January 2004
While Russia has been praised internationally for its improving economy, the government has steadily undermined political pluralism and respect for human rights. While the leadership has paid lip service to the importance of individual liberties and democratic reforms, it increasingly has repressed independent media and selectively prosecuted would-be political opponents and others who address politically sensitive subjects. It also has continued its brutal policies in Chechnya. The recent erosion of some of the most important human rights achievements of the post-Soviet era raises serious concerns that Russia’s new “managed democracy” will increasingly be at odds with international rights standards and the rule of law.
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- Political Opposition
- Press Freedom and Access to Information
- Prosecution of “Whistle-Blowers”
- Chechnya
- Criminal Justice
- Key International Actors
Political Opposition
The December 2003 landslide victory of the pro-Kremlin United Russia party in the parliamentary elections delivered Putin an utterly compliant legislature that is unlikely to serve as a needed check on executive authority. The resounding defeat of the opposition and the new alignment of forces in the parliament have jeopardized the future of Russia’s civil society and human rights movement: none of the parliamentarians known for their support of human rights were reelected and the carefully built system of cooperation between non-governmental organizations and Duma deputies has vanished. Civil society now lacks this important avenue of access to the political system.
Another force with the potential to challenge the Kremlin was Russia’s business elite. Putin appears to have succeeded in his determined effort to stop Russia’s business “oligarchs” from using their wealth to mount any serious challenges to the leadership. In 2000 and 2001 the government launched selective prosecutions against Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky—two “oligarchshs” who also owned television stations—driving them into exile.
In July 2003, the Russian procuracy began investigating Yukos, Russia’s largest oil company, and soon thereafter began issuing warrants for the arrest of the company’s leading executives and shareholders, including its chief, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, on charges of tax evasion, fraud, forgery, and embezzlement. Khodorkovsky is still in detention at this writing. In what many believed was more than coincidence, the arrest came shortly after Khodorkovsky had announced his political ambitions. It was widely interpreted as a demonstration of the Kremlin’s power and a message to other Russian businessmen who may have been thinking of using their wealth to attain political influence.
Press Freedom and Access to Information
The independent media, particularly television, also fell victim to the Kremlin’s drive for control. In June Russia’s Press Ministry shut down Russia’s last independent national television station, TVS, and replaced it with a sports station. TVS was known for being critical of the government. Its closure culminated of a series of network closures and takeovers since 2001.
In August, the All Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion, a polling agency renowned for its break-though independent surveying in post-Soviet Russia, was taken over by the state. The head of the agency, sociologist Yuri Levada, and many of his colleagues have been forced to resign. These developments have further limited the public’s access to diverse and critical information sources.
Prosecution of “Whistle-Blowers”
Just as the Kremlin has sought to reestablish control over politics and strategic state economic interests, the Federal Security Service (formerly the KGB) has sought to reestablish control over sensitive areas it considers to be its exclusive domain. Over the past eight years, it has prosecuted about a dozen journalists, scientists, and environmentalists—who work on issues such as nuclear waste dumping, environmental degradation, and military technology—on dubious treason charges, a phenomenon described as “Spymania.” Several were given prison sentences ranging up to five years. Though some of these cases continue to wend their way through the courts, no new charges have come to light in the past three years. On December 29, 2003, a jury acquitted Dr. Valentin Danilov of espionage charges; the prosecutor’s office said it would appeal. Another scientist, Igor Sutyagin, continued his legal battle with the FSB. October 27, 2003 marked the fourth anniversary of Sutyagin’s pre-trial detention. His trial date still had not been set at this writing.
Chechnya
Government control over information has allowed the authorities to misrepresent the situation in Chechnya. Official statements that the conflict is subsiding are starkly at odds with the brutality that continues to leave thousands of Chechens displaced from their homes. The government painted the March 2003 referendum on Chechnya’s status and the October 2003 election for president of the republic as evidence that a political solution had been found to the conflict. Both votes, though, were seriously flawed. Poor security conditions made free and fair votes impossible. The inconceivably high turnout in October contrasted sharply with eyewitness accounts of deserted polling stations. The withdrawal of all major competitors of the Kremlin-favored presidential candidate, Akhmad Kadyrov, from the race shortly before the elections and the unprecedented government support for Kadyrov made both local and international observers question the legitimacy of his victory. Lord Judd, the Council of Europe’s rapporteur on Chechnya, resigned in protest over the elections.
The October election coincided with a government push to return approximately 80,000 Chechen internally displaced persons living in neighboring Ingushetia, despite ongoing conflict and devastated infrastructure in the war-torn republic. Tent camps still housing several thousand displaced persons in Ingushetia were also reportedly set to close by March 1, 2004. Ministry of Internal Affairs officials destroyed several tent camps in Ingushetia, turned off water and electricity supplies, and threatened the population with a combination of violence, arrests, threats and promises in order to force them across the border. Since summer 2003, federal and pro-Moscow Chechen forces have conducted a number of abusive search-and- seizure operations in Ingush villages and displaced persons settlements. They appeared to indicate the spreading of the conflict from Chechnya into Ingushetia.
Criminal Justice
Russian authorities have been citing the success of criminal justice reforms as one of the major achievements of the past year. However, the implementation of Russia’s new criminal procedure code, which went into effect on July 1, 2002, has been slow in many respects. Despite new code provisions aimed at preventing torture of detainees, for example, local human rights groups have reported that police torture remains rampant in pre-trial detention all over Russia. And while new provisions requiring judicial warrants for arrests are believed at least in part responsible for a significant decrease in the total number of arrests, members of ethnic minorities continue to be disproportionately targeted for identity checks and to face arbitrary detention and deprivation of procedural rights.
Key International Actors
In 2003, political leaders in Europe and the United States consistently praised Russian’s improving economy and expressed their eagerness to strengthen economic and political ties. Key actors preferred to ignore Russia’s clear backsliding on democracy and the country’s steadily worsening human rights record.
By attending a luxuriant party thrown by President Putin to celebrate the 300th anniversary of the founding of St. Petersburg in May, major world leaders gave the Russian president a grand endorsement in advance of elections without seeking any concessions in exchange. Statements emanating from the summits that coincided with the celebration extolled cooperation and strategic partnership, and contained no reference to Russia’s poor human rights performance.
The Russian government’s attacks on certain Russian business figures caused some anxiety in the West, but world leaders never challenged the government about them. European leaders allegedly planned to discuss the Yukos case and the future of Russian democracy at the November 2003 E.U.-Russia summit. Instead, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who then held the rotating E.U. presidency, provided an unprecedented and lively defense of the Russian president, dismissing international criticism over Chechnya and the arrest of Khodorkovsky as "myths" and distortions. While other E.U. officials have distanced themselves from Berlusconi’s remarks, the summit ended with E.U. leaders supporting Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization by the end of 2004.
Leading international organizations and many governments continued to be shamelessly disengaged on the Chechnya issue. Although Russia has blatantly disregarded recommendations advanced previously by key international institutions and used all possible means to close Chechnya from international scrutiny, leading international players chose not to pressure the Russian government to end the abuses or ensure accountability.
