The attached fact sheet describes government harassment of human rights defenders during the meeting and intimidation of those who used that forum to speak out against abuse. We also describe more general setbacks in human rights since the meeting ended. These developments indicate that the Bank’s engagement with Uzbekistan has not served its intended purpose of providing an incentive for progress. They also underscore the importance of serious and sustained follow-up. Below are some thoughts on what we see as important components of an effective follow-up process.
Protection for human rights defenders: Human Rights Watch welcomes the fact that so many nongovernmental groups were able to take part in the meeting. We believe it was a valuable experience for human rights defenders, particularly those from the region, to witness first-hand the significant attention to human rights and criticism directed at the Uzbek government for its appalling record. However, we remain concerned about a number of incidents of intimidation and harassment targeting many of our local NGO colleagues who participated in the meeting, or organized peaceful protests in conjunction with it. By choosing to hold its meeting in Tashkent and providing a forum for open discussion of human rights, the Bank assumed an important long-term obligation to monitor the human rights situation in the country, and should intervene on behalf of those facing reprisals for speaking their minds at the meeting.
Operationalized benchmarks: The Bank’s country strategy for Uzbekistan identified three broad human rights benchmarks: (1) greater political openness and freedom of the media; (2) registration and free functioning of independent civil society groups; and (3) improvements in the country’s human rights record, including through implementation of the recommendations issued by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture. We welcome these benchmarks, which make clear that the Bank expects reforms in exchange for continued engagement. We believe that to maximize the utility of these benchmarks, it would be useful for the Bank to operationalize them by articulating the specific steps the Uzbek government would need to take in each area in order to be considered in compliance with the respective goals. For example, with regard to the second benchmark, we have suggested that the Bank request the Uzbek government to officially register all Uzbek NGOs registered to participate in the annual meeting. Other suggestions with respect to each of the three benchmarks follow:
With respect to benchmark 1:
- Investigate attacks on journalists and bring to justice those found responsible;
- Reopen papers closed since Spring 2002, when censorship was officially lifted;
- End the practice of summoning newspaper editors to the office of the presidential administration to tell them what articles they should allow to be printed in their newspapers;
- Register opposition political parties;
- Open internet access to websites run by political opposition parties and movements.
With respect to benchmark 2:
- Release imprisoned human rights defenders Ruslan Sharipov, Jura Muradov, Musulmankul Khamraev, Norpulat Rajapov, and Tursunbai Utamuratov, pending an impartial review of the charges against them;
- End legal proceedings against Elena Urlaeva;
- End harassment and arbitrary arrest of human rights defenders;
- Issue an invitation to the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights defenders to visit the country, as requested by that office, as well as to other relevant U.N. human rights mechanisms.
With respect to benchmark 3:
- Introduce judicial review of detention (habeas corpus);
- Conduct thorough and impartial investigations of claims of torture or ill-treatment, with particular attention to cases that resulted in death, and hold accountable the perpetrators. Investigations should conform to international standards;
- Adopt measures to ensure in practice absolute respect for the principle of inadmissibility of evidence obtained through torture.
Active Bank engagement: The Bank’s intent to rely on such institutions as the OSCE, the U.N., Tashkent-based embassies, and civil society organizations for information about human rights developments prior to its March 2004 review will avail it of reliable information. This will also strengthen the standing of these institutions’ human rights mechanisms in Uzbekistan. But to make this exercise effective, the Bank should take the lead in establishing a process for input in which these institutions provide sustained monitoring. To this end, the Bank should make clear what information it will need and indicate a timetable. The Bank’s close consultation with NGOs, in particular those based in the country, is an important component of this process. We are eager to learn what your plans are for such consultation, and to discuss ideas for how to best make it work.
Multiple visits: One of the best ways to maintain the momentum for reform is for the Bank to conduct regular visits to the country. It should consider a series of high-level visits in the course of the summer and fall to assess progress in meeting the benchmarks. This would sustain the pressure on the Uzbek authorities and facilitate regular communication with the local NGO community, also lending it support and protection.
Public assessments of progress: Periodic public assessments of Uzbekistan’s progress would also help sustain the momentum for reform prior to the March 2004 evaluation. Such assessments could take a variety of formats, ranging from press releases or interviews with the media to more formal communications.
The Bank’s engagement this year with Uzbekistan also has broader implications for its operations in the region. We hope to see the Bank develop benchmarks relevant to its political mandate with regard to other countries of operation. We are convinced that the Bank’s engagement could be significantly enhanced by using benchmarks as a standard method for measuring progress and linking the level of involvement directly to progress in meeting them.
Secondly, we firmly believe that the Bank could do more to promote the direct relationship between political and economic reform. We are pleased to note that the last twelve months have seen the Bank take its political mandate more seriously than it had previously. But much more could be done to maximize the Bank’s potential to help advance democratic principles as part of its engagement with the various countries of operation. It could, for example, devote a session of next year’s Board of Governors’ meeting to a discussion of the Bank’s Article 1 mandate – as it is ultimately the shareholders who will need to be convinced of the benefits of such an approach in order to make it work in practice. We would be pleased to contribute to such a discussion, and look forward to continuing our overall dialogue with you on these issues.
With best wishes,
Elizabeth Andersen
Executive Director
