(September 9, 1998) — Pending legislation poses a threat to effective U.S. foreign policy, warned Human Rights Watch executive director Kenneth Roth, in testimony presented Tuesday, September 8, to the U.S. Senate Task Force on Economic Sanctions.
"Human Rights Watch is concerned that, under the guise of fine-tuning the use of sanctions, certain elements of the business community are proposing to eliminate a key tool for the promotion of human rights and other foreign policy interests," explained Roth. "While we agree that the commercial impact of sanctions should be considered, so too the U.S. must consider the human rights impact of imposing — or not imposing — these measures."A copy of Kenneth Roth's testimony before the Senate Task Force follows.
The Role of U.S. Sanctions Policies in Promoting Human Rights
September 8, 1998
Thank you, Chairman McConnell, for your invitation to Human Rights Watch to address the Task Force on the issue of U.S. sanctions policies and the promotion and protection of human rights. I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to the discussion of how sanctions can best be tailored and implemented. At the same time, Human Rights Watch is concerned that, under the guise of fine-tuning the use of sanctions, certain elements of the business community are proposing to eliminate a key tool for the promotion of human rights and other US foreign policy interests.
While we agree that the commercial impact of sanctions should be considered, so too the U.S. must consider the human rights impact of imposing - or not imposing - these measures. Just to cite a few examples of their usefulness, the multilateral imposition of sanctions contributed to the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, while unilateral U.S. sanctions helped build pressure on and hasten the downfall of the Argentine military junta, Jean-Claude Duvalier and Idi Amin. And only this summer, in a different context, we saw the threat of sanctions help to resolve the negotiations involving Holocuast-era assets held in Switzerland.
I would like to begin today with a brief discussion of sanctions policies generally, followed by a number of comments relating to approaches currently under consideration.
I. Sanctions as an important tool of U.S. foreign policy
Human Rights Watch believes that, as set out in the Foreign Assistance Act, a principal goal of United States foreign policy should be to promote the increased observance of human rights by all countries. To this end, the United States government should, on the one hand, seek sustainable long-term improvements through assistance programs which promote human rights, the rule of law and democratic development, and, on the other hand, use active diplomacy - including frank exchanges with the government concerned, and unilateral and multilateral public criticism - to address human rights violations. When diplomatic pressure fails to curb egregious abuses, however, the U.S. and other nations claiming to uphold human rights must retain the ability to employ limited and targeted sanctions to express their condemnation of violations, press for a change in abusive government policies, and avoid complicity in abuses.
Sometimes even the threat of sanctions, if consistently and credibly applied, can avoid the need for their imposition. At times, however, the actual application of sanctions is necessary. Their prompt imposition in such cases can serve the interests of the U.S. and the international community by promoting an environment of respect for human rights, and by helping to prevent a worsening of repression and resulting disorder which can create destabilizing refugee flows or in which military or other extreme measures may become necessary.
Multilateral sanctions are generally more effective than unilateral sanctions, so efforts should always be made to join forces with like-minded nations to address human rights abuses. The European Union has officially linked its aid programs to human rights practices, as have most other western donors. We have regularly faulted the U.S. government for making insufficient efforts to enlist multilateral support for sanctions. At the same time, the U.S. government should be able to resort to unilateral sanctions when multilateral sanctions are not possible or urgent action is required -- as it did this spring in response to events in Kosovo when the Contact Group and Security Council were deadlocked.
Foreign policies that promote human rights, good governance, income security and the rule of law, including through the use of conditionality and sanctions, are also consistent with U.S. trade interests, because they can help foster truly stable societies that, in the long run, offer greater opportunities for economic growth and development. They also help create the level playing field in terms of respect for basic labor rights on which Americans are more likely to support enhanced global trade.
II. Considerations for effective sanctions policies
The term "sanctions" covers a multitude of penalties that can be imposed on an abusive regime, including conditions on aid or trade benefits and restrictions on trade. Our experience has taught us that certain types of sanctions, under certain conditions, offer the greatest promise of success in countering abusive human rights practices. A number of policy prescriptions flow from this experience:
Sanctions supported by domestic constituency in targeted country. When human rights activists seeking freedoms in their own countries ask the international community to impose sanctions, the choice is clearest. The United States must listen to Burmese voices today, as it listened to South African voices in 1986 and Polish voices in 1981. Sanctions imposed in response to their pleas reinforce and legitimize their efforts. Domestic support also undermines any effort by the targeted regime to blame the U.S. or the international community for the negative economic impact of sanctions. However, we must recognize that severe repression can prevent a population from expressing its approval for sanctions, and in those cases it may be necessary to act without a manifestation of local support.
Targeted sanctions. We advocate sanctions that are targeted, and designed to have the greatest impact on an abusive regime by depriving it of the tools and means of repression, while avoiding or minimizing any negative impact on the general civilian population.
First in the hierarchy of sanctions are arms embargoes and restrictions on military assistance that a brutal regime would likely use to perpetrate further abuses. In the case of systematically abusive governments, these sanctions are mandated under section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, which also requires that security assistance be administered in a manner which promotes human rights and avoids identifying the U.S. with repressive foreign governments. Unfortunately, the U.S. government routinely ignores section 502B, and thus contributes to the suffering of the victims of abuses perpetrated with U.S. military equipment and aid. In addition, the U.S., together with the wider international community, has not provided the means and the resources to effectively implement existing arms embargoes which are often thus reduced to mere pronouncements.
Turkey provides an example of the power of potential arms sanctions. Objections were raised to the sale of attack helicopters to Turkey in 1996, when it was shown that the Turkish military was using these in its highly abusive counterinsurgency campaign against Kurdish rebels; facing this criticism, Turkey withdrew its tender for the U.S. equipment. This year, as once again Turkey seeks to purchase U.S.- manufactured helicopters, Prime Minister Yilmaz and members of the Turkish military have promised President Clinton and senior administration officials concrete human rights improvements in exchange for marketing licenses. It remains to be seen, of course, whether Turkey will live up to its commitments and get the U.S. equipment.
We particularly urge the use of "smart sanctions" which narrowly target decision-makers, and which do not permit them to shift the burden to the general population. These includefreezing the assets of abusive leaders or governments and denying visas and residency permits to such officials. Another "smart" targeted sanction is active support for the criminal prosecution of abusive officials. An example of this tool in action was the announcement this March of the chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that she would commence an investigation into killings by Serbian forces in Kosovo, and the U.S. government's quick provision of $1 million to support this effort—steps that directly imperiled Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Unfortunately, while the U.S. government has been a strong supporter of the two international tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, it opposed the creation of an effective International Criminal Court to prosecute those responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity wherever their crimes occur. Another targeted sanction is the restriction on trade benefits that are most likely to benefit an abusive ruling elite, such as sanctions against an industry that is dominated by an abusive central government or from which the government derives substantial resources.
When these targeted sanctions are not sufficient, we support certain restrictions on economic assistance to systematically abusive regimes. Again, some such sanctions, such as the cutoff of assistance to governments that systematically commit gross abuses of human rights, unless that assistance will directly benefit needy people, is mandated by section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act. A concrete example of this type of sanction is conditionality on U.S. aid to Bosnia which denies benefits to those who shelter indicted war criminals and has contributed to substantial pressure on local authorities to cooperate in the surrender of war crimes suspects. Similarly, a cutoff in all bilateral and multilateral assistance to the government in the wake of the coup in Cambodia last July was used to express severe U.S. disapproval of the coup and the accompanying murder of civilian opponents of the coup government. In the early 1990s, the threat of aid suspension led Presidents Moi of Kenya and Banda of Malawi reluctantly to free prisoners and hold multi-party elections. A related sanction is the denial of World Bank loans to systematically abusive governments—another tool for denying these governments the means to maintain their machinery of repression. Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act requires a negative vote by the U.S. executive director to the World Bank in such cases. International financial institutions are, of course, an ideal forum in which to rally multilateral support for sanctions.
When we seek restrictions on economic assistance to abusive governments, we always encourage the delivery of aid, particularly aid aimed at meeting basic human needs or promoting economic development in the most impoverished sectors of society, to be channeled through nongovernmental organizations. For example, while we called for restrictions on bilateral and multilateral assistance to the central government of the Democratic Republic of Congo because of its continuing suppression of political activity and lack of cooperation with the United Nations investigation into the slaughter of thousands of Rwandan refugees in Congo in 1997, we urged the international community to reinforce the flow of aid to the Congolese people through organizations of Congolese civil society, international NGOs, and United Nations agencies. Last summer, the U.S. government successfully used this strategy to funnel aid to the Cambodian people after cutting off assistance to the government.
Sanctions consistent with human rights. We oppose sanctions that themselves violate norms of international human rights or humanitarian law. Therefore, we oppose restrictions of aid or trade that is essential to meet basic human needs for food, shelter, clothing, sanitation or medical care, particularly when such measures would violate fundamental economic rights or prohibitions against the use of starvation and related deprivation as a method of warfare. As President Clinton recently reiterated, "food should not be used as a weapon to influence other nations." Generalized sanctions are a notoriously blunt instrument susceptible of causing severe adverse humanitarian consequences. If they are ever imposed, their implementation must be carefully monitored for these consequences and provisions must always be made to meet the basic needs of the civilian population, as is being attempted in the case of the "oil-for-food" sales in Iraq.
We also oppose sanctions that would restrict the provision of aid, sales or exchanges for the purpose of disseminating information and ideas. Nor do we in general favor sanctions that would, in violation of international norms, restrict the right of ordinary citizens to travel or to speak to or to have contact with citizens of any other country. We do, however, support restrictions on visas for military or civilian officials of abusive regimes, because of the implicit legitimization of their conduct that would be conferred by receiving them outside their country. Such measures have been an effective means of censuring conduct in Nigeria, Liberia, Burma and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo).
Sanctions tied to clear benchmarks. We have found that sanctions that are tied to clearly defined benchmarks are most effective. The sanctions should be inspired by principle, not political expedience, and this should be reflected in benchmarks rooted in international norms and standards, which, if reached, would trigger a lifting of sanctions. The often-cited example of such graduated sanctions was the Reagan Administration's response to martial law in Poland; tough sanctions were gradually lifted in return for various positive steps by the Polish government, from the release of political prisoners to the formal lifting of martial law. In 1991, Congress put a temporary hold on $95 million in aid to Peru on human rights grounds and within a month disappearances dropped dramatically. This year, the benchmarked conditions placed by the World Bank Consultative Group, with the tacit support of the South African Development Community, on aid to Zambia is credited with improvements there including the release of Kenneth Kaunda, the establishment of a national human rights commission, and greater freedoms for political parties and the media.
By contrast, we have objected to the form of sanctions currently imposed on Cuba because they reflect an all-or-nothing approach, with no promise of loosening until the government changes, rather than rewarding concrete steps toward democratization and respect for human rights. In the case of Burma, we have linked our opposition to private foreign investment to a specific human rights abuse: the egregious use of forced labor by Burma's military government on a wide scale, including for infrastructure development and to attract tourism and investment. We do not believe that U.S. or other foreign companies should directly or indirectly contribute to or benefit from forced labor.
When thus tied to clear, realistic, and principled criteria, sanctions serve as a carrot as well as a stick and are more likely to achieve the desired results. For this approach to work, all institutions and agencies of the U.S. and other sanctioning governments must consistently press for implementation of the stated conditions for removal of sanctions. Mixed signals or waffling greatly dilute the effectiveness of sanctions.
Multilateral versus unilateral sanctions. We prefer the use of multilateral sanctions because they are more effective and have greater international legitimacy. Frankly, however, the problem with some U.S. sanctions is not so much that they are imposed unilaterally, but rather that they are imposed in situations and in ways which are actively rejected by the rest of the international community. At the same time, when a multilateral effort is not possible, unilateral sanctions can be useful to stigmatize a government's abusive actions, as leverage to induce change, or to avoid U.S. complicity in abuses. As an example, we support unilateral sanctions imposed on Sudan, including the recent trade ban. Because U.S. trade with Sudan was limited, the trade sanctions have had little impact on the Sudanese population, but, at the same time, they have sent a clear message to a government that, despite its rhetoric, values its ties with the U.S. At times, even a small symbolic message, or the mere credible threat of unilateral sanctions, can be a source of meaningful leverage when the U.S. is a key financial or political supporter of a government. In the 1980's, the threat of the withdrawal of U.S. aid to El Salvador, for example, was often brandished to produce specific positive actions by the government. In 1993, in response to a petition filed by Human Rights Watch, the U.S. Trade Representative (U.S.T.R.) called on Indonesia to improve its labor rights policies or face a cut-off of tariff benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences. In January 1994, the Indonesian government responded by announcing some limited legal reforms that included revoking a decree that allowed military intervention in labor disputes; allowing workers to negotiate collective bargaining agreements at the workplace level; and restructuring the single government-recognized union. Unfortunately, the U.S.T.R. then prematurely suspended its review of Indonesian labor practices, and, with the pressure off, the promised reforms were not fully implemented and the government stopped short of making greater progress on the key issue of freedom of association.
The threat or imposition of unilateral U.S. sanctions can also induce other countries to follow with sanctions or other diplomatic and economic forms of pressure, leading to an ad hoc multilateral effort. Burma is one such case.
III. Enhancement of Trade, Security, and Human Rights through Sanctions Reform Act
With these comments in mind, I would like to turn to the Enhancement of Trade, Security, and Human Rights through Sanctions Reform Act (S.1413) introduced by Senator Lugar and others, as recently amended by its sponsors. The Lugar bill would create a procedural nightmare for the imposition of new unilateral economic sanctions, and require that the sanctions terminate two years after they are imposed, unless they are specifically reauthorized. The Senate narrowly tabled this measure when it was offered as an amendment to the agriculture appropriations bill for fiscal 1999, but its sponsors have announced their intention to re-introduce it.
The bill excludes from its definition of affected sanctions restrictions imposed on U.S. bilateral military assistance and on exports of military equipment. This is important because, as I have noted, such restrictions often represent the most effective means of penalizing abusive regimes and depriving them of the weapons and means to sustain their machinery of repression, without causing substantial hardship to the general population of the targeted government. Congress and the executive must remain free to wield these important foreign policy tools without the kind of procedural red-tape envisioned by the law. We would strongly oppose any amendment to the bill that would widen its scope to apply to such sanctions.
The proposed law would apply to "unilateral economic sanctions," defined to include not only restrictions on trade and trade benefits but also conditions on economic assistance as well as any requirement that the U.S. government exercise its vote in international financial institutions against multilateral assistance to the targeted country.
We are in agreement with certain provisions of the bill: the principle that sanctions should be targeted "as narrowly as possible on foreign governments, entities, and officials that are responsible for the conduct being targeted"; the bar on restrictions on the provision of medicine, medical equipment or food; and the requirement that any adverse impact on U.S. and foreign humanitarian aid be minimized. We believe, however, that the key elements of the bill would unduly restrict Congressional and executive discretion required to impose effective unilateral sanctions when necessary.
The bill creates an artificial distinction between trade and other U.S. interests. The bill excludes sanctions imposed to enforce U.S. trade rights, as if it were more important to stop the theft of intellectual property or expropriation than it is to halt mass murder or other atrocities. Indeed, the bill divides sanctions into two categories: those that serve U.S. commercial interests, which have priority, and those that serve all other goals, which are seen as ancillary to and at odds with U.S. commercial interests. In fact, the picture is much more complicated. Human rights and business interests often coincide. Unilateral sanctions imposed for human rights and many other purposes often promise not only to stigmatize and curb abusive behavior, but also to establish a level regulatory playing field and a stable investment climate in the targeted country, both of which further U.S. interests. And in many cases in which human rights concerns and business interests really do appear to conflict, experience teaches us that the human rights concerns ought to loom larger as a factor of long-term U.S. foreign policy.
To illustrate, one need look no further than Iraq. This year marks the tenth anniversary of Saddam Hussein's chemical attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja. Members of Congress reacted to that attack with proposed unilateral sanctions to halt agricultural credits to Iraq, but the measure died on the floor after the Reagan Administration called it "terribly premature." The signal to Saddam was catastrophic. The genocide against the Kurds of northern Iraq did not stop until some 100,000 people were slaughtered and chemical weapons were used at least 40 times. Ten years and a war later, Iraq's chemical arsenal remains the top item on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, and there is no hope of economic trade or investment with Iraq in the foreseeable future.
The United States' approach to unilateral sanctions ought to be consistent, with all U.S. foreign policy interests weighed in considering the utility of any sanctions. The bill's procedural restrictions are no more appropriate for human rights-related sanctions than they would be for trade-related sanctions. In both cases, Congress and the executive need the flexibility to act effectively through sanctions when needed.
The bill inappropriately ties the hands of the U.S. government in conveying conditional trade benefits. There are times when U.S. interests are better served by a conditional rather than an overt grant of trade benefits. But the bill, by adding procedural complexities to the enforcement of these conditions, seems to favor an all-or-nothing approach. That would unduly restrict the policy options available to the United States. For example, trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences and risk insurance offered by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) are conditioned on respect for labor rights in the country in question. These statutory schemes reflect the sensible view that international trade and investment should be encouraged only on a level playing field of basic respect for labor rights.
The defeat this spring of the Clinton Administration's request for "fast-track authority" to negotiate free-trade agreements highlights the cost of pursuing trade and investment without a parallel effort to create a level playing field by ensuring trading partners' respect for basic labor rights. The defeat shows that a significant cross-section of Americans fears a "race to the bottom" if labor rights guarantees are not made an integral part of free trade. Unfortunately, S. 1413 would work in the opposite direction, by making it more difficult to enforce conditions on trade benefits that require respect for labor rights.
Forty-five day delay.The law provides that before imposing sanctions, the President must announce his intention to do so and then wait 45 days (down from 60 in the original version) before implementation. The 45-day delay could be waived in cases of national emergency, defined narrowly as "any unusual or extraordinary threat . . . to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States." In the case of Congressional action, the bill would require reports by the President and the Secretary of Agriculture, which would also likely entail considerable delay. These procedural requirements are intended to provide time for consultation and analysis of the effects of the proposed measure and to pursue alternative measures.
As I mentioned earlier in discussing the threatened sanctions on Indonesia, such delays can in some cases be effective in allowing the targeted government a chance to respond to a credible threat of sanctions. The administration may wisely choose to use this strategy in some cases, but requiring it to do so in all cases would significantly impede swift executive action in the face of serious human rights abuses. Such a delay might have precluded, for example, the decisive U.S. action to retract some minor but symbolic concessions to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over its abuses in Kosovo. By imposing these sanctions quickly, the U.S. sent a clear message to Belgrade and the international community that such abuses would not be tolerated. Another good example of the importance of prompt unilateral sanctions came in 1993 when then-Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano Elías shut down the Congress, Supreme Court and Attorney General's office and suspended constitutional rights. The Clinton Administration succeeded in reversing this coup by immediately cutting off aid and threatening Serrano with a suspension of trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences and U.S. opposition to loans by international financial institutions.
The 1990 study of the Institute of International Economics -- often cited by opponents of unilateral sanctions -- concluded that sanctions are most effective when imposed quickly and decisively. This legislation purports to promote the more effective use of sanctions, but the provisions delaying action may in some cases have the opposite effect.
Contract sanctity over the sanctity of human life. S. 1413 provides that unilateral economic sanctions, whether imposed by legislation or executive action, must preserve "contract sanctity," meaning that the sanctions may not impede performance under contracts entered into prior to the imposition of the sanctions. In the case of sanctions imposed by executive action, the President could waive the "contract sanctity" requirements only in limited circumstances. The notion of contract sanctity seriously undercuts the strength of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. For example, notwithstanding a European Union arms embargo imposed on Nigeria in the wake of the 1995 execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists, several European governments continued to allow military equipment to be shipped to Nigeria in fulfilment of pre-existing contracts, because the embargo did not apply to arms transfers under contracts agreed to before the embargo came into effect. Contract sanctity may be important to the reputation of U.S. business as reliable trade and investment partners. But the proposed legislation would, perversely, allow this business interest in contract sanctity to override the moral interest in the sanctity of human life.
Confusing restrictions on aid with limitations on trade. The bill displays similarly misplaced priorities when it proposes to limit not only trade-related sanctions but also restrictions on economic aid. The apparent reason for this rewriting of long-established U.S. law curtailing economic aid to abusive governments is that an aid cutoff could lead to retaliation against U.S. businesses or affect the "atmosphere" in which commerce is conducted. Be that as it may, we believe it is wrong to continue to pump U.S. government funds into the coffers of regimes that commit systematic abuses like summary executions, torture and prolonged arbitrary imprisonment. Existing U.S. law requiring the cessation of most U.S. aid in such circumstances is designed to avoid making the United States complicitious in the most severe forms of human rights abuse through the funding of an abusive regime's machinery of repression. We would object to any compromise of this principle. It would be a disgrace to bloody the hands of the American people in the name of not sullying the atmosphere for commerce with the world's worst tyrants.
Insufficient consideration of the human rights impact of sanctions policies. The law would require considerable analysis and reporting by the President, the Secretary of Agriculture and the U.S. International Trade Commission. These reports must analyze the extent to which proposed sanctions would achieve their stated foreign policy goals. The legislation emphasizes, however, reporting on any detrimental impact that the proposed sanctions will have on U.S. commercial interests. We support efforts to develop targeted, effective sanctions policy, but to do so, all relevant interests must be weighed appropriately. If this kind of analysis of sanctions is to be required—and, as noted, we object to it as a precondition to the imposition of sanctions for reasons of timeliness—it should include a report of the Secretary of State addressing such matters as: (1) the likely impact on the U.S. government's commitment to uphold human rights; (2) the extent to which sanctions are required by U.S. human rights law; (3) the extent to which failure to impose sanctions would make the United States complicit in human rights abuses, such as by providing direct or indirect benefits to an abusive regime; (4) the extent to which human rights abuses targeted by the proposed sanctions are related to corruption that also preys on business interests; (5) the extent to which human rights abuses contribute to an unstable investment climate in the targeted country; and (6) the extent to which the enforcement of sanctions is integral to the legislative scheme that originally conferred the benefits being revoked. Only with the addition of such analysis could we hope that the legislation would produce the well-informed policy-making that is its stated purpose.
Impact on efforts in multilateral fora. The legislation includes among unilateral economic sanctions subject to its procedural requirements and other limitations any requirement that the U.S. representative to an international financial institution vote against loans or assistance to a targeted government. This provision belies the sponsors' stated preference for utilizing multilateral sanctions in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives and suggests that the real preference is for no economic sanctions at all.
Under Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act, U.S. representatives to international financial institutions are instructed to oppose assistance to countries whose governments engage in a pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. Such action by U.S. representatives often sends an important symbolic message to abusive regimes, sometimes mobilizes effective multilateral action, and is a first step toward ensuring that American tax dollars are not used to finance a repressive regime.
To illustrate the impact of the proposed legislation, the bill's procedural requirements would apply to provisions such as language included in the 1998 appropriations act that directs the U.S. to vote against multilateral assistance to communities in Bosnia and Hercegovina that have failed to turn over indicted war criminals. Thanks to this provision, in December, the U.S., under considerable pressure from non-governmental organizations including Human Rights Watch, persuaded the World Bank to remove a town known to be harboring seven indicted war criminals from the list of those slated to receive aid. This is precisely the type of effective leadership that the U.S. ought to be taking in multilateral fora. Anything in this legislation that would curtail such efforts should be abandoned.
The sunset clause - Finally, the bill's sunset clause would require that the sanctions terminate two years after they are imposed, unless they are specifically reauthorized. We believe that the lifting of sanctions should be tied to concrete improvements in the conditions for which the measures were imposed. The effect of tying the lifting of sanctions instead to an arbitrary date will be to let tyrants know how long they must wait before sanctions will be removed, and thereby diminish the effectiveness of the measures.
IV. Sanctions Rationalization Act
I would also like to comment briefly on the Sanctions Rationalization Act pas de deux of President and Congress, by a combination of promise and threat, United States human rights policy has achieved a spectrum of influence on the condition on human rights around the world."
[Henkin, The Age of Rights, 1990] This bill would upset that combination and we would oppose it.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me reiterate that we support efforts to develop sanctions policies that are targeted and effective. We urge an approach that will foster balanced consideration of U.S. interests affected by sanctions policies and that will leave Congress and the executive sufficient discretion to impose effective unilateral sanctions when necessary.
For further information, contact:
Ken Roth, NYC, 212-216-1201
Carroll Bogert, NYC, 212-216-1244