, March 2004, Rocket Hydra 70 MPSM HE M261, p. 7, http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/fy05/amended/pform-ammo.pdf (retrieved April 7, 2004).

    [13] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, “Unexploded Ordnance Report,” n.d., table 2-3, p. 5, transmitted to Congress on February 29, 2000.

    [14] Anthony J. Melita, “A Viewpoint from OSD.”  This presentation lists the Hydra as one of the weapons affected by the Cohen policy, subject to a waiver or modification.

    [15] Department of the Army, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates: Procurement of Ammunition, Army, February 2004, Item No. 16, Projectile 155mm DP Basebled M864, p. 336, http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY05/pforms/ammo.pdf (retrieved April 7, 2004). 

    [16] U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center, Technical Center for Explosives Safety, “Study of Ammunition Dud and Low Order Detonation Rates,” July 2000, p. 9.

    [17] The DPICM is used in several models of cluster munitions.  The Army has not released what percentage of the DPICMs it used in Iraq came in M864 projectiles.

    [18] Department of the Army, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates: Procurement of Ammunition, Army, February 2004, Item No. 15, CTG, Artillery, 105mm: All Types, p. 304.

    [19] U.S. Army Armaments Research and Development Engineering Center, Contract Award Notice DAAE30-03-R-0800, “M234 Self-Destruct Fuze Low Rate Initial Production—Sole Source,” February 6, 2003.


    <<previous  |  index  |  next>>June 2004