With great fanfare, the United Nations Security Council, in February 1993, called for the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of war crimes in the Balkan conflict.1 The Security Council then waited three months before approving a tribunal.2 Now, nearly eight months after the U.N.'s original announcement, a tribunal has not yet come into being.3

Not a single case file has been created. Not a single defendant has been named. Meanwhile, evidence of war crimes disappears daily and witnesses and survivors scatter across the globe. Unless the international community acts now, any elaborate legal machinery developed to try war crimes will fail; the evidence needed to utilize that machinery will be nowhere to be found.

The Security Council has yet to appoint the promised prosecutor, investigative staff and judges. The U.N. has never even made clear that amnesty for those who have planned, ordered or carried out war crimes in the former Yugoslavia will never be put on the bargaining table --- a crucial step to ensure that the tribunal means anything. In light of the U.N.'s failure of will to enforce other pronouncements on the former Yugoslavia, the lack of such a clear declaration deprives the tribunal of much of its deterrent effect. And, while a U.N. Commission of Experts has been struggling since last fall to record war crimes data, it has been handicapped by a lack of financial and technical resources. Unless the U.N. supports the Commission's work, its efforts will be destined to remain an academic exercise as well.

In this document, Helsinki Watch, a division of Human Rights Watch, presents summaries of eight cases that, with immediate investigation, will be strong candidates for prosecution. Helsinki Watch identifies 29 possible defendants by name, links each defendant to specific crimes and, in turn, enumerates potential violations of the pertinent law.4 Each case file also includes a brief summary of the case and an explanation of the type of evidence presently available, including testimony gathered by Helsinki Watch.

The cases presented here are only the tip of the iceberg, as the over 800 pages of war crimes testimony and analysis previously released by Helsinki Watch demonstrate.5 Helsinki Watch selected these cases from among the hundreds of potential cases in its files, based on the following criteria: strength of case, availability of evidence for immediate prosecution, and diversity of defendants and alleged crimes. Five of the cases charge Serbs with offenses, two charge Croats and one charges Muslims; the allegations span the spectrum of war crimes offenses, from gang rape to genocide.

The accused range from the lowest prison guard to the former Yugoslav Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav National Army. Helsinki Watch's failure to name other heads of state and top military commanders as defendants in no way is intended to absolve them of responsibility. While we have not presented such information here, we believe that many senior officials should also be found criminally liable for aiding and abetting in the "planning, preparation, or execution" of war crimes.6

Helsinki Watch has been able to assemble these cases even though, in line with its mandate as a nongovernmental human rights organization, it set out only to report human rights abuses, not to gather evidence for criminal prosecutions. If Helsinki Watch can readily produce this information from its files, a properly financed, international investigative team surely could go much further.

While these case summaries alone may not suffice for criminal indictments, they surely present enough prima facie evidence of war crimes to spark immediate investigation. Indeed, under the Statute of the International Tribunal the prosecutor must investigate such evidence.7 Accordingly, Helsinki Watch calls on the United Nations to appoint a prosecutorial team without delay, and to devote the degree of technical and financial resources necessary for comprehensive investigations. Helsinki Watch invites the prosecutor's office to begin investigating the cases described in this document and, to that end, offers whatever assistance it can provide to facilitate its work.

The impetus that compelled the Security Council to call for a war crimes tribunal in the first place has not diminished. The tribunal is an essential component for diffusing ethnic andnationalistic tensions in the former Yugoslavia. Even if no defendant can ever be brought to trial, a thorough investigation of alleged war crimes will establish a historical record of the events, which in turn will individualize what is now too often seen as collective guilt. In addition, regardless of whether defendants can be compelled to stand trial, indictments alone will be a sanction against the accused; an indictment and the resulting arrest warrant would turn the individual into a political pariah, subject to immediate detention if he ever steps outside the boundaries of his isolated state.8

The U.N. has thus far utterly failed in its mission in the former Yugoslavia.9 Its "peacekeeping troops" have done little to keep the peace and its "humanitarian aid" forces --lacking political, military, and financial support -- have failed to provide sufficient aid. If the war crimes tribunal remains but an empty promise, the credibility of the U.N. may sink beyond repair. The U.N. should investigate and prosecute war crimes -- now!

VUKOVAR 6

VLA_I? 10

POSAVSKA MAHALA 13

OMARSKA 15

LORA PRISON 18

DOBOJ 20

?ELEBI?I 22

?ARAKOVO 24

The following eight cases are selected from hundreds of possible cases in Helsinki Watch's files on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. They were selected because they are ready for investigation and reflect a diversity of crimes and defendants.

Veljko Kadijevi?: Yugoslav Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) during the siege of Vukovar.

Col. Veselin _ljivan?anin: in charge of security after the fall of Vukovar.

Stanko Vujanovi?: commander of the first company of the territorial defense unit of Vukovar.

Captain Miroslav Radi?.

Predrag Milojevi?: called "Kina," a JNA volunteer from Ruma.

Dragoslav Milosavljevi?: called "Panta," a JNA reservist from Negotin.

Ivica Andri?: called "Djeti?," a JNA reservist from Montenegro.

Spasoje Petkovi?: called "_tuka," a JNA reservist.

Milan Lazarevi?: called "Grozni," a JNA volunteer from Uzdina.

Other executioners identified presently only by nickname.10

Murder, torture, inhumane treatment, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, and devastation not justified by military necessity.

o Article 5(a)(h)(specifying that murder and other inhumane acts

committed against civilians are "crimes against humanity").

o Article 3(b)(specifying that "wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity" are violations of the rules of war).

o Article 2(a)(b)(c)(d)(specifying that willful killing, torture, inhumane treatment, "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health", and "extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly" are "grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention of 1949).

Following Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav National Army [JNA], began to occupy by force certain areas of Croatia in conjunction with local Serbian militia groups. Vukovar -- a Croatian city in eastern Slavonia -- became the scene of a fierce battle between Croatian troops, and Serbian irregular forces backed by the Yugoslav National Army. The JNA and Serbian paramilitary squads bombarded the town, directly targeting schools, cultural monuments and hospitals. Residents struggled to survive, living for days at a time in chambers underneath the city hospital; after months of fighting, Serbian forces finally took the town in November of 1991.

Both during and after the battle of Vukovar, Serbian and JNA forces committed some of the greatest atrocities perpetrated in Croatia. One of the most notorious offenses involves the Serbian evacuation of 440 Croatian patients from the Vukovar Hospital. Evidence gathered so far indicates that Serbian soldiers and paramilitary squads summarily executed nearly half of these patients, burying their remains in mass graves.

Major _ljivan?anin admits that Serbian troops did evacuate a number people from the hospital to a place called Ov?ara, but addedly claims that he turned all these people over to prison authorities in Sremska Mitrovica, a Serbian town which houses a major prison facility.11 Helsinki Watch, however, has prima facie evidence that all of the above defendants, with the exception of Kadijevi?, took part in the summary execution of 200 patients at Ov?ara.12

Though not a perpetrator himself, Kadijevi? also bears responsibility for the massacre and wanton destruction of the city. As the Yugoslav Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav National Army, Kadijevi? received timely warnings from his officers in the region that crimes were taking place and that the Serb paramilitary forces should be disarmed. Kadijevi? not only neglected to disarm the paramilitary forces, he also failed to take any substantive measures to prevent further crimes -- such as the Ov?ara massacre -- from occurring. Furthermore, following the executions, Kadijevi? took no steps to investigate allegations and discipline the perpetrators.

There is physical evidence of a massacre which took place approximately six miles south of Ov?ara -- the area to which Major _ljivan?anin admits having taken approximately four hundred prisoners from the Vukovar hospital. Based on a preliminary exploration of this site, Physicians for Human Rights has concluded that "[a] mass execution took place at the grave site. The grave site is a mass grave, containing perhaps as many as 200 bodies."13 The team also had discovered "clusters of spent Kalashnikov cartridges" and bullet scorings on acacia trees behind the grave site.

A Helsinki Watch representative has interviewed a witness who testified that all of the above listed defendants, with the exception of Kadijevi?, either organized, ordered, or executed the massacre. Provided that he is given adequate protection, this witness might testify at trial. In July 1993, Helsinki Watch representatives gathered additional testimony from approximately seven other Vukovar survivors of the Ov?ara massacre. Since January 1992, Helsinki Watch has collected scores of testimony fromVukovar survivors and witnesses, all of whom provided accounts of both the siege and the subsequent abuses.

The large number of refugees from Vukovar now living in Croatia could provide investigators with additional information. Also, all of the major newspapers have carried accounts of the incident which could direct investigators to additional witnesses.

Croatian governmental and nongovernmental organizations have released reports on Vukovar that could prove useful as well. In particular, Croatian government sources and humanitarian aid groups have prepared lists naming the patients of Vukovar's hospital, indicating which patients subsequently "disappeared."

This is a case that urgently calls for immediate investigation and prosecution. Given that physical evidence of the Vukovar massacres may be disappearing daily, investigators must act now to locate and preserve physical evidence of mass grave sites. The extensive work on Vukovar already conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, Helsinki Watch, Croatian governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and other humanitarian and human rights groups should facilitate the investigation.

Dragan Mrdja.

Individual police officers (not yet identified by name).14

Genocide, murder, aiding and abetting genocide and murder.

o Article 4(2)(a)(b)(specifying that killing members of a national, ethnic, or religious group and causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, that group is an act of genocide).

o Article 5(a)(specifying that murder of civilians committed in armed conflict is a crime against humanity).

o Article 2(a)(b)(c)(specifying that willful killings, torture, inhumane treatment and "willfully causing great suffering" are "grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention of 1949).

o Article 7(1)(specifying that those who aid and abet in the planning, preparation and execution of war crimes are also responsible for those crimes).

In August of 1992, Serbian forces released thousands of non-Serbs from detention camps in northwestern Bosnia. Serbs expelled many of the former prisoners from the area by loading them onto buses, and then driving them toward the Muslim and Croatian controlled town of Travnik in Bosnia.

On August 21, a group of non-Serbs released from the Trnopolje camp was sent on buses toward Travnik. Armed men stopped the convoy en route and systematically executed approximately 150-200 men aged seventeen and older in the mountainous area known as Vla_i?. Allegedly, Serbian police officers lined the men up on theedge of a ravine, shot them and then pushed them into the ravine. Witnesses report that the officers then started firing down into the ravine to make sure that no one remained alive. At least seven of the men are known to have survived.

Witnesses have identified Dragan Mrdja as the commander of the police officers. Although Serbian authorities have admitted that the massacre took place, Helsinki Watch has received no evidence of a serious attempt to bring the guilty parties to trial.

Helsinki Watch is in possession of testimonies given by two witnesses who survived the Vla_i? massacre by falling into the ravine before being shot. B.J.,15 a Muslim resident of the village of Kevljani in the municipality of Prijedor, and Esad,16 a thirty-year-old Muslim resident of the village of Trnopolje in the municipality of Prijedor provide corroborative accounts of the mass execution. In addition, both eyewitnesses have identified Dragan Mrdja as the commanding police officer.

The Helsinki Watch reports are also supported by press reports. In a Washington Post interview published September 22, 1992, a survivor nicknamed ?erni provides a description of the massacre. In subsequent Washington Post articles, Mary Battiata writes that "the man in charge was identified by three convoy passengers, including a former neighbor," (September 23, 1992) and that "many of the survivors have identified the police officer [in charge]" (September 28, 1992). In addition, on September 28, 1992, The New York Times published an Associated Press Report according to which a survivor named Semir (last name withheld) was able to recognize several of the killers from his home village of ?arakovo. The witness recognized among the officers two brothers who had rounded up Muslims in ?arakovo.

The accounts of the Vla_i? massacre are further corroborated by a Serbian authority, Stojan Župljanin. Župljanin, chief of security forces in Banja Luka, admitted to The Washington Post that the massacre had occurred. He stated that fifty bodies had been recovered from the mass grave and that others were still waiting to be picked up.

In addition to the testimony of survivors, investigators maybe able to perform autopsies on the bodies of victims and collect physical evidence -- such as empty bullet shells, traces of blood and bodies -- from the site itself.

The Vla_i? massacre is extraordinarily well-documented. In particular, survivors have been able to describe the incident in great detail. Witnesses have identified the police commander and at least some of the perpetrators. Furthermore, the recovery of bodies from the site indicates the possibility of detailed autopsies. Clearly, the Vla_i? case is well suited for immediate investigation.

Marijan Brni?.

Jozo Baruk?i?.

Martin Baruk?i?.

Martin Baruk?i? (not the same as above).

Ilija Juri?.

Ilija Glava_.

Pavo Glava_.

Rape, torture and inhumane treatment.

o Article 5(f)(g)(specifying that torture and rape committed against civilians in an armed conflict are "crimes against humanity").

o Article 2(b)(specifying that torture and inhumane treatment are "grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention of 1949).

On June 5, 1992, fifteen members of a Bosnian Croat paramilitary group identified as the "Fire Horses" ("Vatreni Konji") allegedly gang-raped five Serbian women in Posavska Mahala. After the incident, a group of women visited the Croatian military headquarters at Novi Grad where they reported the rapes to the Bosnian Croat military police. The Bosnian Croat police arrested the alleged rapists and then released them without prosecuting them.

Helsinki Watch is in possession of testimony given by two of the victims, one of whom identified all of the seven possible defendants named above.17 Once granted adequate protection, thesewitnesses may agree to testify. In addition, the military police in Novi Grad purportedly has records containing information on the victims and the alleged rapists.

Given that the Statute of the International Tribunal specifically includes rape as a "crime against humanity," no reason exists to delay the investigation. If the investigators discover that the paramilitary leader planned or aided the gang rape in any way, he should be prosecuted as well, under Article 7 of the Statute.

Željko Mejaki? (alternately referred to as Meaki?, Mejakovic and Mehaji?): commander of the Omarska camp.

Drago Prca?: a deputy of Mejaki?'s described as the "most brutal" of all the soldiers at Omarska.

Du_an (Dule) Tadi?: alleged to have ordered and/or conducted the castration of one or more prisoners.

Nedejlko Grabovac: an officer in the "Serbian Army" reported to have raped at least one prisoner.

Mladjo Krkan: An Omarska prison guard directly implicated in the murder of two prisoners.

Radoslav Brdjanin: a member of the government of the self-proclaimed "Serbian Republic" [Republika Srpska] who visited the Omarska camp.

Genocide; murder; rape; torture; unlawful confinement of civilians; persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds; other inhumane acts committed against a civilian population; and aiding and abetting all of the above acts.

o Article 4(2)(a)(b) (specifying that killing members of a national, ethnic, or religious group and causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, that group is an act of genocide).

o Article 5(a)(e)(f)(g)(h)(i)(specifying that murder; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; and other inhumane acts committed in armed conflict against a civilian population are crimes against humanity).

o Article 2(a)(b)(c)(h)(specifying that willful killing, torture, inhumane treatment, "willfully causing great suffering" and "unlawful confinement of civilians" are "grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention of 1949).

o Article 7(1)(specifying that those who aid and abet in the planning, preparation, and execution of war crimes are also responsible for those crimes).

Omarska was a predominantly Serbian village in the Prijedor region of northwestern Bosnia. Serbian authorities converted part of the village into a detention camp following the outbreak of fighting in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The camp was the scene of some of the most brutal atrocities committed in detention camps in the Balkan conflict, as Serbian soldiers and prison guards raped, castrated, and brutally beat their prisoners.

Prior to the discovery of the camp by foreign journalists in the summer of 1992, Omarska held approximately two thousand Muslim and, to a lesser extent, Croatian men. The camp also detained between thirty-three and thirty-eight women; the majority of these detainees were civilians.

A clear chain of command existed at the camp, with commander Željko Mejaki? at the top. As the leader, Mejakic assumed responsibility for the acts of his subordinates. The nature of the atrocities committed by those subordinates precludes the possibility that they were isolated crimes committed without the sanction of a commanding officer. In particular, soldiers attacked prisoners in a continuous and systematic manner. For example, witnesses have described a procedure in which Serbian soldiers routinely forced new prisoners to pass through two rows of guards to be beaten. Witnesses have also testified that every night guards beat to death five to fifteen men inside a white house used for interrogations. The guards regularly left "heaps of bodies" lying in front of the building throughout the next day.

If Željko Mejaki? did not directly order his subordinates to commit such acts, he certainly knew or had reason to know that his subordinates were guilty of atrocities. Thus, his failure to take measures to prevent and punish these crimes cannot be excused.

Radoslav Brdjanin, a member of the government of the self-proclaimed "Serbian Republic" [Republika Srpska] visited the Omarska camp during the time in which the atrocities were committed. Given the prevalence of the crimes, he too knew or should have known of their existence. His visit, as well as the close proximity of the camp to Banja Luka, provide evidence that knowledge of the Omarska atrocities extended beyond the confines of the camp itself, and that authorities in the Bosnian Serb government allowed and perhaps even encouraged the crimes committed therein.

Helsinki Watch has collected testimony from numerous witnesses to the Omarska crimes.18 Witnesses have identified, by name, all of the above possible defendants as possible war criminals and have provided names of several of the deceased. Given the large number of witnesses, some of them could be located in the event of trial.

In addition to pursuing witnesses, investigators should examine the site of the prison for physical evidence, such as bullet-holed and blood stained walls and remains of the deceased.

The atrocities committed in the notorious Omarska prison camp lend themselves particularly well to prosecution. Both the extensive media coverage of the Omarska crimes and the prevalence of survivors speaking about their experiences indicate the existence of a solid case deserving thorough investigation.

Tomo Duji?.

Individual Croatian soldiers (identified presently only by nickname).19

Torture, inhumane treatment, aiding and abetting torture and inhumane treatment.

o Article 2(b)(c)(specifying that torture, inhumane treatment and "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health" are "grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention of 1949).

o Article 7(1)(specifying that those who aid and abet in the planning, preparation and execution of war crimes are also responsible for those crimes).

As the commander of the Croatian-controlled Lora prison in Split, Tomo Duji? is responsible for the continued torture and beating of Yugoslav National Army Reservists who were detained in the prison. According to the witness, soldiers tortured prisoners at all times, but particularly beat some prisoners whenever Duji? visited them. Those prisoners include: Gavrilo Tripkovi?, Damjan Tripkovi?, Drago Vujovi?, Rusko Bekan, and Mile Sakovski. According to the witness, Dujic at times personally took part in the torture; on one occasion, Dujic put a thick rubber glove on his hand and rammed it inside the prisoner's anus.

The witness also reports that prison interrogators (identified only by the first names or nicknames: Toni, Markota, Dego, ?emera_, and Kudra), strapped prisoners to an "electric chair" in Duji?'s office. According to the witness, the interrogators connected Gavrilo Tripkovi?, Damjan Tripkovi?, and Zoran Perkovi? (a priestfrom Kupres) to a hand-cranked generator until they fainted. The witness also testified that soldiers would force them to drink urine, and would urge them to rape each other.

The above crimes could not have been committed without Duji?'s sanction. If he did not actually order crimes to be committed, he certainly allowed them to occur under his command. And, in any event, Duji? is criminally liable for the crimes he committed personally.

Helsinki Watch is in possession of testimony given by Gavrilo Tripkovi?, 50, a Serbian salesman from Prebilovci (a village three kilometers away from ?apljina), and other collaborate testimony. In addition to such testimony, investigators should be able to collect physical evidence from the prison site, and hospital records detailing prisoners injuries.

The availability of testimony from a man who not only experienced and witnessed abuses, but also knows the names of both the perpetrators and the victims renders this case suitable for investigation and prosecution.

Nikola Jorgi? (also known as "Jorga").

Dr. Obrad Filipovi?.

Dr. Jodi?.

Rape, torture, inhumane treatment and aiding or abetting rape, torture and inhumane treatment.

o Article 5(d)(f)(g)(specifying that torture and rape committed against civilians in an armed conflict are "crimes against humanity").

o Article 2(b)(specifying that torture and inhumane treatment are "grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention of 1949).

o Article 7(1)(specifying that those who aid and abet in the planning, preparation and execution of war crimes are also individually responsible for the crimes).

In early May of 1992, Serbian forces took over the northeastern Bosnian town of Doboj. Immediately thereafter, Serbian forces converted a Doboj high school into a detention center for women. Witnesses testify that the school hall was packed with hundreds of women forced to sit side by side, and that members of the Yugoslav National Army, paramilitary forces and the local militia systematically raped, gang raped, raped with various objects (bottles, guns etc.), beat, spat on and urinated on the women over an extended period of time.

Witnesses have identified the overseer of the center as Nikola Jorgi?, a Serbian police officer from Doboj. According to the witnesses, Jorgi? introduced himself as the man in charge. He in fact exerted a substantial degree of control over the center by deciding, among other matters, when women were allowed to leave. Given the prevalence of rape within the center, one can conclude that Jorgi? knowingly permitted them to continue unpunished. Some evidence indicates that he even ordered rapes to be committed: onewitness has recalled that Jorgic forced certain men to commit rapes.

In addition to naming the overseer of the camp, one victim was able to identify two of her rapists as acquaintances named Dr. Jodi? and Dr. Obrad Filipovi?.

Helsinki Watch is in possession of testimony provided by B.,20 a forty year-old Muslim woman from Doboj. Serbs detained B. in Doboj for twenty-eight days until her brother paid 1,000 German marks for her release. B. identified Nikola Jorgi? as the commander of the Doboj police force. Furthermore, she recognized two of her rapists, Dr. Jodi? and Dr. Filipovi? as workers and acquaintances from her work place. In the event of a trial, it is possible that B. might agree to testify.

In addition to the evidence compiled by Helsinki Watch, investigators can draw from other sources for information concerning the Doboj detention center. The Croatian Ministry of Health has complied a report summarizing incidents of wartime rape which includes descriptions of cases from Doboj. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia and Hercegovina claims that it has collected and documented 13,000 cases of rape; if so, accounts from Doboj most certainly are included. Furthermore, many news reporters have covered Doboj and thus may be able to provide investigators with leads.

This case is well documented and appropriate for immediate investigation. Given that the Statute of the International Tribunal specifically includes rape as a "crime against humanity,"(see Article 5), no reason exists to delay the investigation.

Hazim (or Adem) Deli?.

Prison guards (now identified only by nickname).21

Murder, torture, inhumane treatment, willful causing of serious injury to body and health, and aiding and abetting such acts.

o Article 2(a)(b)(c)(specifying that willful killing, torture, inhumane treatment and "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health" are "grave breaches" of the Geneva Convention of 1949).

o Article 7(1)(specifying that those who aid and abet in the planning, preparation and execution of war crimes are also individually responsible for the crimes).

In May 1992, after the Yugoslav National Army withdrew from its barracks in the village of ?elebi?i (in the municipality of Konji?) Bosnian forces assumed control and used the facility to house Serbian prisoners. On the basis of Helsinki Watch interviews with international relief workers, Serbian advocates in Belgrade, and former detainees, it appears that the ?elebi?i detention facility was initially controlled by Croatian forces and manned by Muslim guards; shortly thereafter Muslim forces assumed control.

Hazim Deli? -- the commander of the prison -- was directly responsible for the ill treatment of numerous prisoners. Described by a witness as the soldier who conducted the most beatings, Deli? often joined the guards in brutally beating the prisoners. Many prisoners died as a result of injuries inflicted by prison guards.

According to a former ?elebi?i prisoner, a guard nicknamed"Zenga" willfully beat to death Simo Aramovi? and Nedjo Milo_evi?. Guards also shot to death Kuljani (first name not known), Miroslav Vuji?i?, and Bo_ko Samoukovi?. In addition, the former prisoner recalls having been forced by prison guards to remain in a manhole with six other prisoners for two days without food or water.

Given his position of authority and his active participation in the beating of prisoners, Deli? must have been aware of the crimes being perpetrated in his camp. If Deli? did not specifically order atrocities to be committed, he nevertheless tolerated continued mistreatment of prisoners. He thus may be held responsible for all the crimes committed during his command of the ?elebi?i camp.

Helsinki Watch is in possession of testimony given by Ljubimir,22a twenty-one-year-old Serb from the village of Brdjani. The witness gave a full account of the abuses, beatings, and killings that took place at ?elebi?i. He identified, by name, the camp commander and some of the victims. Furthermore, he was able to identify by nickname an executor of the actual killings. It is possible that Ljubimir might testify at trail. At least two additional witnesses have corroborated his testimony.23

In addition to the testimony of witnesses, investigators are likely to discover physical evidence of the alleged crimes when they visit the camp, which has reportedly since been closed.

This well documented case of Bosnian Muslim, and possibly Croatian abuses against Serbs. In particular, there is prima facie evidence that the camp commander is guilty of war crimes. Given the likely availability of witnesses, this case is particularly well suited for prosecution.

Rajko Dragi?.

Rape.

In late July of 1992, Serbian forces took over the northwestern Bosnian town of ?arakovo. Shortly after the fall of the town, Rajko Dragi? (nicknamed "Bokser", identified as a soldier in the "Serbian Army") broke into the home of Senada,24 a young Muslim woman and Selim, her husband. Wielding both a machine gun and a knife, Dragi? took the family's television and VCR and then proceeded to rape Senada repeatedly in front of both Selim and the couple's four-year-old daughter. "Bokser" then set the house on fire, forcing the family to flee.

Both Selim and Senada have been able to identify Dragi?. Selim recognized him as his co-worker at the rail company in Prijedor. Senada knew him from her native village of Rakeli?i. If they are granted adequate protection, Senada and Selim may testify at trial.

This is a particularly well documented and simple case. Both the victim and her husband knew and identified the assailant. Furthermore, the victim's husband was a witness to the crime. Given that the Statute of the International Tribunal specifically includes rape as a "crime against humanity,"(see Article 5), no reason exists to delay the investigation.

Helsinki Watch was established in 1978 to monitor domestic and international compliance with the human rights provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The chair of Helsinki Watch is Jonathan Fanton and the vice chair is Alice Henkin. Jeri Laber is executive director; Lois Whitman is deputy director; Holly Cartner and Julie Mertus are counsel; Erika Dailey, Rachel Denber, Ivana Nizich and Christopher Panico are research associates; and Pamela Cox, Christina Derry, Ivan Lupis and Alexander Petrov are associates.

Helsinki Watch is a division of Human Rights Watch, which includes Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Asia Watch, and Middle East Watch. The chair of Human Rights Watch is Robert L. Bernstein and the vice chair is Adrian W. DeWind. Kenneth Roth is acting executive director; Holly J. Burkhalter is Washington director; Gara LaMarche is associate director; Ellen Lutz is California director; Susan Osnos is press director; Jemera Rone is counsel; Michal Longfelder is development director; Dorothy Q. Thomas is Women's Rights Project director; Joanna Weschler is Prison Project director; Kenneth Anderson is Arms Project director.

Helsinki Watch is affiliated with the International Helsinki Federation in Vienna, Austria.

1 Security Council Resolution 808 of February 22, 1993.

2 Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993.

3 Former State Department desk officer for Yugoslavia George Kenny remarked that "It's not much more than a cosmetic effort." (Quoted in Roy Gutman, "War Crime Unit Hasn't a Clue," New York Newsday, March 4, 1993).

4 The Statute of The International Tribunal, in Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993 (incorporating The Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 808 of February 22, 1993). Among other substantive provisions, the statute incorporates a list of "grave breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 First Additional Protocol (Article 2); enumerates specific violations of the laws of war (Article 3); specifies that the tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide (Article 4); lists nine crimes that will be considered "crimes against humanity" when committed in armed conflict against civilians (Article 5); and specifies when persons shall be liable for aiding and abetting "grave breaches" under Article 2 and "crimes against humanity" under Article 5 (Article 7).

5 Helsinki Watch has released portions of the extensive testimony gathered by its field representatives in War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volumes I and II (released in August 1992 and April 1993, and available from Human Rights Watch, 485 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10017). In addition, Helsinki Watch has been updating these volumes with periodic additional reports.

6 See The Statute of the International Tribunal, Article 7(1). Helsinki Watch is in the process of gathering specific information on the knowledge of certain Serbian leaders that could prove useful in charging them with criminal responsibility.

7 Under the Statute of the International Tribunal, the prosecutor is obligated to conduct at least a preliminary investigation when presented with information of alleged war crimes. See Article 18(1) ("The prosecutor shall assess the information received or obtained and decide whether there is sufficient basis to proceed.")(emphasis added). If a prima facie case exists, the prosecutor must prepare an indictment. See Article 18(4)("Upon a determination that a prima facie case exists, the Prosecutor shall prepare an indictment ...")(emphasis added).

8 Sanctions can also be imposed on a state that harbors war criminals, until they are turned over for prosecution.

9 Human Rights Watch's The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and U.N. Field Operations, June 1993, p. 85-103, details failure of U.N. actions in the former Yugoslavia.

10 Testimony on file with Helsinki Watch. Helsinki Watch will release the names only after they are confirmed.

11 In an interview for Monitor, an independent Montenegrin magazine, Major _ljivan?anin attempted to account for the bodies found six miles south-east of Ov?ara with the following explanation: "There were no killings and shootings, though there were bodies which were gathered in piles during the cleaning of the town...you can imagine how difficult it was to bury them properly..."

12 The Serbian government's account also contradicts Major _ljivan?anin. In response to a protest letter written by Human Rights Watch to Slobodan Milo_evi?, the Serbian government (in a letter dated March 18, 1992) claims that the account of the Vukovarincident is inaccurate and proceeds to correct the facts: instead of Serbs taking 440 patients from the hospital, as Human Rights Watch claimed, Serbs took only 380 patients; instead of Serbs releasing 128 patients to Croatian authorities, Serbs released 173 patients. This contradicts _ljivan?anin's claim that Serbs handed over all patients. It also fails to explain what happened to the patients who were not delivered to Croatian authorities.

13 Testimony of Eric Stover, Executive Director, Physicians for Human Rights, before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, on January 25, 1993. See also Physicians for Human Rights, "Report of a Preliminary Site Exploration of a Mass Grave Near Vukovar, Former Yugoslavia," January 19, 1993, inserted as Annex II to "Letter Dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/25174, February 10, 1993.

14 Helsinki Watch will release names once they are confirmed.

15 Interviewed by a Helsinki Watch representative on October 17, 1992, in a refugee camp in Croatia.

16 Interviewed by a Helsinki Watch representative on October 17, 1992, in a refugee camp in Croatia. The witness is identified here under a pseudonym.

17 Interviewed by Helsinki Watch representatives in January 1993, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. The witnesses were identified by the Yugoslav State Commission on War Crimes.

18 Interviews conducted by Helsinki Watch representative between October-December 1992, and January-February 1993 at various locations in Croatia. See Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Vol. II (released in April 1993); pgs. 87-121 and 163-164.

19 Helsinki Watch will release the names only after they have been confirmed.

20 Interviewed in January 1993 by a Helsinki Watch representative in Zagreb, Croatia.

21 Helsinki Watch will release the names only after the identities of the accused are confirmed.

22 Interviewed by Helsinki Watch representatives on October 6, 1992, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav State Commission on War Crimes and Genocide supplied the witness. The witness chose to withhold his name and the name used here is a pseudonym.

23 These witnesses were also supplied by the Yugoslav State Commission on War Crimes. They were interviewed by Helsinki Watch representatives on October 6, 1992.

24 Interviewed by Helsinki Watch representatives in January 1993 at the mosque in Zagreb, Croatia. The names used here are pseudonyms.