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VII. The International Response

The United Nations Security Council

Strongly condemns the recruitment and use of child soldiers by parties to armed conflict in violation of international obligations applicable to them. . . .

Expresses its intention to consider imposing targeted and graduated measures, through country-specific resolutions, such as, inter alia, a ban on the export or supply of small arms and light weapons and of other military equipment and on military assistance, against these parties if they refuse to enter into dialogue, fail to develop an action plan or fail to meet the commitments included in their action plan, bearing in mind the Secretary-General’s report.

—Security Council resolution 1539 (2004)

Since 1998 the United Nations Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions aimed at stronger enforcement of international standards related to children and armed conflict. In 2001 the Security Council specifically called on member states to “consider appropriate legal, political, diplomatic, financial and material measures, in accordance with the Charter of the UN, in order to ensure that parties to armed conflict respect international norms for the protection of children.”²⁸¹ The Security Council also stated its intention in 2004, 2005, and most recently, in a presidential statement issued on November 28, 2006, to consider sanctions (such as arms embargoes) against groups that persist in recruiting and using child soldiers.²⁸²

The UN secretary-general submits reports to the Security Council on children and armed conflict approximately every year. Since 2002, at the Security Council’s request, these reports have included annexes listing specific parties to armed conflict—including both government forces and non-state armed groups—that recruit or use child soldiers in violation of their legal obligations. The annexes focused initially only on a limited number of situations on the Security Council’s agenda, but in 2003 a second annex was added to include countries like Burma that were not formally on the Security Council’s agenda. In September 2006, by a vote of 10 to 4, with one member abstaining, the Security Council agreed to place the situation in Burma on its formal agenda.²⁸³

In four consecutive reports since 2002, the UN secretary-general has identified Burma’s national army, the Tatmadaw Kyi, among the parties that recruit or use children in armed conflict in violation of international law.²⁸⁴ The reports have also listed the Karen National Liberation Army, the Karenni Army, and the United Wa State Army.²⁸⁵ The Security Council has requested that the UN secretary-general submit his next report on children and armed conflict by February 2008.²⁸⁶

In 2005 the Security Council acted to create a working group on children and armed conflict, specifically to consider information regarding violations against children in armed conflict (specifically recruitment and use of child soldiers, killing and maiming of children, rape and other sexual violence, abductions, denial of humanitarian access to children, and attacks against schools and hospitals by parties to armed conflict).²⁸⁷ The working group considers country-specific reports from the UN secretary-general, and makes recommendations to the full Security Council on actions that should be taken in response to reported abuses against children. As of September 2007, the working group had met to consider violations against children in nine countries.²⁸⁸ In at least two instances (Democratic Republic of Congo and Cote d’Ivoire), the working group has recommended that sanctions be applied against child recruiters.

The working group is expected to meet in November 2007 to consider violations against children in Burma, based on a report prepared by the UN secretary-general. This will be the first time that Burma has been considered by the working group.

United Nations Country Team

Despite the attention to the issue of child soldiers by the UN Security Council, the United Nations country team has been only minimally involved on child soldier issues. Although this is due in significant part to the SPDC’s recalcitrance, the UN country team does not appear to have seriously advocated on behalf of child soldiers, nor has it displayed particular initiative in protecting children against recruitment in the areas where it works. For example, despite the clear requirement to report on child soldier practices in Burma under the monitoring and reporting mechanism created under Security Council resolution 1612, the United Nations country team did not begin to actively collect information until less than six months before the Security Council working group on children and armed conflict was scheduled to consider Burma. Consequently the country team has found itself scrambling to fulfill its reporting requirements. At the time of the June 2007 visit to Burma by special representative of the secretary-general on children and armed conflict (see Chapter V, sub-section “Government Cooperation with International Agencies”), the UN had not yet even informed the United Wa State Army that it had been listed in the secretary-general’s report in 2006 as a party that conscripts child soldiers;²⁸⁹ the UWSA expressed surprise that they had been.

The UN country team’s strategy for 2003-2007 identifies protection as one of the country team’s eight primary goals, under which child protection, and specifically the reintegration of child soldiers, are identified as key components. While identifying child soldiers as a priority, this document appears to understate the scale of the problem particularly with regard to the Tatmadaw, noting “[t]here continues to be no verifiable information on the actual figures of minors associated with military forces and other armed groups ... there continue to be credible reports that a number of the non-state armed groups have minors within their ranks, as does the government military to some degree in spite of the national law.” ²⁹⁰ Thus far the UN has played only an indirect role in the demobilization of child soldiers, and has not provided any reintegration assistance to child soldiers.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs identifies the Plan of Action of the Committee for Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage Children and “visits to government recruitment sites” as two of the UN’s accomplishments, calling them “advances on sensitive issues.”²⁹¹ Although the formation of the Committee and its Plan of Action have given the UN a basis for dialogue and cooperation with the SPDC, UN officials noted shortcomings in the document and stated candidly that the UN had minimal input in the drafting of the Plan of Action. The SRSG has further noted that there are serious shortcomings in the document and recently requested its amendment.²⁹²

UNICEF

Since 2002 UNICEF has worked with the Myanmar Literacy Resource Center and the Department of Social Welfare to conduct training workshops on child rights and child protection. These workshops have been attended by over 9,000 members of child rights committees and community leaders across the country. Beginning in 2004, UNICEF began an additional program to support child rights training and child protection activities by community-based and faith-based organizations. As of September 2007, eight community-based organizations in 37 townships were participating in the program. UNICEF reported that both training initiatives include discussions on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the protection of children from various forms of exploitation, including child recruitment. In areas where these trainings have been conducted, UNICEF reported that some child soldier cases have been documented and brought to the attention of UNICEF and to the government for redress.²⁹³

As mentioned previously (see Chapter V, sub-section “Government Cooperation with International Agencies”), UNICEF conducted a half-day training in April 2007 for recruitment officers from the Directorate of Military Strength, covering child protection and international legal obligations regarding children and armed conflict. As of September 2007, the agency was pursuing discussions with the SPDC regarding additional trainings in Rangoon, Mandalay, and Naypyidaw (the new capital).²⁹⁴

ILO

As discussed above, the ILO has taken up complaints of child recruitment with the government in the context of its work on forced labor, and in several instances has been able to secure the release of child soldiers from the Tatmadaw. Additional cases taken up by the ILO were pending as of September 2007. However, as discussed above, government obstruction, including the arrest and intimidation of complainants, and the SPDC’s refusal to accept the ILO’s documentation of such cases, has limited the agency’s ability to act effectively in cases of child recruitment. The ILO’s ability to receive complaints and protect complainants is further constrained by its limited staffing and restricted access. Because the ILO is based exclusively in Rangoon, many persons living in distant or remote areas are unable to travel to Rangoon to lodge complaints due to travel restrictions or simply because the costs of doing so are prohibitive.²⁹⁵ Although the ILO liaison officer is able to travel throughout the country, he must first receive clearance from the government, and may be accompanied by a representative of the government.²⁹⁶

Neighboring country and cross-border initiatives

Some of the difficulties faced by Tatmadaw deserters who cross the border into a neighboring country are described above in Chapter V (see section “Desertion, Imprisonment, and Re-recruitment”). Since 2002 several local and international organizations have attempted small programs to alleviate this situation, primarily in Thailand. From 2003 to 2005 UNHCR offices in Thailand provided refugee status determination and direct protection for some child soldiers who had escaped the Tatmadaw, and assisted some of them to obtain resettlement in third countries.²⁹⁷ This ceased for a combination of reasons, including the takeover of refugee status determination by Thai authorities through civilian-military “Provincial Admissions Boards,” and the preference of resettlement receiving countries for civilian refugees. Another important development was the Thai policy that came into effect in 2005 that anyone requesting refugee status must move to a refugee camp. This gave deserters in Thailand two main options: move into a refugee camp and seek refugee status and resettlement, or go underground and survive through illegal labor. For Tatmadaw child deserters, going to a refugee camp is problematic because they may be ostracized by the refugee population, who have fled Tatmadaw abuses and who are usually of a different ethnicity; and because this makes them “visible” to Thai authorities, who they fear will arrest them and hand them back to the Tatmadaw.

Nonetheless, some child deserters found at least temporary refuge in refugee camps, though there were problems of discrimination, ostracism, difficulty settling in, and problems staying in schools, often leading them to depart the camps in the end. There have been no reported cases of Thai authorities arresting and deporting former child soldiers from refugee camps, though this may be partly because they do not advertise their presence. In refugee camps there are referral systems for those with urgent protection needs, and schooling, psychosocial, and recreational programs, but none of these can be targeted at or geared towards former child soldiers. This is partly for their protection, but it also limits the programs’ ability to deal with the severe traumas some former child soldiers have suffered.

Most former Tatmadaw child soldiers, however, remain outside the refugee camps, where UNHCR and NGO representatives say their situation is increasingly precarious because Thai authorities are progressively clamping down on refugees found outside of refugee camps. One UNHCR representative told Human Rights Watch that it is now extremely difficult for UNHCR to provide any form of protection for people outside refugee camps, while NGO representatives added that it is simultaneously becoming harder for people to gain admission to refugee camps because the Thai Provincial Admissions Boards are now refusing most applicants. Though basic education and psychosocial services are available in the refugee camps, former child soldiers outside the camps have no support systems or services available to them. Some local groups have stepped in to try to fill this need, as they can operate under less scrutiny than UN agencies and international actors. The nature of the problem, however, limits this response to a small scale, and it can only reach a proportion of those who need it. A more durable solution would require a more sympathetic approach from Thai authorities, but this is unlikely due to sensitivity over Thai government relations with Burma.

Greater scope has been possible in initiatives related to child recruitment by non-state armed groups. Some of these have taken the form of awareness raising with children in refugee camps and in conflict zones in Burma regarding child rights, including the right not to be recruited to any army. Some of these programs have been carried out by the Human Rights Education Institute of Burma (HREIB), an independent local organization, and have taken the form of workshops, booklets, and videos. According to HREIB, awareness of the issues involved has been rapidly increasing particularly in refugee camps in Thailand.²⁹⁸ The Catholic Office of Emergency Refugee Relief (COERR) plays a protection role in the refugee camps by monitoring children identified as vulnerable to recruitment and former child soldiers with non-state armed groups. This includes regular visits to every child residing in school boarding houses (and therefore without their parents) in the refugee camps to check on their status and ensure that they are not being pressured to join an armed group.²⁹⁹

In one of the Karenni refugee camps in Thailand, an “accelerated school” project was implemented by Karenni refugees with a small amount of outside funding. This school accepted adolescents who had never attended school for intensive learning, compressing several primary levels into each year to enable them to catch up with their age group without having to sit in classes with small children. For children who had spent much of their lives displaced in Kayah state, this provided an alternative to joining one of the non-state armed groups in their area; while it lasted, it also proved useful to some former Tatmadaw child soldiers. It unfortunately closed in 2006 due to a combination of factors, including the death of the headmaster and the loss of some teachers to resettlement, but UNHCR had already recommended that similar schools be opened in other refugee camps. This now appears unlikely, and local agencies are looking for alternatives such as one-on-one tutoring programs.³⁰⁰ UNICEF representatives in Bangkok told Human Rights Watch, however, that they would not be able to support any such initiatives due to a lack of funds, despite the very low costs involved.³⁰¹

HREIB reports that over the past several years they have worked with officers of non-state armed groups along Burma’s borders with Thailand, China, and India, conducting child rights trainings with junior officers and commanders, advocating that they adopt policies against recruitment and use of child soldiers, offering technical advice, and putting them in contact with international organizations.³⁰² In 2006 UNICEF and UNHCR pursued discussions with the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Karen National Union (KNU) which led in early 2007 to those groups and their armies signing Deeds of Commitment promising to end all recruitment of children, demobilize children in their ranks, and allow outside monitoring of their observance. Unfortunately just as the Deeds were being signed, UNICEF and UNHCR were ordered by the Thai government to have no further contact with the KNU or KNPP, which hinders any further cooperation of non-state armed groups with these agencies.³⁰³ At present negotiations are still underway for permission to resume contact, but this appears to be another facet of increasing Thai government restrictions that are making it difficult for local and international agencies to respond to the problems of child soldiers.