Testimony of Human Rights Watch to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on the human rights situation of Uighurs in the People's Republic of China (PRC), prepared by senior researcher Mickey Spiegel and delivered by Asia division advocacy director Veena Siddharth.
Today, some 60 percent of Xinjiang’s population is of Central Asian origin––as against 94 percent in 1949; of those, 8 out of 9 are Turkic-speaking Uighurs. Almost all Uighurs are Muslims. Had it not been for a major government initiative begun in the early 1990s to foster ethnic Chinese migration into Xinjiang through economic and land ownership incentives, the percentage of Muslims and particularly Uighurs would have been considerably higher. Statistics indicate that despite overall economic growth in the region, ethnic Chinese have tended to be the major beneficiaries.
Anecdotal and sometimes conflicting reports of specific instances of human rights abuses against Uighurs in Xinjiang have circulated for years, increasing in frequency and complexity after Uighurs mounted a major protest against the central government in the city of Baren in 1990. In the wake of that protest, the government initiated a series of policies aimed at tightening control over the region
The collection of Chinese government documents in Devastating Blows, some of which were revealed there for the first time, makes clear that the abuses were not random local cadre excesses. Rather, they were part of a systematic and sustained attack, centrally controlled by the Chinese government and Chinese Communist Party, on an ethno-nationalist group perceived as a threat to the stability and cohesiveness of the Chinese state. China’s leaders perceived Islam, its belief structure and its societal arrangements, as central to Uighur identity. That is why, in its effort to undermine Uighur cohesiveness and to force loyalty to the State, the government chose to crack down on religious expression.
Some Uighurs campaign for real autonomy, that is for regional and local policies that would truly give Uighurs a say in the economic, social, and religious policies that affect their livelihoods and the preservation of their culture, language, and religion. Granted, there are Uighurs who campaign for an independent state. And a few Uighurs over the years––and even Chinese authorities acknowledge that “few” is the appropriate adjective––have resorted to violence to pursue this end. In 1997, three simultaneous bus bombings in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital, killed nine civilians and seriously wounded many more. And there have been attacks on political leaders, prisons officials, police stations, and military installations. But the Chinese government has refused to differentiate violent so-called separatist tendencies from non-violent acts and even artistic expressions of nationalist longings. Authorities have even gone a step further, equating separatist sentiment not simply with harming national unity, but with ties to international terrorism.
As part of their approach, officials crafted an intensive and thorough-going program to reeducate imams (religious leaders) so that their first loyalties would be to the state; vetted all religious literature, past and present, even going so far as to mandate what version of the Koran could be used; razed mosques on the grounds that the number exceeded the need; initiated a rectification drive to cleanse Party ranks of Uighurs unwilling to wholeheartedly abide by all religious directives, and initiated campaign after campaign to sentence, both judicially and administratively, young Uighur men who joined “illegal” organizations, distributed “illegal” religious material, or who simply thought “reactionary” religious thoughts.
Many of the restrictions are articulated in the “Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Regulations on the Management of Religious Affairs (2001).” Among the most telling sections are those which insist that those involved in religion, as believers, clergy, or “organizations” “must support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system, love their country and abide by its laws, safeguard the unification of the motherland and national solidarity, and oppose national splittism and illegal religious activities,” as well as “accept the supervision of the religious affairs bureaus of the people's government,” and “educate citizen believers in patriotism, law-abiding and living in harmony.” In addition, the regulations prohibit “mass religious activity which spans different localities.”
Additional documents detail “Party Disciplinary Actions Against Communist Party Members and Party Organizations Involved in Violations of Political Discipline in the Struggle Opposing National Separatism and Safeguarding the Unification of the Motherland,” the “Specific Scope of State Secrets in Religious and Ethnic Affairs,” and excerpts from a “Manual for Urumqi Municipality Ethnic Religious Work” which answers such questions as: “What are the four fundamental principles and guiding principles on religious work set forth by Comrade Jiang Zemin?”, “What qualifications must religious personnel possess?”, and “What are illegal religious activities?”.
Interviews with Uighurs in Xinjiang and elsewhere provide evidence of the way such policy initiatives played out on the ground. At one extreme there are the stories of campaigns and sweeps designed to sidestep judicial protections. Despite their billing as anti-crime initiatives, key targets included separatist and religious extremists. Such campaigns were characterized by hundreds of arrests, swift judicial processing, minimal procedural protections, and mass sentencing rallies. Claims of torture surfaced repeatedly.
But interviewees were also quick to explain examples of the kinds of intermittent harassment directed at daily activities that helped cement Uighur identity. Uighurs whose personal appearance suggested religious devotion––a man sporting a beard or a woman covering her head––found employment opportunities closed off. School authorities looked askance at children who celebrated religious holidays or fasted during Ramadan. At times they were threatened with expulsion. Security personnel broke up meetings of young men who joined together to discuss common everyday problems.
I turn now to two of the most ubiquitous and thorough-going campaigns, the one directed at reforming the thought of imams; the other directed at expunging religion from students’ experience. Both campaigns take into account the government’s appreciation that realization of an atheist state, the Communist ideal, will be a long, slow process. Imams command respect; their opinions carry weight. Should they be “persuaded” to toe the government line, or as is more likely, should those who are unreliable be banned from leadership roles, the job of converting rank and file Muslims to the government view is made easier. As for children, the point of the campaign is to disallow family influences that might strengthen weaken adherence to religious beliefs at odds with official views.
Religious training for imams, led by Party and government officials, began in earnest in 2001 with some 8,000 imams obliged to take part. In addition to speeches and written and oral examination on the content of regulations and Party policies, those in attendance were required to participate in “exchange of experience” sessions which closely resembled the “criticism/self-criticism” sessions prevalent in the Maoist era. Imams had to confess their errors of commission and omission and to examine their “incorrect” ideas, and they had to point out similar errors on the part of their colleagues. As Devastating Blows explains:
These sessions are purposely designed as loyalty tests. If clerics do not offer precise accounts, they are viewed as being insincere about opposing separatism. But if they admit mistakes, they are considered guilty of violating regulations. This serves to put continuous pressure on the clerics. The imam’s “attitude” is monitored by instructors during the training. Final evaluations are recorded in the imam’s personal file, which is kept by the religious affairs bureaus.
Directives aimed at students targeted both youngsters under 18 and college age students. The former were forbidden from obtaining a religious education. The latter were targeted in a 2001- 2002 “clean-up” campaign. Books disappeared from libraries, teachers and students and teachers were monitored for compliance with the Party line, and authorities threatened college-age students with expulsions should they follow the core requirements of Islam, for example, perform the required five daily prayers, read the Koran, or fast during Ramadan. Teachers at some locales were made responsible for their students’ compliance with the new directives. In addition, on-going surveillance, random searches, and encouragement to report suspect activities and discourse increased, students increasingly refrained from talking about religion or expressing unacceptable political opinions.
In light of the above summary of human rights abuses in Xinjiang, particularly as they pertain to religious freedom, Human Rights Watch urges that:
- Senior Chinese government and Party officials explicitly affirm that the independent practice of religion, peaceful dissent, and advocacy for Uighur autonomy do not constitute criminal acts.
- Religion in Xinjiang, and the practice of Islam in particular, should not be subject to government interference or approval.
- The right of children and young adults to worship, obtain religious education, and express their religion, including through dress, should be respected. The right of parents and legal guardians to provide religious education to their children likewise should be respected.
- The unjustified detention, maltreatment, and torture of Uighur religious prisoners should halt immediately, and all those imprisoned for their peaceful religious practices or religious beliefs should be freed.
- No country should cooperate in the return to China of Uighurs, including those accused of terrorist acts or other crimes, so long as they are likely to be at risk of being tortured upon return.
- The United States should not, for political convenience, acquiesce in any future demands from China to place organizations on lists of terrorist organizations without sufficient evidence.
