

News from **Asia Watch**

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ROUGH JUSTICE IN BEIJING

Punishing the "Black Hands" of Tiananmen Square

1. Introduction

"During late spring and early summer, namely, from mid-April to early June of 1989, a tiny handful of people exploited student unrest to launch a planned, organized and premeditated political turmoil, which later developed into a counterrevolutionary rebellion in Beijing, the capital. Their purpose was to overthrow the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and subvert the socialist People's Republic of China..."

"In order to achieve thorough victory, we should mobilize the people completely, strengthen the people's democratic dictatorship and spare no effort to ferret out the counterrevolutionary rioters. We should uncover instigators and rebellious conspirators, and punish the organizers and schemers of the unrest and the counterrevolutionary rebellion....and focus the crackdown on a handful of principal culprits and diehards who refuse to repent."

(Chen Xitong, Mayor of Beijing, on June 30, 1989.)¹

In late 1990, the Chinese government brought formal charges against several dozen of the most prominent detained leaders of the May-June 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement. Trials began in the first week of 1991. On January 5, the government announced the conviction of nine activists, including four student leaders - Wang Youcai, Ma Shaofang, Zhang Ming and Zheng Xuguang - all of whom appeared on the government's "21 most wanted" list after June 4, 1989 (see *Appendix* for details). The four were sentenced to terms of two to four years' imprisonment on charges of inciting subversion; attempting to overthrow the socialist state; obstructing the armed forces; and undermining public order. Two others tried at the same time were convicted but released without punishment for

¹ "Report on Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counter-Revolutionary Rebellion," a speech delivered by Chen Xitong on June 30, 1989 to the standing committee of the National People's Congress. The full text appears in *Beijing Review*, July 17-23, 1989.

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showing "willingness to repent."²

These sentences have been characterized as "lenient" by Western diplomats. They are certainly lighter than those received by countless others accused of "counterrevolution" over the past decade, including an estimated several hundred who have been tried secretly since the June 4, 1989 crackdown. But these student leaders had done no more than peacefully exercise their right to free expression, and they should never have been arrested in the first place.

It is in the trials still to come, however, that the full consequences of pro-democracy activism will become apparent. The official conspiracy theory maintains that the students who protested in Tiananmen Square in the spring of 1989 were all along manipulated and deceived by a "tiny handful" of "outside conspirators," sometimes dubbed the "black hands" of the movement.

One such person is the pioneering human rights advocate Ren Wandong, whose trial opened on January 8, only to be suspended a few days later. The trial of student leader Guo Haifeng and three others, which opened on January 9, was also suspended. Liu Zihou, allegedly head of the Beijing Workers Special Pickets, went on trial on January 11. And on January 15, the trials of eight dissidents began, including that of Bao Zunxin, a leading editor and historian who signed pro-democracy petitions during the 1989 movement.³ The following day, the trial of Liu Xiaobo, outspoken literary critic and participant in a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square during the last days before the crackdown, also commenced.

Other "black hands" reported to have been charged and to be awaiting trial include leading

² The sentences were announced by New China News Agency on January 5, 1991: Wang Youcai was sentenced to four years in prison, Ma Shaofang and Zhang Ming to three years, and Zheng Xuguang to two years. Also sentenced were Kong Xianfeng, who received a three-year term, and Zhang Qianjin and Xue Jian'an, who were given two-year terms; the occupations of these three are not known.

³ The others brought to trial on the same day as Bao Zunxin were: Wang Haidong, who like Bao was charged with "counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement"; and Li Shuntang, Liu Xiaojing, Yang Junzhong, Zhou Wanshui, Lu Xiaochun and Yu Yongjie, all of whom were variously charged with arson, looting, larceny and blocking traffic. (*New York Times*, January 15, 1991.)

KEY ACCUSED*

Intellectuals

CHEN ZIMING
WANG JUNTAO
REN WANDING
LIU XIAOBO
LIU SULI
CHEN XIAOPING
BAO ZUNXIN
MIN QI
LU JIAMIN
WANG PEIGONG
ZHANG WEIGUO

Workers

HAN DONGFANG
LIU QIANG
LIU ZIHOU

Students

WANG DAN
ZHOU YONGJUN
LIU GANG
XIONG YAN
ZHAI WEIMIN
GUO HAIFENG
WANG YOUCAI
MA SHAOFANG
ZHENG XUGUANG
ZHANG MING

Government Officials

BAO TONG
GAO SHAN

**list not exhaustive*

economist Chen Ziming and journalist Wang Juntao; Liu Gang, a physics graduate who worked in Chen Ziming's private research institute and whose name appeared third on the government's "21 most wanted" list, and the writer and editor Min Qi, also a colleague of Chen; law professors Liu Suli and Chen Xiaoping, both of Chen Ziming's group; top student leaders Wang Dan, Zhai Weimin and Zhou Yongjun, whose names also appeared on the "21 most wanted" list; Wang Peigong, an avante garde playwright; and (according to some sources) Bao Tong, who was deposed Party leader Zhao Ziyang's chief aide and secretary. (See *Appendix* for details of all these cases.)

Prosecution indictments for these activists and many others are reportedly now under preparation, and the trials of at least 60 leading dissidents are expected to take place over the next few weeks.⁴ These dissidents are only a handful of the several thousand who have been held in China since the military crackdown of June 1989.

The formal charging and imminent trials of people like Chen Ziming and Wang Dan represent a major new phase in the Chinese government's 18-month-old campaign of repression against the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement. Trials and sentencing of pro-democracy activists have taken place steadily since the crackdown first began, and more than 40 people accused of violent crimes in connection with the 1989 demonstrations have been judicially executed, one man as recently as August 1990.

But the principal target of the repression up until now has been the working class participants of the democracy movement, especially those involved in forming independent

labor unions such as the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation - whose leader, Han Dongfang (see *Appendix*), has been held in prison since June 1989 and may well be one of those soon to be tried as a "black hand." In addition, workers who allegedly engaged in acts of sabotage or violence against troops of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) on the night of June 3-4, 1989 or in the demonstrations which erupted all over China afterwards to protest the assault on Tiananmen Square, were arrested by the thousands. Many were quickly tried as common criminals, receiving harsh sentences ranging from several years to life imprisonment, or even death. Thousands more remain imprisoned without charge in squalid, overcrowded detention centers in which arbitrary violence and brutality by police guards is the norm.

"More than thirty years ago, Khrushchev's secret report to the CPSU, the Polish and Hungarian events, and our own Hundred Flowers Movement, provided moments of scintillating possibility for an international communist movement hovering on the edge of irrelevance. The saddest thing was that each was followed by a long period of military-autocratic rule in those countries. Today, however, Eastern Europe is again reminding us of the spirit of 1956..."

"What is happening in Eastern Europe should teach us two things. First, we see that the dictatorship of one party (or some similar system known by a different name) should be abandoned, the introduction of democratic politics being a major trend in socialist development. It is now obvious that a refusal to reform the political system is an attempt to protect vested interests, and is against the tide of change. Second, the promising developments in those countries must be attributed to the ceaseless efforts of the opposition inside both the party and the general population. Their prolonged and untiring efforts in pursuit of freedom of speech and the protection of human rights is responsible for the creation of a healthy political atmosphere. It also reaffirms that democracy is not a gift, but the product of struggle from below by the people themselves. In this struggle, the educated elite must play a leading role by acting as the vanguard."

"We think that the path taken by Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia is the only way to save socialist countries from their internal crises. Political developments in China must learn from these countries. Let us bluntly state: Only when China follows in the footsteps of these Eastern European countries will full democracy and full development be successfully accomplished."

WANG DAN: "The Star of Hope Rises in Eastern Europe", March 4, 1989

⁴ *The South China Morning Post*, December 28, 1990

The immediate objective of this first wave of criminal prosecutions may have been to curtail the possible emergence of a Polish Solidarity-style workers' movement in China. The second wave, now underway, is directed, by contrast, at the top student and intellectual leaders of the Tiananmen Square movement, all of whom face serious charges of "counterrevolution" (the most heinous crime possible in China). Having dealt with the workers, the authorities are now ready to proceed with the more demanding task of identifying and punishing the movement's "sinister masterminds". The trials now underway in Beijing thus represent, in effect, the government's symbolic public decapitation of the 1989 pro-democracy movement.

2. Rough Justice

The trials now underway are unfair, both in terms of Chinese law and international human rights standards. Under Chinese law, they should not be taking place at all. The defendants have been in detention for periods ranging from 13 to 19 months, whereas according to China's Criminal Procedure Law, the maximum period that the police may lawfully detain a suspect before either releasing him or her or bringing the case to trial is five and one half months.⁵

⁵ According to the Criminal Procedure Law of China (1980), the following procedures and time limits must be observed by the judicial authorities - meaning public security organs (police), procuracy (prosecutor's office) and law court - in order for a detention to be lawful:

A detention warrant must be produced at the time of carrying out the initial detention, and the detainees family or work-unit must be informed within 24 hours (Article 43); and the public security authorities (police) must begin interrogating the detainee within 24 hours of his detention (Article 44).

If a formal arrest is to be made, the police must request permission to do so from the procuracy within three days (extendable to seven) of the initial detention, and the procuracy must make its decision within three days of receiving the request (Article 48).

Article 48 continues: "If the public security organ or the people's procuracy has not handled a matter in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the detained person or his family has the right to demand release, and the public security organ or the people's procuracy shall immediately release him."

When making an formal arrest, the police must show an arrest warrant, and the family or work-unit of the arrested person must be informed within 24 hours (Article 50); and interrogation must commence within 24 hours of making the formal arrest (Article 51).

A detainee may not be held in investigative custody for more than two months, unless "the circumstances of the case are complex and the case cannot be concluded before the expiration of the period," in which case a one month extension of custody may be granted by the procuracy (Article 92).

Article 92 further states: "In the event of an especially major or complex case that still cannot be concluded after an extension according to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Supreme People's Procuracy shall request the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to approve postponement of the hearing of the case."

If, after concluding their investigations, the police wish to go ahead with a prosecution, they must, within the above time limits, make a formal recommendation to that effect to the procuracy (Article 93), which must render its decision on the matter within one month, this period being extendable to one and a half months "in major or complex cases" (Article 97). If after receiving the request for prosecution, the procuracy considers that supplementary investigations should be made, then these must be completed within one month (Article 99).

The cumulative maximum period, taking all permissible extensions into account, therefore, for which the authorities may lawfully keep a person in custody before either deciding to prosecute or, if no prosecution is to occur, then immediately releasing the person, is five and a half months.

In several and perhaps all of the cases, formal notices of arrest were not even issued to either the defendants or their families until late November 1990. By that time, virtually all of them had been held in jail for well over one year, in violation of Article 48 of the Criminal Procedure Law which stipulates that formal arrest must be applied for by the police and approval given by the procuracy within a maximum period of ten days following initial detention.

The only lawful way in which the five and a half month limitation on pre-trial detention may be exceeded is if, in accordance with the stipulations of Article 92 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the Supreme People's Procuracy specifically requests the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) to grant such an extension, and the latter then gives its assent.

The Chinese government has asserted that the NPC had indeed approved the extensions. On January 7, 1991, however, the Taiwanese delegate Huang Shunshing, who is actually a member of the NPC Standing Committee, informed the Hong Kong press corps that he had absolutely no knowledge of any such approval having been granted by his committee. According to a report in the *Hong Kong Standard* the following day,

"Huang Shunshing said yesterday that the committee had been told not to discuss the plight of dissidents jailed after the June 4, 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protests. He said Beijing had used the pretext that parliament should not interfere with the judiciary."

"Mr. Huang also said he had not seen a request from the people's procuratorate asking the committee if it could postpone the trials of the dissidents, as required by law, and doubted if such a request was ever made."⁶

Several reports have indicated,⁷ however, that the authorities have not actually been holding the pro-democracy leaders under the provisions of the Criminal Law at all, but rather under a special form of administrative detention known as "shelter and investigation" (*shourong shencha*) for which, according to an October 1989 article published in the official law press, there exists "no legal basis whatsoever."⁸

Taking people in for "shelter and investigation" is an entirely unsupervised form of detention employed by the police on a wide scale, and one that is subject to no intervention or monitoring by the judiciary. The police resort to this form of detention precisely because it frees them from having to observe the various time limitations on detention as specified in the Criminal Law.⁹

Most people taken in under this law are held at specific "shelter and investigation" centers. But many of the pro-democracy movement leaders detained under this measure and now being brought to trial have been held at Qincheng Prison, a maximum security facility for political prisoners located in the

⁶ "Dissidents 'off limits' to NPC," *Hong Kong Standard*, January 8, 1991.

⁷ See, for example, *Jing Bao*, No.1, 1991, p.40.

⁸ "A preliminary look at the question of how 'shelter and investigation' might properly be converted into a coercive criminal sanction," by Yang Lianfeng and Wei Huaming, *Faxue Pinglun* (Law Review), No.5, 1989, pp.29-33.

⁹ Legally, suspects can only be detained for "shelter and investigation" for a maximum period of three months. But because the police are accountable to no one where this method is concerned, the reality is (according to the October 1989 article cited in previous footnote) "a universal problem of case reports not being submitted to the higher authorities and of people being held in detention beyond the proper time limits" for periods "as long as four years."

outskirts of Beijing and administered by the 13th Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security. Once notorious for brutality toward inmates, Qincheng Prison appears to have improved in recent years, and a number of the leading intellectuals held there since June 1989 apparently have been treated relatively humanely. All have endured continuous solitary confinement, however, and there are persistent rumors that others held at Qincheng - including Bao Zunxin, Wang Peigong and possibly also Wang Dan - have been subjected to particularly traumatic forms of mental persecution that may leave them with longterm psychological damage.

The main pro-democracy defendants, including Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao, are reported to have recently been transferred, in preparation for their trials, to Banbuqiao Detention Center, a strict-regime jail located next to Beijing No.1 Prison, and the place where key Democracy Wall figures like Liu Qing and Xu Wenli were held following their arrests ten years ago.

Access to defense counsel has been minimal. In November 1990, the Associated Press reported from Beijing that the Ministry of Justice had issued two secret directives, one barring lawyers from defending pro-democracy activists without prior approval from the ministry, and the other forbidding defendants to plead not guilty without first notifying the ministry. The report accorded with what was already known of China's previous judicial practices in the area of legal defense.

The report was further substantiated by a two-person fact-finding delegation from the Hong Kong Federation of Students which went to Beijing on January 1, 1991 and met secretly with the families of jailed dissidents, student leaders and recently-released intellectuals. According to Tsoi Yiu-cheong, secretary-general of the federation:

"All the lawyers are required to submit their draft defenses for the scrutiny of their lawyers' offices, which will then submit the defence to the Ministry of Justice for prior approval.

"The mission learned from sources that the lawyers' defence for the dissidents must be written in the context that the dissidents are regarded as guilty. The lawyers are just allowed to submit mitigation in court."¹⁰

These restrictions clearly violate the right to a fair trial and represent only the most recent of a whole series of judicial measures which effectively divest the accused's right of defense of all practical meaning. Chief among these are:

- A longstanding ban on the accused engaging the services of, or having any contact with, a defense lawyer until the state has wrapped up its indictment and the case is ready to go to court.

- The continued existence of emergency administrative regulations, first introduced during the 1983 "crackdown on crime" campaign, which reduced legal safeguards for the rights of the accused to a dangerously low level in order that "serious criminals" could be "punished swiftly and severely."

- A strong presumption of guilt, found at each stage of the criminal process and symbolized by the distinctive form of criminal adjudication commonly referred to in China as "verdict first, trial second."

The trials now underway are not open, in violation of international human rights standards. Selected family members have been given tickets to the trials, but no international observers or members of the foreign press corps have been allowed to attend. The shortcomings of the trials are magnified by

¹⁰ "Up to 100 will be sentenced say students," *Hong Kong Standard*, January 10, 1991.

the fact that those being tried as the "black hands" of the movement were peaceful protestors advocating democratic change.

The Chinese government has repeatedly stated over the past few years - in response to growing international criticism of its longstanding policy of incarcerating peaceful dissidents - that "there are no political prisoners in China." Such people have violated the Criminal Law, the government claims, and are therefore simply "criminals." Just prior to the 1989 democracy movement, however, legal opinion in China was increasingly moving towards the view that the charge of "counterrevolution" should be abolished and replaced with something less blatantly political. As one Chinese jurist frankly pointed out, in a book published in early 1989: "Counterrevolution is a political concept, not a legal one." The book even raised, as a reason for abolishing the charge of "counterrevolution," the fact that it is incompatible with basic standards of international law:

"Abolishing the crime of counterrevolution and replacing it with the crime of endangering the security of the state would benefit China in terms of its struggles on the international level. For since the charge of counterrevolution obviously belongs to the category of political crime, and the international standard is that there should be 'no extradition of political criminals,' it would otherwise be very difficult for China to bring to justice and punish those counterrevolutionary criminals who endanger the security of the state and then escape from China."¹¹

The official denial that China has political prisoners is contradicted in a 1986 textbook on criminal statistics work. The book is of the "restricted circulation" (*neibu*) variety - that is, the kind of publication to which all foreigners and most Chinese are not supposed to have access:

"In our surveys of criminal cases, crimes are generally ranked according to category. The two categories of crime are: those of a political nature, and those of a non-political nature. By political crime is meant counterrevolution..."¹²

The following account of the defendants' long record of pro-democracy activity represents, in a sense, an attempt to preempt the grossly distorted version of their activities which will duly appear in the official prosecution indictments. Instead of the claimed "conspiracy", the facts reveal a consistent pattern of adherence to constitutional norms of behavior on the part of the accused.

3. Genesis of the "Conspiracy": China's Democracy Movement, 1976-89

"Almost immediately, the Tiananmen Incident was labelled 'counter-revolutionary'.... They carried out witch hunts in all places of work to find out who had played an active part at the Square during the incident..."

¹¹ *Zhongguo Xingfa de Yunyong yu Wanshan* ("The Application and Perfection of China's Criminal Law"), by Zhao Bingzhi et al., Law Publishing House, April 1989, pp.206-207.

¹² *Fanzui diaocha jiqi tongji fangfa* ("Crime Surveys and their Statistical Methodology"), by Gao Shuqiao and Li Congzhu, Masses Publishing House, Beijing (1986), p.11. The original Chinese version of the passage cited is: "Fanzui leixing you fenwei zhengzhixing yu feizhengzhixing liang zhong. Zhengzhixing fanzui shi zhi fangemingzui..."

"China was on the verge of being turned into a fascist state manipulated by a handful of ambitious leaders. The spontaneous action of the Chinese people during the [Tiananmen Square] events helped to thwart their plans and save the nation from being subjected to a tyranny whose consequences would be inconceivable to us today."

(from *The Tiananmen Poems*, a volume published officially by the Beijing authorities)

April 5th Movement

The passage quoted above offers a salutary reminder of the ease with which judgments once written in stone by the Chinese authorities may be erased and then completely reversed following a change of political power in Beijing.¹³ The events so glowingly eulogized by the Chinese authorities in this passage occurred, of course, not in the spring of 1989, but in the spring of 1976. And the "incident" in question is not the Beijing massacre of June 4, 1989, but a comparatively minor incident of protest and subsequent repression, the April 5th Movement.

That movement is important because several of the "black hands" now awaiting trial for their activities in 1989, Wang Juntao and Chen Ziming in particular, began their careers of dissent and pro-democracy activism during the events at Tiananmen Square in 1976.

The April 5th Movement, which occurred several months before the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, marked China's long-delayed exit from the chaos and suffering of the Cultural Revolution, and initiated the era of reform and modernization associated with Deng Xiaoping. On April 5, 1976, mass demonstrations in Tiananmen Square by the people of Beijing to mourn the death of Premier Zhou Enlai and protest the repressive policies of the Cultural Revolution were violently suppressed by the security forces, leaving hundreds injured and many more imprisoned. Initially condemned as "a serious counterrevolutionary incident", the demonstrations were later, following Deng Xiaoping's rise to power in 1978, declared to have been in reality "a wholly revolutionary action" by the people of Beijing, a patriotic protest movement against Deng's enemies, the "Gang of Four." Almost overnight, the legions of "counterrevolutionaries" who had been imprisoned after the Incident were transformed by the Party-controlled media into "the heroes of Tiananmen".

Perhaps the most famous entry in *The Tiananmen Poems*, the anthology which celebrated that 1978 rehabilitation, was a short poem written in early 1976 by a 17-year-old high school student to mark the death of Zhou Enlai and express the young author's anger at attempts by the Gang of Four to outlaw public mourning of the event:

*"In my grief I hear demons shriek;
I weep while wolves and jackals laugh.
Through tears I shed to mourn a hero,
With head raised high, I draw my sword."¹⁴*

In a footnote, the anthology states: "This poem was considered by the Gang of Four as the most counterrevolutionary." Jailed for several months, its author was eventually released and declared to have

¹³ *The Tiananmen Poems* (edited and translated by Xiao Lan), Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1979.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.24.

been a victim of the Gang, and was rewarded for his bravery by the new government of Deng Xiaoping with a position on the central committee of the Communist Youth League. The name of this erstwhile teenage "counterrevolutionary" was Wang Juntao.

Another of those eventually hailed by Deng as one of "the heroes of the Tiananmen Incident" was a 24-year-old man who had been secretly filmed making a rousing speech to a large crowd of demonstrators outside the Great Hall of the People during the protests of April 5th, 1976. Although denounced on national television by the Gang's publicists for carrying out "counterrevolutionary incitement", the speaker - who was referred to at the time by the authorities only as "Crewcut Shorty" (Xiao Pingtou) on account of his distinctive appearance in the secretly-shot film - was never actually identified or caught.

By a strange irony of fate, during the several months of the Gang's search for the villains of the Tiananmen Incident, he was safely ensconced in the one place where the authorities would never think of looking for him: a prison. A convicted "counterrevolutionary" already (for what remains unclear), he had been temporarily released from prison in Beijing on April 4, 1976, prior to being transferred the following day to a labor camp to serve out the remainder of his sentence. He was thus able to deliver his impromptu speech in Tiananmen Square during the mass protests against the Gang, and then report back to the police as scheduled without arousing any suspicion. Only close friends and relatives knew the real identity of "Crewcut Shorty." Chen Ziming - master-to-be of inconspicuous pro-democracy activism - had made a characteristic first appearance on China's political stage.

Democracy Wall

The official rehabilitation of the Tiananmen Incident led directly to the next major wave of open dissent and pro-democracy activity in China: the famous "Democracy Wall" movement. Named after the long stretch of wall at Xidan, central Beijing, where wall-posters and samizdat-style bulletins calling for democracy and human rights first appeared in the winter of 1978, the Democracy Wall movement initially received the support and endorsement of Deng Xiaoping. Deng regarded the young poster-writers as a useful source of popular leverage in the power struggle which he was then waging against hardline Maoist elements in the Party leadership. Once he had defeated his enemies in the Party, however, Deng promptly dispensed with these allies and in early April 1979, just before the third anniversary of the Tiananmen Incident, ordered an initial suppression of the Democracy Wall activists.

The most famous of those arrested in this first swoop was Wei Jingsheng, editor of the unofficial magazine *Exploration* and author of a pioneering article entitled "The Fifth Modernization," which identified political democracy as being the essential prerequisite for Deng's "Four Modernizations" of the economy. Sentenced in November 1979 to 15 years' imprisonment for "counterrevolution," Wei has been held in harsh conditions of solitary confinement ever since.

Another major casualty of the April 1979 crackdown was Ren Wanding, a young worker who on January 1 of that year had posted a "19-Point Manifesto for Human Rights" on Democracy Wall. It was the founding charter of the China Human Rights League, the first-ever organization dedicated to human rights in China, and Ren Wanding was its leader. Imprisoned for four years, Ren upon his release resumed his unofficial human rights activities, and in late 1988, on the tenth anniversary of the founding of Democracy Wall, wrote an article published in *The New York Times* calling upon student activists to speak out on behalf of imprisoned Chinese dissidents. Ren, who went on to make many speeches in Tiananmen Square during the May-June 1989 protest movement, was arrested several days after the June 4 massacre, went on trial on January 8, 1991 in Beijing.

Democracy Wall was closed down by order of Deng Xiaoping in the fall of 1979. But the activists of the Wall continued to produce large numbers of unofficial pro-democracy bulletins and magazines, and organized nationwide liaison networks through which they developed and promoted their plans for China's peaceful democratization. The final crackdown came in April 1981: dozens of the movement's leaders were arrested, and many were tried and convicted in the summer of 1982 on charges of "counterrevolution" movement. The top leaders of the all young workers, received sentences ranging from 10 to 15 years' imprisonment; Xu Wenli, editor of the unofficial journal April 5th Forum, and Wang Xizhe, a prominent theoretician in the movement, are still (like Wei Jingsheng) being held in solitary confinement at the present time. The fate of several others tried at the time is still unknown.

These various individuals were, in a certain sense, the "black hands" of the Democracy Wall period, and their harsh punishment at the hands of the judicial authorities provides the most likely model of how the trials currently underway of the 1989 democracy movement leaders are being conducted. As happened to their Democracy Wall counterparts, the "black hands" of 1989 are being tried within days of each other, having spent between a year and 18 months in detention: the standard (although according to Chinese statutes entirely unlawful) length of time needed by China's state prosecutors to sew up cases against the "enemies of the people."

But as mentioned above, the government's crackdown on the Democracy Wall movement focussed almost entirely on the young workers, people like Wei Jingsheng, Xu Wenli and Ren Wanding, who had been its chief mainstay and had run most of the unofficial journals. The crackdown left unscathed almost all of the college students and intellectuals who had also played active and roles in the movement. It is from this key group of pro-democracy figures, the students and intellectuals of the Tiananmen Incident and Democracy Wall, that several of the most prominent of those now about to go on trial in Beijing for their "counterrevolutionary crimes" during the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement, are drawn.

"In the final analysis, the 1976 Tiananmen Incident was a movement for human rights. The significance of human rights is more far-reaching, profound and enduring than anything else....The citizens demand freedom of thought, freedom of speech and the release of everyone in the country found guilty of offenses connected with these two freedoms.

"Citizens demand that a national referendum be held to elect state leaders at all levels...and that the state uphold the law and punish those Party and state leaders who violate the law....State ownership of the means of production should be gradually abolished in a transition to social ownership.

"Citizens demand realization of the Marxist doctrine that a socialist society is one in which everyone can develop freely. Any socialist country's form of government is a continuation of the traditional form existing under capitalism. Without the material civilization of capitalism, socialist democracy and freedom cannot survive....We must not only draw on Western science and technology but also on Western traditions, democracy and culture.

"Let ideas smash through the confines of prisons. Let freedom spread far and near. Let the wise people of China share the treasures of all mankind. Let the suffering generations enjoy freedom. Let the younger generation be spared suffering. Eliminate class prejudices and ban deceptive propaganda.

"Secret police and the Party committee of a unit have no right to arrest citizens or investigate them. The secret police system is incompatible with socialist democracy. Citizens demand its abolition....We are 'citizens of the world'. We demand that the borders be thrown open, trade be promoted, culture exchanged and people be allowed to work abroad.

"The China Human Rights League appeals to governments around the world, to human rights organizations and to the general public to support our cause."

REN WANDING: "Nineteen Point Manifesto for Human Rights in China" (extracts), January 1979.

In staging the show trials of people such as Wang Juntao, Chen Ziming, Lü Jiamin (see *Appendix*) and Min Qi, the authorities may be settling accounts with the entire course of the pro-democracy movement in China since 1976, by punishing the main veterans. All four of these individuals were leading organizers of *Beijing Spring*, one of the most influential unofficial journals of the Democracy Wall period. Wang Juntao, by then a student at Beijing University and still bathed in glory as a "hero of the Tiananmen Incident," served as deputy chief editor and wrote many articles for the magazine; Chen Ziming, a second-year student at the Beijing Chemical Industry College, played, as always, a key but inconspicuous and undesignated role, contributing occasional articles and overseeing operations; and Lü Jiamin and Min Qi, also both students, were core contributors.

The magazine was less radical in content than many of the other Democracy Wall publications, notably Wei Jingsheng's *Exploration*, which rejected Marxism in its entirety and bluntly demanded human rights and Western-style liberal democracy. *Beijing Spring*, however, more accurately represented the movement's majority view, which held that the Party could be reformed and eventually persuaded to carry out political democratization and that the main task of the unofficial movement was thus to exert grassroots pressure from below, in support of Deng Xiaoping's reform program from above.

The group had close links, indeed, with some of Deng's leading associates, and their articles were reprinted in internal bulletins of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and other key think-tanks of reform. In the summer of 1980, moreover, Wang Juntao held a four-hour meeting with Hu Yaobang - the future Secretary-General of the Party, whose death in April 1989 sparked off the Tiananmen Square protest movement - at which an intense exchange of views between the two on China's strategy for democratization reportedly ensued.

Much later, when an associate of Wang was arrested after the June 4 massacre in Beijing, one of the police officials who made the arrest told the man's family: "Our squad has been carrying out surveillance of Chen Ziming's group for more than ten years." Apparently, a special unit from the Ministry of Public Security, operating out of a small booth in the bus park behind Democracy Wall at Xidan, had been set up for this purpose in late 1978, and the same police officers were retained to carry out this task after the establishment in 1983 of the Ministry of State Security.

The Election Campaigns

The year 1980 marked the high-point of the campaign by senior progressives in the Party leadership to introduce a program of cautious democratization. The move, which soon proved abortive, was initiated by Deng himself, in a series of speeches that year calling for "reform of the political structure." A key facet of the plan entailed the holding, in winter 1980-81, of direct popular elections to the local People's Congresses. While these local legislative bodies were largely powerless, with responsibilities limited to such matters as overseeing traffic control and garbage disposal, the election procedures included, for the first time, a provision for the nomination of independent candidates. This opportunity was eagerly seized upon by student pro-democracy activists, determined to test the limits of Deng's renewed promises of democracy, and by others who had escaped the April 1979 crackdown against Democracy Wall.

The elections, which began in Shanghai in April 1980, were most hotly contested on the university and college campuses of the capital. At Beijing University and elsewhere, in probably the first modern-style election campaigns ever to be held in China, dozens of student candidates stood forth, each with their own distinctive platform and manifesto, and backed by impromptu squads of publicists and campaign managers. The list of main candidates in the elections read like a Who's Who of China's future

dissident movement: Hu Ping, a young research student in philosophy and chief editor of the influential Democracy Wall journal *Fertile Soil*, which carried devastating articles by Hu on China's need for freedom speech and independence of the press; Wang Juntao who was beaten into second place by Hu in the Beijing University campaign only after delivering a controversial speech arguing that Mao had been a "great peasant leader and agrarian revolutionary", rather than, as tradition had it, a "great Marxist"; Fang Zhiyuan, a student of international relations who drafted an unofficial press law and campaigned nationwide for its public endorsement, and who later - together with Hu Ping - went on to lead the U.S.-based Chinese Alliance for Democracy, the first organization overseas of mainland Chinese dissidents; and - last but not least - Chen Ziming, who was successfully elected to represent his college on the local legislature.

"The purpose of this election should be to choose delegates who truly represent the will of the people and dare to reflect their views and wishes, and who will solidly uphold the people's interests. Those elected should replace, and provide a counterbalance against, our corrupt, muddleheaded, manipulative, untutored and apathetic 'emperor-like' bureaucrats and politicians..."

"If I am elected as a people's representative, I will strive to defend the interests of the people and will fight against any threat to those interests from the corrupt bureaucrats and politicians. My reason for standing as a candidate is to try to promote the political democratization of China. Regardless of whether I am elected or not, I will continue to struggle towards this lofty goal for the rest of my life."

WANG JUNTAO, "Election Manifesto," November 3, 1980

The campaigns sent shock waves through a Party establishment long accustomed to regarding the People's Congress system as being no more than a rubberstamp. Chen Ziming and Hu Ping were both barred from taking up their duly elected positions as people's deputies, and the authorities hastily introduced regulations to prevent any further such unseemly examples of free contesting of local elections in future. All the independent candidates received bad job placements upon graduation. During the campaign, Wang Juntao had ignored officials who threatened, "If you continue with this, your future is finished." He was sent to work in a remote physics research center in Fangshan.

China's minister of Civil Affairs passed the verdict on the whole affair some months later when he said, "During the elections a tiny minority of people made use of the opportunity afforded by the election of people's representatives to carry out so-called 'election contests.' In

disregard of the socialist legal system, they spread anarchy and ultra-individualism, conducted secret 'link-ups' and expressed outrageous and inflammatory views... We must resolutely oppose this."¹⁵

The Student Demonstrations of Winter 1986-87

At virtually every manifestation of pro-democracy sentiments since Deng Xiaoping came to power, Chinese authorities have charged that "a tiny minority" of deviant elements were responsible for misleading China's docile and pliant masses. The charge reached the height of absurdity during the massive Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, when more than a million Beijing citizens gathered spontaneously to demonstrate solidarity with the fasting students. But it was also made in the winter of 1986-87, when tens of thousands of students took to the streets of Shanghai, Beijing and other cities calling for greater democracy and human rights. The movement could not plausibly be dismissed as an orchestrated conspiracy of a small "minority", although the authorities tried to make that case.

¹⁵ Zheng Ming, October 1981.

With the crackdown of early 1987, Hu Yaobang, the Party's general secretary, was swiftly forced from power - but for having allegedly "condoned", rather than actively promoted the unrest. Rather than Hu, the Party elders who came out of retirement to lead the crackdown selected, as their principal scapegoats, three leading intellectuals: Fang Lizhi, the famous dissident astrophysicist; Liu Binyan, China's leading investigative journalist and critic of the abuse of official power; and Wang Ruowang, an elderly writer and longtime fiery critic of the authorities. (Arrested after June 4, 1989, Wang was not released from prison until November 1990.) Prior to the student protests of winter 1986-87, political dissent and pro-democracy activity in the Deng era had indeed been confined to a relatively "tiny minority" of the population.

When it came to trying to pin the blame for the 1986-87 demonstrations on a mere three intellectuals, however, the Beijing authorities were obliged to resort to a more subtle type of ideological gymnastics. The Party did not even try to make a causal link between the activities of the three men and the nationwide demonstrations. Instead, the three were stigmatized as being the embodiment of "bourgeois liberalization" or Western influence.

The scene was thus set for the forthcoming show trials of the "black hands" of the 1989 Tiananmen movement. No longer was it necessary to demonstrate that concrete actions of "conspiracy" produced concrete results of "counterrevolution." Henceforth, the authorities would need only to show sufficiently heinous traces of "bourgeois liberalization," in the form of books, articles or statements by the accused, in order to clinch their case. Any concrete actions by the victims of this process, such as holding meetings or undertaking private pro-democracy initiatives, could then - regardless of their true purpose and nature - be adduced as useful collateral proof of the fundamental political charge.

Peaceful evolution: the 'plot' thickens

One final touch had to be added, however, before the official conspiracy theory could be retroactively extended to encompass the full enormity of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protest movement. This was the charge of "peaceful evolution", an alleged plot purported to have been collectively pursued by the domestic and foreign enemies of socialist China ever since the early 1950s. As life-long exponents of the opposite credo - violent revolution, China's aging rulers evince a strong distaste for the methodology in question. But it is the aim and substance of the "plot", said by Deng just after the June 4 massacre to consist of nothing less than the founding of a "bourgeois republic" in China, that worries them most. As the *People's Daily* explained on December 1, 1989:

"The international reactionary forces...will work in coordination with the turmoil created in socialist countries, in an attempt to force them to make concessions to them so that socialist countries may 'peacefully evolve' into capitalist countries, thus turning those socialist countries into their vassal states. Imperialist have openly declared that their principle is to implement political pluralism and market economy in socialist countries; in other words, they want to implement the bourgeois multiparty system and rotatory term of office, while driving the Communist Party out of office and eventually restoring capitalism."

Having been free of any significant external military threat to the country's security since at least the late 1960s, China's surviving Long Marchers discovered in the course of the 1989 protest movement their hold on state power being eroded by the forces of internal social change. For them, the erection of the "Goddess of Democracy" in Tiananmen Square in late May 1989 was a concrete (more accurately, styrofoam) symbol of the crime of "peaceful evolution" in the making.

The students: preparing for 1989

If the pro-democracy intellectuals were, by and large, the thinkers and strategists of the movement, the students were its active vanguard. As organizers of the massive street demonstrations and the occupation of Tiananmen Square, student leaders like Wang Dan and Guo Haifeng always had a much higher visibility during the events of April-June 1989 than the intellectuals. They proved to be highly adept at the tactics of mass activism, skillfully deploying such techniques of non-violent protest as the hunger strike and the peaceful sit-in, in order to generate sympathy and support from the general public.

But the students had been planning and preparing for the events of spring 1989 for some time. Eager for an opportunity to resume the large-scale student protest movement of the winter of 1986-87, they identified 1989 as probably offering the most auspicious moment. As Shen Tong, a leader of the student "dialogue delegation" which tried to negotiate with the government during the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement, later remarked: "We all knew that a major political event would trigger demonstrations, which would snowball quickly into a nationwide movement. Nineteen eighty-nine was a year of significant anniversaries: the tenth anniversary of the Beijing Democracy Wall, the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the PRC, the seventieth anniversary of the May 4th Movement, and the bicentennial of the French Revolution." When on April 15, 1989 moreover, Shen (who now studies in the U.S.) learned of the death of Hu Yaobang: "I was very happy, not that he had died, but that our opportunity had arrived."¹⁶

"[The] so-called 'democratic salon,' 'freedom forum' and various kinds of 'seminars,' 'conferences' and 'lectures' mushroomed in Beijing's institutions of higher learning. The 'democratic salon' presided over by Wang Dan, a Beijing University student, sponsored 17 lectures in one year, indicative of its frequent activities. They invited Ren Wanding, head of the defunct 'Human Rights League,' over to spread a lot of fallacies about the so-called 'new authoritarianism and democratic politics.' At one point, they held a seminar in front of the Statue of Cervantes, openly crying to 'abolish the one-party system, force the Communist Party to step down and topple the present regime.' They also invited Lu Shuxian, the wife of Fang Lizhi, to be their 'advisor.' Li fanned the flames by urging them to 'legalize the democratic salon,' 'hold meetings here frequently,' and 'abolish the Beijing Municipality's ten-article regulations on demonstrations.' All this prepared, in terms of ideology and organization, for the turmoil that ensued."

(Chen Xitong, Mayor of Beijing, June 30, 1989)

Throughout 1988, Wang Dan, Liu Gang (a close associate of Chen Ziming), Shen Tong and other student leaders in Beijing had been organizing campus discussion groups to explore ideas of democracy and greater freedom as found in the major works of Western philosophy. Wang's "Democracy Salon" and Shen's "Olympic Institute," both based at Beijing University, regularly invited such prominent dissident intellectuals as Fang Lizhi to address their meetings, and even Bette Bao Lord, wife of the U.S. Ambassador to Beijing.

The scope of these students leaders' advance plans for pro-democracy activity during 1989 fell far short, however, of the massive protest movement which in the event actually transpired. Many of the student organizers who initially led the movement, including Wang Dan, were even dismayed at the way in which the protests snowballed to encompass other, non-student sectors of society - notably the workers. The more radical student leaders, such as Chai Ling and Li Lu, who came to prominence during the week-long hunger strike and who later escaped to the West, did not play a major role in the advance preparations for the movement during 1988. The authorities, in their efforts to pin the "conspirator" label

¹⁶ *Children of the Dragon*, edited by Human Rights in China, New York, 1990, p.48.

on most of the student leaders currently held in detention, thus find themselves severely hampered by the facts.

The 1989 pro-democracy movement really began in December 1988, when Ren Wanding sent a letter to the foreign media and international human rights organizations calling for an investigation into the condition of still-detained Democracy Wall activists and students who had been held since the winter 1986-87 demonstrations. Then in January 1989, Fang Lizhi, in a step unprecedented for a leading Chinese intellectual, sent a personal letter to Deng Xiaoping appealing for the release of all prominent political prisoners in China, including Wei Jingsheng. Fang's bold move inspired at least four similar initiatives by other intellectuals in early 1989 - notably a petition requesting amnesty for imprisoned dissidents that was sent to the National People's Congress (China's parliament) by 33 prominent writers poets and others, including Bao Zunxin. China's intellectuals, cowed for so long by the decades of persecution and humiliation under Mao, were finally starting to speak out.

FANG LIZHI'S LETTER TO DENG XIAOPING

*"Chairman of the Central Military Commission
Deng Xiaoping:*

"This year is the fortieth year since the founding of the People's Republic of China and also the seventieth year since the May 4th Movement. There will certainly be many commemorative activities centring on these anniversaries. However, in comparison to the past, there are many more people today than before who perhaps are concerned about the present and even more concerned about the future. They harbor the view that the two commemorations will bring forth new hope.

"In view of this, I sincerely suggest to you that on the eve of these two dates, a general pardon be granted nationally, and in particular, that Wei Jingsheng as well as all similar political prisoners be released.

"I think that regardless of how one evaluates the acts of Wei Jingsheng, the freeing of this man, who has already served approximately ten years in prison, would be a humanitarian act that will promote an excellent social atmosphere.

"This year is also coincidentally the two hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution. No matter how one views this event, the freedom, equality, fraternity and human rights it symbolizes have been accorded universal respect by mankind. Thus, I again sincerely hope that you will consider my suggestion, and in doing so, add new esteem to the future.

*"Respectfully submitted,
Fang Lizhi, January 6, 1989."*

4. Preparing for the "Counterrevolutionary Rebellion": Chen Ziming and his Group

The students and intellectuals played complementary but different roles in the complex social processes that culminated in the Tiananmen Square protest movement. One group of intellectuals in particular - several of whom are among the most prominent of the "black hands" soon to go on trial in Beijing - worked mainly through an unofficial, privately funded network of research institutes that had been set up from 1985 onwards by Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao. Using the most advanced survey techniques in China, the group produced a series of pioneering studies of the social impact and consequences of Deng's economic reforms. They drew often radical conclusions, for they saw, in the reforms' gradual expansion of the sphere of economic and individual autonomy, the seeds of a powerful resurgence of "civil society" in China: a gradual efflorescence of new interest groups, civic bodies and lobbying organizations, all gradually finding their own voices and generating a mounting chorus of social - and eventually political - pluralism across the country.

Where previously, the pro-democracy movement had relied on a strategy of grassroots pressure aimed at encouraging bolder reforms from above, the movement's leading activist intellectuals now began to address themselves to the task of extending, horizontally, the processes of social autonomy and diversification which Deng's reforms had triggered off. For more than a decade, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao had been maintaining that true democracy, when it came, would be the product of a thorough, organic reformation of social and cultural relations in China -- and that such changes would depend, primarily, on economic diversification as a bedrock of other forms of pluralism. Finally, by the late 1980s, they had begun to see this process getting underway.

Contrary to the government's claim, at no time did any of the leading intellectuals who are soon to go on trial show even the slightest interest in "seizing power" or "fomenting chaos and unrest" as a means of achieving their goals. They were all too well aware of the damaging results that several decades of such methods and policies had already had on Chinese society. In raising the specter of "peaceful evolution," and insinuating that it represents an even higher, more insidious form of "attack" on the state, the authorities may hope to circumvent this awkward absence of violence by the leaders of the 1989 pro-democracy movement.

The "blackest of the black hands"

Rather than being content just to talk about the need for a "civil society" to emerge in China, Chen Ziming, from the early 1980s onwards, set about building up the first and, to date, by far the largest and most effective network of independent civic organizations in the history of the People's Republic. The entire operation - which centered on an institute set up by Chen in late 1986 called the Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute (SERI) - was financed through funds raised privately by Chen and his colleagues themselves; they received no government funding whatsoever. The record of this extraordinary enterprise is probably the major untold story of the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement.

Not surprisingly, the names of leading members of Chen's group - Wang Juntao, Min Qi, Liu Gang, Chen Xiaoping, Li Shengping, Zheng Di, Bi Yimin, Fei Yuan (now released) and of course Chen himself - figure prominently on the list of those arrested after June 1989 and all except Bi Yimin, Fei Yuan and Li Shengping may soon be brought to trial. It is no coincidence, either, that the heaviest charges so far known to have been levelled against any of the 1989 pro-democracy activists have been reserved by the authorities for Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao, who have been charged with the capital "counterrevolutionary" offenses of "subverting the government" and "seeking to overthrow the socialist state."¹⁷ In a recent internal speech, Premier Li Peng reportedly labelled Wang and Chen as being "the black hands behind the black hands" (*heishou de heishou*), and insisted to his colleagues in the Party leadership that if these two "old tigers of four dynasties" - a reference to their participation in all the major pro-democracy movements in China since 1976 - were not finally crushed, the regime would know no peace.

The detailed nature of the following account of the group's activities during the 1980s is justified both by the crucial role played by Chen and Wang in developing the ideas and concepts which underlay so much of the 1989 pro-democracy movement, and by the corresponding severity of the charges on which they are soon to be tried in Beijing. Other key leaders of the 1989 movement, also about to be tried, made

¹⁷ Some of the students whose sentences were announced on January 5, 1991 (see p.1 above) were reportedly charged with "inciting subversion"; but this appears to have been a variant on the charge of "counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement," rather than the much more serious charge of actually "subverting the government."

major contributions to the pro-democracy cause. But few others have struggled for so long and as persistently for democratic ideals as have "Crewcut Shorty" and the young poet who in 1976 penned the line (now immortal in China): "With head raised high, I draw my sword". Their story provides a fitting testimony to the struggle of all those currently detained in China on account of their efforts to achieve a more open, just and rational society.¹⁸

Early activities

As described above, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao both began their pro-democracy careers during the April 5th Movement of 1976 and at Democracy Wall. But several other members of the group also began their activities around this time. Min Qi and Bi Yimin were both imprisoned for several months in 1976 for their participation in the Tiananmen Incident; they went on to join Wang's *Beijing Spring* editorial board in 1979; Li Shengping also first started working with Chen and Wang at the time of *Beijing Spring*. After his involvement in the journal, Bi Yimin, who had never been to university, worked for several years as a factory manager. Two others who later, in 1980, joined the group were Zheng Di and Fei Yuan, both students in the economics department of Beijing University. Zheng and Fei were active during the 1980 election campaign at the university, serving as advisers in the "electoral support groups" of two of the independent student candidates.

After graduation, in 1981-82, the group drifted apart. Chen Ziming was admitted as a graduate student in the physics department of the China University of Science and Technology in Hefei (where Fang Lizhi would later work). But he soon dropped out, and instead took a job as an assistant researcher at the Philosophy Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing. Fei Yuan won a graduate place at Beijing University, but was denied admission because of his involvement in the 1980 election campaign. He returned to work in his hometown in Zhejiang Province, but upon reapplying in 1983 was successfully admitted to Beijing University graduate school. Fei later worked as a teacher at the Central College of Finance.

In 1983, Wang Juntao quit the low-grade job he had been allocated at Fangshan, and went off on a long period of travel around central and southern China, finally settling in Wuhan, at the Central China Normal University. (Many students from this college, such as Li Haitao, Liao Baobin and others, who played active roles in the 1989 movement were subsequently put on wanted lists and arrested.) Wang's ideas were consistent from the outset: the key, in his view, to achieving the goal of "national enlightenment" lay in education. While in Wuhan, Wang set up his first enterprise: the Jiangnan Private Coaching School. In the course of this project, he met Xie Xiaoqing, who later became a core member of Chen Ziming's SERI group; Liu Weihua, who was placed under house arrest after June 4, 1989 because of his association with the group; and Liu Danhong, who later became head of a SERI research institute established by Chen's wife (Wang Zhihong), and was arrested after June 4, 1989. All these people helped Wang Juntao run his coaching school. However, Wang was soon 'dismissed' from his job in Wuhan by the local authorities, on the pretext that he was "not a citizen (sic) of Wuhan municipality." At this time, Wang was generally financially destitute. He often looked dirty and half-starved, and he slept in the open-air, on hay ricks.

Meanwhile, in 1983, Chen Ziming carried out a social survey on the topic of "youth values." He had no assistants and no funding, and just sent the questionnaires to his friends all around the country.

¹⁸ The following detailed account of the activities of Chen Ziming's group is an edited version of an extensive interview conducted by Asia Watch in October 1990 with one of the two members of Chen's group who managed to leave China after the June 1989 crackdown.

He received less than 1000 replies and was unable properly to analyze the data, since he had no computer. The survey, however, was the first privately-conducted public opinion poll in the history of the PRC.

Min Qi, who had never been to university (except possibly as a "worker-peasant-soldier" student in the Maoist early 1970s), had by this time - such being the need for good minds in China after the Cultural Revolution - risen to become an editor of *Social Sciences in China*, one of the main publications of the prestigious CASS. Because of his job, Min Qi, later a key member of SERI, had extensive social connections, and he ran many pro-reform conferences and symposia during the 1980s.

Until the late 1980s, when he became a leading associate of SERI, Chen Xiaoping had no contact with Chen Ziming's group. Born in Hunan in 1960, Chen Xiaoping studied first at the University of Politics and Law, Beijing, and then in 1983 entered Beijing University as a masters' degree student in constitutional law. Upon graduation, he became a professor at the University of Politics and Law and then deputy director of the university's constitutional law research office. He first became politically active during student protests held in September 1985 against latter-day Japanese "economic imperialism" in China. Taking advantage of the movement to raise pro-democracy issues, Chen wrote a famous wall-poster at Beijing University denouncing a recent government ban on student demonstrations as being "in violation of the Constitution." He actually signed his name to the poster, thereby gaining instant celebrity among his fellow students, but because of this he became a major focus of investigation by the authorities after the protests had died down. Despite intense pressure, he refused to recant his views.

Organizational evolution

In 1980, Chen Yizi, a prominent Party cadre and associate of Zhao Ziyang, set up the first major policy think-tank of the Deng Xiaoping era: the Research Group on China's Rural Development. The findings of this group helped pave the way for the subsequent decollectivization of agriculture and the dismantling of the People's Communes - perhaps the most significant innovation carried out by Deng since his return to power in 1978. Chen Yizi went on to become a prominent actor in the 1989 pro-democracy movement and was placed on a top wanted list after June 4. He escaped from China and now lives in the U.S.

In 1984, when the economic reforms were extended from the countryside into the cities, Chen Yizi's group split into two separate organizations: the Research Institute for the Reform of the Economic Structure (RIRES), which focussed on the problems of urban economic reform, and the Research Institute for China's Rural Development. These organizations, as official bodies sponsored by the Party-state establishment, received generous funding and extensive office accommodation. Both RIRES and a later official institute, the ill-fated Research Center for the Reform of the Political Structure (RCRPS), were regarded by the authorities after June 4, 1989 as being hotbeds of "bourgeois liberalization." Gao Shan (see *Appendix*), formerly the deputy director of RCRPS, was arrested during the 1989 crackdown and is thought to be one of those shortly to be put on trial as a "black hand" of the pro-democracy movement.

Zhao Ziyang's personal secretary, Bao Tong (see *Appendix*), who was also arrested after June 4 and is one of those most likely to be tried as a "black hand," was a close associate of Gao Shan and played a key role in the work of the RCRPS. Chen Ziming's private research network, centered on SERI, in effect constituted a parallel, unofficial version of these various government-sponsored think tanks. (It also had extensive direct contacts with the latter).

At its height in the late 1980s, the SERI network comprised several different institutes, a weekly economics journal, several publishing houses, a printing plant capable of producing book-length titles in

print-runs of many thousands, a fully equipped computer data-processing center, and a small fleet of cars for staff use. Besides a full-time complement of several dozen paid researchers and employees, many of whom had mobile phones and beepers (still very rare in China), it was able to draw on the research and writing skills of several hundred prominent academics and social scientists across the country.

Whereas Chen Yizi's RIRES focussed almost exclusively on economic reform issues, Chen Ziming's SERI group concentrated, from the outset, on the social issues and problems arising out of the economic reforms. This was the fundamental difference between the two, and one which eventually led to SERI becoming more popular and enjoying even greater prestige among reform-minded intellectuals in China than did RIRES. One important reason why Chen Ziming and his colleagues, instead of finding a congenial working home in the various official reform-oriented institutes mentioned above, decided to take the more arduous route of setting up and funding by themselves their own private research organizations, was that several of them had served time in prison on account of their pro-democracy activities. Even for those of them who had later been rehabilitated, this fact stayed on their personal dossiers (which are kept by the government on all citizens) and effectively barred them from being employed in the official reform think-tanks.

The other main reason, however, had to do with the group's basic interests and agenda: ever since the 1980 election campaigns, they had openly declared that their primary aim was to try to promote the democratic reform of the Chinese Communist Party and, from there, Chinese society as a whole. Also, they were for the most part not trained economists, and their emphasis on the social consequences and problems of the reforms was far too sensitive for the authorities. In fact, SERI and its affiliate bodies were the only organizations in China specifically devoted to exploring these issues. (Significantly, Bai Nanfeng and Yang Guansan, heads of the only department in RIRES that dealt with non-economic issues - the Social Research Office - were both arrested after June 4, 1989; they were released only in mid-1990.)

Since 1976, Chen Ziming and his friends had been constantly talking about the need for democracy, freedom and human rights; the group's motto was "social justice." Chen's first attempt to research systematically these various issues came in 1982-83, when he set up a body called the "Employment Group." The effort quickly failed, however, because Chen could not get the authorities to recognize and fund it as a part of the official think-tank network. The lesson he drew from this experience was that henceforth, he would need to become his own funder.

The Beijing Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute (SERI)

At the end of 1985, Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao, Min Qi, Li Shengping, Wang Zhihong (Chen's wife), Yang Baikui and Chen Zhaogang (both of whom were arrested after June 4, 1989 but were later released) and Zhang Lun began to make preparations for setting up a private research institute. They were inspired in this both by the success of Chen Yizi with RIRES, and by the prevailing liberal atmosphere of the time. Their first problem was money. Some of them sacrificed prestigious, reasonably well-paid jobs in order to undertake the risky venture. Chen Ziming gave up his post at CASS; Li Shengping his job as editor of the journal *Encyclopedic Knowledge*; Min Qi his editorship of *Social Sciences in China*; and Wang Zhihong her job in a small work-unit, where she had been a branch delegate in the Communist Youth League. This was a huge sacrifice to make, especially in 1985, when there was still no free-labor market and the prospects of success were so slim. Yang Baikui and Chen Zhaogang, however, both assistant researchers in the Politics Institute of CASS, and Zhang Lun, a sociology student at Beijing University, were able to keep their existing positions upon joining the new group. (Zhang Lun was one of only two leading members of SERI who escaped from China after June 4, 1989.)

In 1983-84, Wang Zhihong, using her Communist Youth League credentials, had together with Chen and Li Shengping taken advantage of a new and more permissive government policy in order to get permission to set up a small book distributing firm, called the Beijing Books and Journals Distribution Company. This brought them their first funds, and allowed them to develop their circle of contacts. Then, in the autumn of 1985, they established two "correspondence colleges," a novel idea for China, but one which had proved very popular since the government's approval of such colleges a short time earlier. These were the China Trade and Finance Correspondence College, and the China Correspondence College of Administration. Advertisements for student enrollments were placed in the national press, including the China Youth Daily, and the response was overwhelming: very soon, almost 250,000 students nationwide enrolled in the two colleges. Initial receipts amounted to RMB 15 million yuan [US\$3,176,553], of which 10 million yuan was clear profit.

The danger of being labelled by the authorities as "capitalist profiteers" was thus considerable; however, the group had legally registered the enterprises and found a state-run work-unit to provide them, as required by law, with the requisite "affiliated" (*gua kao danwei*) status. (Many state units were happy to provide this kind of service, as it automatically brought them five to ten percent of the affiliate enterprise's profits, by way of a "management fee.") At that time, the government officially recognized degrees and diplomas issued by correspondence colleges. In the summer of 1988, however, it withdrew this recognition because of the great proliferation of such colleges, and Chen's two colleges were then closed down by order of the State Education Commission. But they continued to be a major source of funds right up until their closure.

Everything was done in an entirely legal manner, and the Chen Ziming group quickly became rich well beyond the confines of the "ten thousand dollar household" target which Deng Xiaoping had recently begun to dangle tantalizingly before the Chinese people, as an incentive for them to set about "enlivening" the economy. Virtually all the profits were channelled directly into the research institutes that the group then proceeded to found, however, with only a tiny portion being allocated to staff salaries. Chen Ziming paid himself only 150 yuan per month (US\$32); Min Qi received 180 yuan; and Wang Juntao took home a mere 100 yuan. Right up until the moment when they fled Beijing after the June 4 crackdown, Chen and his wife continued to occupy, as living quarters, only a single room rented from a friend.

In August 1986, at the height of the movement for political reform which swept the country that year, Chen Ziming's group established their first research organization: the China Institute of Politics and Administrative Science. The institute published a bi-monthly journal called *Political and Administrative Studies*, edited by Guo Xia, a researcher at the official Higher Party School. This magazine, though type-set, was distributed unofficially (as in the case of the Democracy Wall journals). The institute focussed on administrative law (the fashionable issue in 1986) and sponsored several conferences on topics ranging from the problems of the intellectuals to foreign policy and government administration. A storm erupted over one of these meetings: a symposium on "military-political science," held in collaboration with young teachers from the Central Military Academy and chaired by a staff researcher from the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army. When word of the conference reached the ears of the Party's Central Military Commission, official fury erupted and the whole matter was intensively investigated. All participants from the army were severely criticized. From then on, Chen Ziming had increasing difficulty in finding work-units willing to bestow the necessary "affiliate" status upon his various institutes. (Largely as a result of this affair, Chen was not allowed to use the "China" prefix when naming these institutes and usually had to settle for using "Beijing" instead.)

In the winter of 1986-87, a fairly serious split occurred in the group. Li Shengping departed, taking a large portion of the funds (but no significant personnel). He set up a new organization named the Beijing Social and Economic Research Institute. Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao, Min Qi, Wang Zhihong and Fei Yuan, showing a Marxist-Leninist flair for such things, promptly established a rival organization

called the Beijing Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute (SERI). They evacuated their former office at Yangfangdian, near Muxidi and the Military History Museum (the scene of some of the worst killing by troops on the night of June 3-4, 1989), and moved into large new premises at Shuangquanbao, in the vicinity of Desheng Gate. The center consisted of more than 20 offices spread over two floors.

The new institute, SERI, was initially headed by Fei Yuan, with Min Qi serving as general secretary. There were over 40 employees in all, including more than 10 full-time researchers (all of whom had resigned from their former jobs so they could join), and typists, secretaries, computer operators, data-entry staff, librarians and archivists. In addition, the institute had more than 200 unofficial affiliated researchers - including graduate students, university professors, and staff from the various government-sponsored think-tanks such as RIRES. The institute undertook numerous major research projects and social surveys, all paid for by SERI itself. It had vast contacts, and its publications and ideas exerted great influence in many official circles. Increasingly, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao were becoming the objects of deep respect and admiration among wide sections of China's intelligentsia. Surprisingly, however, almost none of the SERI group had ever been outside of China. This was not because of any lack of interest on their part in doing so; rather, the fact was that they preferred to stay in China so they would be able to do something to improve life and conditions there.

Structure and Activities

The core of SERI was its four "academic research departments." These were the Political Science Department, the Psychology Department, the Economics Department, and the Sociology Department. In addition, a number of support sections (science and research, public relations, liaison, accounts, library materials and videotapes)

APPEAL BY LIU SULI'S WIFE

I am Chang Jingru, wife of Liu Suli who was actively involved in the 1989 pro-democracy movement in Beijing. Two days ago, I received the message that a formal arrest warrant for my husband had been issued by Beijing Procuratorate on November 24, 1990. The charge is "counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement," and the trial is now pending.

Mr. Liu Suli, 30 years old, was a lecturer in public administration at the China University of Politics and Law. He headed the liaison department of the Beijing United Consultative Committee at Tiananmen Square during the 1989 pro-democracy movement. He was arrested on June 17, 1989 and detained thereafter at Beijing's Qincheng Prison. I have not seen him at all since then.

I came to the United States to continue my education at the end of November, 1989. Until today, I have kept silent in the hope that my husband would be released. I never imagined that the result of all my waiting would be a formal arrest warrant.

My husband loves his country very much. What he did during the 1989 pro-democracy movement was aimed at promoting the reform of China. He insisted on the principles of peace, rationality and non-violence. He committed no crime against his country and he should not be punished.

During his childhood, he received a head injury which was never completely cured and which sometimes still makes him suffer from temporary loss of memory. I have been told that he often suffers from headaches in prison and is unable to sleep. I am so concerned about my husband's state of health.

We have a happy family. Our three-year-old son is too young to understand why he cannot see his dear dad. He needs his dad, and the love of both parents. My husband should be able to live in freedom and to enjoy his fundamental rights as a human being.

As a wife and a mother, I appeal to the Chinese government: Please release my husband and let him receive basic medical care and treatment.

I appeal to all who are concerned about the fate of those arrested in China since the June 4 Democracy Movement of 1989: Please help my husband to regain his freedom.

*Chang Jingru,
November 30,
1990.*

were set up.¹⁹ The four main departments developed rapidly, however, spawning numerous subsidiary "centers" and "institutes." The affiliate relationship of these latter groups to SERI was not generally known, so they often appeared to be independent and separate units. As expansion continued, the four research departments became, increasingly, mere formal containers for all the various "centers" and "institutes" that soon emerged. The pattern of development was as follows:

1) Political Science Department

This was the least "procreative" of the four, in terms of generating affiliate organizations, but was also one of the most productive. In 1987, for example, the department carried out a pioneering nationwide survey entitled "A Survey of the Political Psychology of China's Citizens". The survey, designed by professional statisticians working at SERI and mainly carried out by Wang Juntao and Fei Yuan, gathered altogether 1.5 million items of response data. The preliminary findings, released in late 1987, were reported on extensively in the liberal, Shanghai-based newspaper, *World Economic Herald* (whose chief editor, Qin Benli, has been held under house arrest since May 1989 and is reported to be seriously ill). Reports on the survey also appeared in more than ten foreign newspapers and journals. The final analyzed results, with commentary, were written up by Min Qi and published in February 1989 in a book entitled *Chinese Political Culture: Socio-Psychological Factors in the Delayed Birth of a Democratic Politics*. On the inside cover of the book was printed, in large characters:

"Dedicated to Wang Juntao, Chen Xiaoping, Li Ping, Zhang Lun, Fei Yuan, and all the other comrades striving to establish civic culture"

The survey found that ordinary Chinese citizens "basically know very little about democracy." While the topic of human rights as such was not raised in the survey, the issues of freedom of speech and freedom of association were. Respondents often declared, however, that these rights "should not exist." False options were also included in the questionnaire, such as, "Does democracy mean 'democratic centralism'?" (i.e. Leninist control), and, "Does democracy mean 'the masters acting on the people's behalf'?" Fourteen percent of respondents actually endorsed the latter option. As Andrew Nathan points out, however, in his recent book, *China's Crisis*:

"In this survey, high percentages of citizens expressed pride in living in a socialist country and supported the notion that the Party should take the lead in all things. At the same time, 94 percent of the respondents felt that 'every person has a share of responsibility for the fate of the country,' 58 percent agreed with the statement 'China now has a certain amount of democracy, which needs to be further perfected,' and a strong majority believed that people should be permitted to speak up when the Party makes mistakes."²⁰

The SERI survey concluded, "China's democracy movement must begin, first of all, with a process

¹⁹ Other organizations created by SERI included the Beijing Contemporary Applied Technology Institute, the Beijing Technology Development Center and Printing Plant and the Huaxia Readers Club. The Beijing Contemporary Applied Technology Institute was a fund-raising concern, to supply money for SERI research projects. It undertook research projects on behalf of large industrial and construction companies, and had probably raised about one million yuan by June 4, 1989. The Beijing Technology Development Center was a computer software company, also founded mainly for fund-raising purposes. Its printing plant printed SERI's publications, but also raised funds for the network by printing books for other organizations. The Huaxia Readers Club only began late in 1988.

²⁰ *China's Crisis*, Andrew Nathan (New York 1990), pp. 198-9.

of cultural renewal and enlightenment." Three thousand copies of the book were printed and distributed, but it remained on sale for only a few days after the June 4 massacre. Like all the other books produced by SERI, it is now banned in China.

Other publications by the institute's Political Science Department included a book by Chen Ziming entitled *A Guide to Contemporary Politics*, and a 12-volume series entitled *Famous Thinkers*, which introduced the works of Western writers such as Nietzsche, Weber, Sartre and Freud.

Another major project undertaken by the department was the compilation of a book entitled *A Handbook of Chinese Politics*. This massive work, which covered Chinese politics for the entire decade from 1978 to 1987, and which would have been the first unofficial study of the subject ever published in China, was edited jointly by Chen Xiaoping and Min Qi. Intended to be the first in a series of handbooks on the social sciences, it set forth the current structure, organization and functioning of China's present political system and also introduced the range of SERI's ongoing research projects on the topic. The book was already in finished manuscript form by June 4, 1989, but had not yet been printed. The manuscript was seized by the truckloads of armed police and soldiers who raided SERI's offices on or around June 10, 1989.

The loss of this manuscript was, however, but a small part of the much greater destruction of intellectual effort and suppression of free expression which occurred during the raid: a total of 26 full-length books, all still in manuscript form - including both original works and translations of contemporary Western political thought - which had been prepared by researchers and associates of the Political Science Department of SERI were also seized. Like many other pro-democracy intellectuals prior to June 1989, Wang Juntao was at times strongly attracted by the theory of "neo-authoritarianism" (according to which the presence of a strong, enlightened leader, vested with exceptional executive powers, may provide the best possibility for a rapid transition from autocracy to pluralism). The argument of the theory's critics (of whom Chen Ziming was one), namely, that such a system can always be usurped by an unenlightened despot, was perhaps all too well vindicated in China by the events of June 1989.

2) The Psychology Department

This department early on developed into the Human Resources Testing and Evaluation Center (HRTEV); it was headed by Xie Xiaoqing (whose present whereabouts are unknown) and Wang Zhihong. The ten or more staff of this center mainly carried out employee aptitude and ability tests on behalf of outside companies. But it also did studies for the government, such as "A study of the system for evaluating government personnel," which focussed on methods used in the West. There was no other similar organization in China that could do this kind of work.

Xie Xiaoqing was formerly an associate professor at the Central China Normal University in Wuhan. He quit this job in 1988 to head HRTEV. The center did not actually publish any books, although some manuscripts were with the printers at the time of the June 4 crackdown.

3) The Economics Department

This part of SERI was initially slow to get off the ground. But in March 1988, the department, headed by Fei Yuan and Wang Juntao, bought a newspaper called the *Economics Weekly* for the sum of RMB 300,000 yuan. The director of the newspaper was He Jiadong, 60 years old and formerly a deputy director of the official Workers Publishing House. Fei Yuan served as the deputy director of *Economics Weekly*, and Wang Juntao was assistant to the chief editor, also an elderly man.

The journal had eight pages per issue, and appeared in print runs of several tens of thousands.

It was immensely influential, even more so than Qin Benli's *World Economic Herald*. The main attractions were the regular feature articles by Wang Juntao discussing the various social and economic problems that had been created during the decade of reforms. It was similar in emphasis to *World Economic Herald*, but because of space allowances was able to publish longer and more analytical articles. Indeed, Qin Benli is reported to have said: "In terms of predicting and analyzing [China's] economic situation, providing critique and comment on the economic reforms, and in the quantity of its output of articles on economic theory, the *Weekly* went way beyond the *Herald*."²¹

4) Sociology Department

The first activities of this department of SERI, carried out between 1987 and 1988, consisted of a series of public opinion surveys on reform of the civil service system; reforms "to separate the Party from the state"; reform of the employment system; and "diversification of the resource allocation system." This led, in March 1988, to the establishment (under the SERI umbrella) of China's first independent public polling center: the Opinion Research Center of China (ORCC). The center was headed by a woman, formerly employed at the Social Research Office of RIRES and a lecturer in journalism at the People's University.

From the outset, the center used by far the most advanced and scientifically sound techniques of social surveying in the whole of China, and was equipped with the best computers available. To ensure the quality of the sample designs, three recent Chinese graduates of Michigan University's Survey Research Center were hired, together with ten academic consultants from Beijing University, People's University and CASS. The following were the main projects carried out by the center:

-- "Survey of the views and aspirations of delegates to the National People's Congress". This project, carried out in April 1988, was a resounding success, and it established the center's reputation as a cutting edge of the pro-democracy movement. The center sent questionnaires to all 3000 or so "people's representatives" on the NPC, and received full responses from as many as 1100 of them. The survey had two aims: to discover the level of political and legal knowledge on the part of the delegates (findings: "extremely low"), and to obtain their views on the hot topic of "reform of the political structure." The results of the survey were reported in more than ten major newspapers in China, including the *People's Daily* and also Hong Kong's *Wen Hui Bao*.

-- "Survey of the thoughts and ideology of university students". This nationwide survey, the results of which were also published in the *People's Daily* and other major newspapers, explored the views of students on such topics as their system of values, the job-placement system for college graduates and - provocatively enough - their views on the student demonstration movement of winter 1986-87. Most students said they felt very disillusioned about the latter issue. A common response was: "There's no point. We just want to get on with our studies now."

-- In May 1988, ORCC carried out a survey investigation into the problem of the so-called "secularization" or "worldly-ization" of society (*shehui shisuhua*) - meaning, in the Chinese context, the problem of how to end the prejudiced view that money is something "dirty". The findings of the project, which was carried out in close conjunction with the Sociology Department of Beijing University, were prominently reported in Qin Benli's *World Economic Herald* in late 1988.

-- Also in May 1988, ORCC began preparation of two series of books, *Translated Works of Contemporary Sociology*, covering Durkheim, Comte and others, and *Basic Theory of Contemporary Sociology*. A total of fourteen titles in these series were ready for publication, either in manuscript form or already

²¹ Cited in *Jing Bao*, January 1991, p.44.

typeset and sent to the printers, by June 4, 1989. After the massacre, all were confiscated and banned.

-- "A survey of political participation among China's citizens". Conducted in December 1988, this was a pilot study conducted in Beijing in preparation for a forthcoming national survey on the same topic. (Because of the June 1989 crackdown, however, the latter never took place.) It was, as Andrew Nathan explains, one of the most significant of all ORCC's projects:

"The study was designed, among other purposes, to collect the first set of reliable data on the political attitudes of China's citizens. In the pilot study, [the] respondents showed extremely high levels of attention to political news in newspapers and on radio and television. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents said they were interested in politics.

"The respondents demonstrated strong aspirations for more democracy. In a question on the role that the National People's Congress ought to play, 65 percent felt it should either 'convey the masses' opinions to the government' or 'set laws and represent the citizens in supervising government,' while only small numbers assigned it more passive roles or felt unable to comment.

"Seventy-two percent agreed with the statement that 'democracy is the best form of government' and 79 percent disagreed with the proposition, 'If we implement democracy in our country now it will lead to chaos.' Sixty-two percent disagreed with the statement, 'A country can't be run well if it has too many political parties,' and 55 percent did not agree that 'If people's thinking isn't unified, society will be turbulent.' At the same time, the questionnaire revealed a reservoir of trust in the government; for example, nearly half the respondents said they would expect to receive fair treatment if they sought the help of a government organ."²²

The ORCC survey on political participation in China was funded by three Western sources: the U.S. National Science Foundation; The Ford Foundation; and the Fund for the Reform and Opening of China, established in 1986 in Beijing by the prominent Hungarian-born financier, George Soros. Even before the June 1989 crackdown, however, the Chinese authorities - doubtless anticipating the "peaceful evolution" theme - had compiled a dossier on Soros, accusing him of using the Fund as a cover for CIA-backed espionage activities in China. After the crackdown, official reports fingered Chen Yizi, head of RIRES and co-chairman of Soros' China Fund, as being deeply involved in the "plot" also; and Zhao Ziyang's chief aide, Bao Tong - who personally authorized the Fund's establishment in China - will probably face charges on similar counts at his widely expected forthcoming trial.

(Had the respondents to the ORCC survey, which was partially funded by Soros, known of these sinister circumstances at the time, perhaps they would have been much more guarded in the answers they gave. More probable, though, is that the allegations would have sharply diminished their remaining "reservoir of trust in the government.")²³

The final project was carried out by ORCC during May 13-20, 1989, the week of the student hunger strike in Tiananmen Square. It was a two-part "Survey of opinions and attitudes regarding the 1989 student movement." The first part tested the views of students themselves; the second tested the

²² *China's Crisis*, pp.197-8.

²³ Sadly enough, in view of SERI's main declared aim, Soros' own conclusion on the affair was: "It became clear to me that I had made a mistake in setting up a foundation in China. China was not ready for it because there was no independent or dissident intelligentsia....The foundation could not become an institution of civil society because civil society did not really exist." (*Opening the Soviet System*, George Soros, London 1990, p.15.)

views of the general populace of Beijing. Both were done on a "door to door" basis, that is, by going around people's homes. Another poll on the same subject was carried out by Beijing Normal College, but through interviews conducted on the streets. This had the defect that those surveyed were by definition the most likely to be sympathetic towards the student movement; and sure enough, the poll found that over 90% of those interviewed supported the movement. The ORCC survey also found a majority in favor of the students' actions, but less than in the Beijing Normal College poll. In addition, most of ORCC's respondents, although supportive, still agreed with the statement, "The student movement won't be able to achieve anything." And a majority of the students themselves were apprehensive that the authorities would "settle accounts" with them eventually. The statistical data from this historic poll are still inside China, so the full findings are unknown.

INTELLECTUALS' VOW

"As intellectuals, we solemnly swear on our honor, on our entire conscience, on our bodies and souls, on every shred of our dignity as human beings:

"We shall never betray the struggle for democracy built on the lives and blood of the patriotic students; never seek any excuse whatsoever for our own cowardice; never again allow our past humiliations to be repeated; never sell out our own consciences; never surrender to dictatorship; and never acknowledge the present last emperor of China as our lord and master."

"Open Declaration" by BAO ZUNXIN, YAN JIAQI, SU XIAOKANG and seven other intellectuals, issued in late May 1989. Bao, Yan and Su were all placed on government wanted lists after June 4, 1989. Yan and Su both escaped from China. BAO ZUNXIN was arrested, and his trial is now thought to be imminent.

5. Account by a Leading Member of SERI: the Group's Role in the 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement

"After 1986, the economic reforms stagnated and political structural reform failed to get off the ground. By 1988, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao had begun to have strong premonitions that a large-scale movement for democracy and freedom would take place in China during 1989. In late 1988, therefore, Chen and Wang decided it was necessary to begin studying the situation in detail and to conduct a dialogue and exchange of views with other concerned scholars; and specifically, to carry out preparations for the forthcoming 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement in 1989. They met with Liu Weihua, head of the Scientific Research Section of SERI (Liu was put under house arrest at his home in Wuhan after June 4), and rented several rooms at the State Council's No.2 Hostel at Xizhimen in Beijing, for the purpose of convening a several-month long conference there.²⁴

²⁴ This account was given to Asia Watch in October 1990 by a leading member of the SERI research network who left China after the crackdown and who wishes to remain anonymous.

"A whole host of specialists were invited to the conference: academics from the economic field were invited to discuss China's economic crisis and its future prospects; political researchers came to assess the prospects for China's reform of the political structural; historians came to analyze the lessons to be drawn from previous revolutions and reforms for the current stage of China's history, and to consider what inspiration these might offer for the present problems of reform; and artists and writers were invited to discuss the contribution that a cultural enlightenment could make towards raising the civic quality of the Chinese people.

"This forum at the No.2 Hostel had a great impact on the capital's intelligentsia. It was the first time intellectuals had the chance to exchange views on such matters systematically. (Official state-run research institutes were unwilling to convene discussions of this kind, while those who desired such activities had neither the financial capability nor the necessary social contacts.) However, the series of conferences angered the Ministry of State Security. Soon after the first day of the conference, the guards at the hostel entrance began to pay close attention to all the participants. They prevented them from coming and going freely and in the end, the participants were barred from continuing to use or occupy the rooms that had been rented.

"During this period, Liu Gang had been busy organizing a series of discussion sessions (also known as democracy salons) at Beijing University. Fang Lizhi and his wife, and Bette Bao Lord, wife of the former U.S. ambassador in China, were invited to give talks at the salons. These activities filled Beijing University, the main base of previous student movements in China, with an atmosphere of keen expectation and excitement in the months leading up to the 1989 democracy movement. Agents from the Ministry of State Security soon began subjecting Liu Gang to constant harassment. If he stayed for a night at a certain dormitory, then that night or the next morning policemen or officials from the university's security section would be sure to visit him. In the end, he suspended his activities and left for Anhui to carry out a social survey. After his return, he worked for two months at the Opinion Research Center of China. But at the beginning of 1989, he again threw himself into the task of preparing and organizing for the democratic movement.

"In February 1989, the poet Bei Dao and 32 other intellectuals jointly launched a campaign to get signatures for an open letter to the Communist Party Central Committee and the National People's Congress, appealing for the release of political prisoners. Nearly all of the leading personnel of SERI signed this letter.

"On April 15, Hu Yaobang died. That evening, Chen Xiaoping liaised with other young lecturers at the University of Politics and Law and began to prepare wreaths. The following day, a Sunday, Chen Xiaoping and the lecturers, together with several hundred students, carried a wreath measuring two meters in diameter on a flatbed tricycle, pedalled by Chen, to the Monument of the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square. In universities and colleges around the capital, big-character posters and slogans commemorating Hu Yaobang and criticizing the government began to appear.

"On April 21, the Beijing Students Federation was set up at Beijing University. Liu Gang was the main initiator of this group; he was also the only non-student among its leaders. Because of Liu's special connection with SERI, the student movement was able to benefit from the leadership abilities of people who had had many years of experience of fighting for democracy in China. From the outset, therefore, the 1989 movement was remarkably well organized and displayed a strategically advanced character. On behalf of SERI, Chen Ziming donated 3000 *yuan* to the Committee.

"On the evening of April 21, the Beijing Students Federation organised about 200,000 university and college students in the capital to march to Tiananmen Square. They wanted to get there before the curfew so they would be able to participate in the memorial gathering for Hu Yaobang the following

morning. Chen Xiaoping and Liu Suli organized a column of marchers from the University of Politics and Law. At the forefront of the column of marchers, students carried a huge placard bearing clauses from the constitution protecting civil rights. That evening, all of the SERI committee members went to the Square to be with the students.

The student movement rapidly gained momentum. The publication of the hostile *People's Daily* editorial on 26 April greatly sharpened the confrontation between the government and the students. From April 30 to May 2, SERI's committee members booked into the Xiangshan Villa to hold a series of meetings on the situation. Those present at the meetings included Chen Ziming, director of SERI; Wang Juntao, deputy editor-in-chief of *Economics Weekly*; Chen Xiaoping, editor of the *Handbook of Politics*; Min Qi, also editor of the *Handbook*; Liu Weihua, head of the SERI Scientific Research Section; Zheng Di, deputy editor of *Economics Weekly*; Fei Yuan, deputy director of *Economics Weekly*; Xie Xiaoqing, director of the Beijing Human Resources Testing and Evaluation Center (HRTEV); Wang Zhihong, deputy director of HRTEV and Chen Ziming's wife; Bi Yimin, head of SERI's Beijing Contemporary Institute of Applied Technology and the deputy director of ORCC. The meetings mainly focussed on discussing the developing situation and assessing SERI's various options.

The consensus at the meeting was that the student movement was an epochal event in the history of China's struggle for democracy and freedom. It would give the Communist Party the spur and motivation it needed to begin a process of self-reformation, and would be a watershed in the ten-year reform program. Opinions differed, however, on the question of whether or not SERI should involve itself in the student movement, and if so, how and to what extent. Some members of SERI stressed how difficult it had been, in the face of surveillance from the Ministry of State Security and the Public Security Bureau, and despite all the difficulties that had been created by the various state departments, for SERI to manage to develop into the influential research institute that it had by then become: an independent economic entity, with its own news media, and with several dozen full-time researchers, who had already produced real and substantial results. In their view, SERI should proceed very cautiously during the movement, so as not to provide the Ministry of State Security with an excuse to close down the institute. Other members of SERI, headed by Wang Juntao, took the view that since SERI had been formed voluntarily by a group of people who had been working for many years to establish democracy and freedom in China, and the organization's goal was precisely to strive for political democracy, its choice was clear. If they hesitated in taking part in the student movement, SERI could lose forever its leading position of advocacy in the democracy movement and would suffer an immense loss of status among the intellectuals in future.

The committee members finally decided that it would give the student movement its utmost support by providing help and guidance, but that SERI would not stand in the forefront. The *People's Daily* editorial of April 26 had talked about "an extremely small number of people with ulterior motives [who] continued to take advantage of the young students" and on this basis defined the movement as constituting a "turmoil," and it was important to avoid doing anything which could be used to justify that analysis.

On May 4, Wang Juntao, Zheng Di, Fei Yuan and others initiated a demonstration march by journalists in the capital. Although the march comprised no more than 200 people, when the journalists hoisted placards demanding press freedom and joined with the student marchers at the Square, they gave a tremendous boost to the already very large May Fourth demonstration.

By May 19, the eve of martial law, all the various sections of SERI had begun to participate actively in the movement. The *Economic Weekly* broke through the news blockade by reporting accurate news about the student movement every day. Between May 13 and 20, ORCC carried out two public opinion surveys (as referred to above) which revealed support for the movement among Beijing residents and disappointment among students with the government for the way the movement was handled.

"On May 20, martial law was imposed in Beijing. At 10 a.m., SERI committee members met at the Jimen Restaurant in the northwest of Beijing to discuss the rapidly changing situation and the measures that SERI should take. The meeting decided that as the Communist Party had now taken a stand in direct opposition to the people and the student movement had entered its most difficult moment, SERI would plunge itself into the movement regardless of the possible consequences for itself.

"In a short period of just over ten days, SERI changed its contact point from the Jimen Restaurant to Dongfang Hotel, then to Beiwei Hotel and back again to Guoyi Hotel, but nevertheless it remained under 24-hour surveillance by the Ministry of State Security. The telephones at SERI were bugged, as were the committee members' beepers, and SERI's leaders were trailed by plainclothes personnel and their cars were followed. But still, none of them felt intimidated.

"On May 22, under the leadership and organization of Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao, the *Joint Liaison Group of All Circles in the Capital (JLGACC)* was formed (it was also known as the Patriotic Joint Liaison Group All Circles in the Capital for Protecting the Constitution). The JLGACC set up various constituent bodies: a theory and research section, strategic section, information section, fund-raising section, propaganda section, liaison section, deployment section, logistics section and security section. The JLGACC and its propaganda Section published a four-page daily broadsheet called *News Flash*. The broadsheet carried news and commentary, and the decisions and documents of the JLGACC. *News Flash* was printed at the Monument to the People's Heroes and had a considerable impact on the student movement. At the end of May, the JLGACC started to publish the *People's Voice* (a weekly journal), but in fact only one issue was published - on June 2.

"From May 22 onwards, the JLGACC held meetings every morning at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to consider the rapidly developing situation and discuss what the students' strategy should be. A representative from the student leadership was always present: sometimes it would be Wang Dan, sometimes Chai Ling, and sometimes Wuerkaixi. The JLGACC was in effect an advisory center for the student movement, especially towards the latter part of the movement, by which time the students at the Square had become completely exhausted and their dialogue with the government had reached a total stalemate. The question of whether to remain in the Square or retreat back to campus had become the main focus of dispute among the students and their leaders alike. Hence, the leadership function of the Joint Liaison Group became ever more prominent.

"Almost all the principal personnel of SERI went regularly to the Square. Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao, Chen Xiaoping, Liu Gang, Zheng Di, Min Qi and Bi Yimin were to be found in the tents of the students at the Square almost every day. Chen and Wang often held long talks with Wang Dan and Chai Ling to explain their viewpoints and help them to analyze the situation and grasp the moment.

"There were three non-student leaders in the Command Center to Protect Tiananmen Square: Liu Gang, who served as head of the Logistics Section; Liu Suli, who was the Liaison Section head; and Zhang Lun, leader of the Student Pickets. These three SERI researchers had enormous impact and influence during the latter part of the student movement. On May 27, the Liaison Section of the JLGACC organized a press conference for more than 100 local and foreign journalists, and on May 28 it initiated and organized the "Worldwide Chinese Demonstration March."

"When Beijing was finally placed under siege by 350,000 soldiers of the People's Liberation Army, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao decided that the situation was rapidly heading towards major bloodshed, and at a meeting on May 28 the JLGACC put forward the proposal that the students should retreat from the Square on May 30. The student leaders were divided in their opinions, but the proposal was finally vetoed by them.

DECLARATION OF THE CAPITAL LIAISON GROUP

1. The Joint Liaison Group of All Circles in the Capital (JLGACC) shall be known for short as: "Capital Liaison Group."

2. The Capital Liaison Group is based on the present, great Patriotic-Democratic Movement. It has been spontaneously organized, and is a mass organization of the workers, intellectuals, cadres of the state apparatus, young students, patriotic-democratic elements, peasants and people engaged in business.

3. The goal of the Capital Liaison Group is to unite the different sections of people in the capital. We call on all patriots from different sections, and from all parties and factions, to take action to set up a patriotic-democratic united front, so that the democratic forces can grow and increase in strength, and the republic can be taken along the road of freedom, democracy, the rule of law and civilization.

4. The immediate goal of the Capital Liaison Group is to mobilize all patriotic people to actively assist the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation and other autonomous organizations in the higher education field, and to support resolutely the present Patriotic-Democratic Movement to the very end.

5. The immediate tasks of the Capital Liaison Group include:

a) With the help of professional journalists, to produce an unofficial publication that will reflect the true feelings and sentiments of the people - to be called Voice of the People.

b) To organize citizen patrol groups to assist the students in maintaining order in the capital, that normal life and social stability may be guaranteed.

c) To mobilize the masses from all sections of the community to do everything possible to resist martial law and thoroughly defeat the conspiracy of military rule imposed by the small clique of autocratic elements.

d) To study strategy and tactics for the furthering of the movement, providing reliable information, practical theories, and suggestions for solving the problems of all patriotic organizations.

e) To coordinate the patriotic elements of all sections of the community so that purposeful, prepared, organized, forceful and united actions can be undertaken against the minority of autocratic forces and in support of the university students.

f) To collect opinions and suggestions from all patriotic elements of the community. Endless effort will be devoted to promote the further growth and improvement of the Capital Liaison Group.

6. The Capital Liaison Group will have the following departments: theory and research, strategy and tactics, information, fund-raising, propaganda and agitation, liaison, coordination, supply, editorial board of the "People's Voice", publication and security departments.

7. Capital Liaison Group bases its action on the will of the majority of China's citizens. The Capital Liaison Group supports the Constitution and will work within the Constitution, although it feels that the constitution still needs to be amended and perfected.

8. The sole condition for the dissolution of the Capital Liaison Group will be: that after extensive and sufficient polling of public opinion, it is found that the majority of the Chinese people no longer feel that it should continue to exist. Unless this happens, no other factors or force should be able to bring about its dissolution. The hatred and repression directed at us by the autocratic forces will only lead to the further growth and maturity of the group.

9. The Capital Liaison Group is in a condition of continuous development. It is hoped that the patriotic elements and organizations of all the various sectors of society will give their sincere help and guidance. All help and support, whether material or otherwise, will be welcomed. All sectors of the community and people from all walks of life are also welcome to join the organization.

Long Live Democracy! Long Live the People!
Long Live Freedom! Long Live China!
Unite and Pursue the Democracy Movement to the End!

May 25, 1989

"At 4 a.m. on June 4, a director of one of the SERI institutes, having witnessed soldiers opening fire and killing people, made telephone calls from a public phone booth near the Square to inform Chen Ziming, Wang Juntao and other SERI leaders of the situation. Later the same day, as the killings continued throughout the city, a call was received from Chen Xiaoping and it was learned that Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao were still alive. We urged them to go into hiding immediately, but they said that they would remain in the capital so long there was any possibility left for continued activity.

"During the several days following 4 June, none of SERI's principal personnel made any preparations for going into hiding. All of them held important positions, and they felt they had a responsibility to stay behind and look after their various institutes. In addition, they wanted to be able to monitor the situation, and were thus unwilling to leave Beijing before the situation had finally become clear. This was why SERI suffered such heavy losses during the crackdown. Seven of SERI's top leaders were arrested, and one escaped abroad. One is now in hiding in China; one is under house arrest; and the present whereabouts of another are unknown. Chen Ziming and his wife, Wang Zhihong, were arrested together in Zhanjiang, Guangdong in October 1989, together with several of Chen's relatives, and Wang Juntao was arrested in Hunan around the same time. Wang Zhihong (who has now been released) was six months pregnant at the time of her arrest, and is said to have later suffered a miscarriage in prison. Liu Gang was also arrested; his mother died in November 1989, and his father was later found to have liver cancer. The wives of other SERI leaders who were arrested or escaped now have to raise and look after their children single-handedly."

6. Conclusion

The activities related above are what Chen Ziming and colleagues, together with the other leading intellectuals now stigmatized as the "black hands" of Tiananmen Square, actually did. The facts, all of which are well known to China's Ministry of State Security, contrast sharply with the charges levelled by the Chinese government. The intellectuals in question, with their long experience as pro-democracy activists, attempted to provide guidance to the student demonstrators in 1989 and to steer them toward realistic channels of protest that might minimize the changes of violent confrontation and yield tangible results. They made little headway. Their advice was as often as not disregarded by the students in Tiananmen Square, most notably when they failed to persuade the students to evacuate the Square in advance of the impending crackdown. The idea that they somehow masterminded the entire protest movement and dictated its unfolding strategy is absurd.

Why, then, have these intellectuals been singled out for harsh punishment in the trials now taking place in Beijing? The answer seems to lie in the goal they have been working for over a decade to achieve, namely, the fostering in China of a strong civic culture. The 1989 movement was a resounding vindication of Wang's and Chen's "civil society" project. The term "citizens" (*shimin*), for example, which had never before been used by Beijing residents in reference to themselves, was spontaneously adopted by them during April-June 1989 as the only term which could adequately express the meaning of their popular movement. No longer content with its traditional, Party-designated role as "the masses", the Beijing public displayed a newfound sense of civic responsibility and demanded that the Chinese leadership acknowledge this role.

In this light, the pathbreaking work undertaken by SERI to analyze the changes being wrought in Chinese society by the Deng Xiaoping reforms was particularly threatening to the authorities. Through

their use of modern methods of public opinion polling, the SERI researchers were challenging the Party's claim to represent the interests and views of the general populace. Those views could now be directly ascertained, without the need for any intermediary. The greatest crime of the "black hands" of Tiananmen Square may thus have been their attempt to create the preconditions for a free flow of political information in China and hence, for the gradual emergence of a modern, democratic polity.

APPENDIX: Other Chinese Pro-Democracy Leaders Currently on Trial or Facing Trial

■ **Bao Tong**, 57, a senior adviser to ousted Party secretary-general Zhao Ziyang, was last reported to be under house arrest at the Central Party Organization Department guest house (*South China Morning Post*, June 27, 1989.) According to the source, a full investigation into Bao Tong's pro-democracy involvement turned up "no criminal evidence," but recent reports have suggested that he is likely to be brought to trial soon anyway. Bao was arrested several days prior to June 4, 1989, and according to *Shijie Ribao* (February 20, 1990), was held in solitary confinement for several months in Qincheng prison on a severely inadequate diet. While other inmates of Qincheng reportedly received good treatment, Bao "remained the exception."

Bao Tong, labelled a "black hand" conspirator behind the 1989 turmoil, originally was accused of leaking state secrets by revealing the plans for the imposition of martial law at a May 17, 1989, "plotters meeting" attended by leading members of various research institutes. He was criticized by name in Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong's June 30, 1989, speech to the National People's Congress Standing Committee. A draft scheme for political reform put together by Bao prior to the crackdown was viewed as "anti-party" by the conservative, anti-reform members of the party leadership.

Prior to his arrest, from January 1988 until June 1989, Bao Tong was director of the Communist Party's Research Center for the Reform of the Political Structure and was a member of the Central Committee. He is identified with the reformist views of his mentor, Zhao Ziyang, and was Deputy Director of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economy when Zhao was the Commission's director. According to an article in the *Asian Wall Street Journal* (December 26, 1988), Bao rejected Western-style democracy as being "irrelevant" for China.

■ **Bao Zunxin**, a philosopher and leading intellectual, now in his early fifties, was charged on November 24, 1990 with "counterrevolutionary activities" (*Hong Kong Standard*, November 29, 1990). Bao, an Anhui Province native, was arrested at home on July 7, 1989 shortly after the authorities' issuance of secret warrants in June 1989. His name appears on a government "wanted list" dated September 1989, under the heading, "Major criminals on Ministry of Public Security wanted lists who have now either been caught or have turned themselves in."

Bao reportedly is being held in Qincheng prison, although an Asia Watch source said he was seen in September 1990 in an army hospital. "Small, frail and in poor health before his imprisonment, he looked no more than 70 pounds, scrunched in a wheelchair." According to a second source, Bao made several suicide attempts after discovering that the authorities had used statements made by him in prison as the basis for arresting several other pro-democracy figures. He is said by the source to have developed signs of mental illness and to require daily medication for heart disease and high blood pressure.

Bao was prominently mentioned in Mayor Chen Xitong's June 30, 1989 report, "Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counterrevolutionary Rebellion." Chen singled out Bao for his involvement in the production of several major pro-democracy texts: the May 13, 1989 big-character poster, "We Can No Longer Remain Silent"; the May 14 "Our urgent appeal concerning the current situation," jointly made by 12 intellectuals; and the "May 17 Declaration." Bao also had argued strongly against the imposition of martial law and had tried to organize his fellow intellectuals to form an independent organization and to support demonstrating students.

During the first half of the 1980's, Bao was acting chief editor of the journal *Dushu* (Reading).

which advocated intellectual freedom and openness to the West. From 1983 to 1987, he was editor-in-chief of the book series *Weilai Congshu*, (Toward the Future), a series which introduced new concepts in western social science and humanities to its Chinese readers. A number of leading younger intellectuals now in exile, sat on its editorial board. Bao also was an associate research fellow at the Institute of Chinese History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; he is a writer.

Bao was dismissed from his post and expelled from the party on August 9, 1989 for "stubbornly clinging to bourgeois liberalism (and) fanning...the recent students' unrest...." In July 1989, he and nine other authors had their works banned by the State Press and Publications Administration.

Bao had been allowed to correspond with his wife. At Chinese New Year 1990, he was granted a family visit; but since January 24, 1990 there has been no exchange of letters, and his wife had heard no further news of him (*Amnesty International* ASA 17/60/90) prior to the November 1990 indictment. He went on trial on January 15, 1991.

■ Chen Xiaoping, a 29-year-old native of Hengyang, Hunan Province, is believed to be now facing prosecution, although earlier unconfirmed reports said that he had already, in mid-1990, been sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for "inciting the masses to counterrevolutionary activity."

Chen reportedly turned himself in to the authorities shortly after June 4, 1989. A graduate of Beijing University's Law Department, lecturer at the University of Politics and Law in Beijing and a constitutional law scholar with an international reputation, Chen was a promoter of constitutionally guaranteed basic freedoms. He reportedly was active in student demonstrations in late 1985, at which time he criticized a government ban on demonstrations as unconstitutional. He was punished by being denied a prestigious job with the Legal Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Chen emerged as a leader of the pro-democracy movement in May-June 1989. He was instrumental in forming the Beijing Citizens Autonomous Union and often was seen using a bullhorn to exhort Beijing citizens to support the student protestors. Chen was a colleague of Yan Mingfu, now purged, who was in turn a close associate of Zhao Ziyang, deposed secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party.

■ Gao Shan, a 34-year-old economist and deputy director of the Research Institute for the Reform of the Political System of the Communist Party Central Committee, was arrested in late June, 1989. According to Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong's June 30 speech to the National People's Congress Standing Committee, Gao Shan took part in a meeting on May 19, attended by about 20 leading members of state research institutes, which called for an emergency meeting of the Standing Committee in light of the decision by the Politburo to impose martial law. Gao thus stands accused as one of those who leaked information about the impending imposition of martial law. Gao is a graduate of Beijing Normal University. He was a member of the Rural Development Research Group from 1982 until his most recent affiliation and is a close associate of Bao Tong (see above), former chief advisor to Zhao Ziyang. Gao Shan also acted as adviser to the Research Institute for the Reform of the Economic Structure. He is detained in Qincheng prison and reportedly has been tortured.

■ Guo Haifeng, 23, a student at Beijing University and at one time chairman of the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation, was seized by troops in Tiananmen Square around 2 a.m. on June 4, 1989, shortly after the arrival there of vanguard contingents of the PLA (*Beijing Radio*, June 10, 1989.) According to the report, Guo was captured "on the spot by the martial law enforcement troops while he and a gang of ruffians were trying to set fire to an Army unit's armoured vehicle." On April 22, 1989, Guo Haifeng

and two other students (Zhou Yongjun and Zhang Zhiyong) knelt on the steps of the Great Hall of the People in an effort to submit a seven-point petition to the government calling for the posthumous rehabilitation of Hu Yaobang, former secretary-general of the Party. Guo also participated in the April 29, 1989 "dialogue meeting" with government spokesman Yuan Mu. He reportedly was badly beaten after his arrest. According to recent reports, Guo has been arraigned on charges of counterrevolution and went on trial on January 9, 1991.

■ Han Dongfang, 27, a railway worker in the Fengtai Locomotive Maintenance Section, Beijing, and the leader of the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation (BWAf), has been seriously ill in prison since his arrest in June 1989, according to an Asia Watch source. In January 1990, Han Dongfang, who suffers from an unknown stomach ailment, was admitted to a police hospital in Beijing for the sixth time since his arrest and was placed on an intravenous drip. As of September 1990, Han was reportedly unable to take solid food, had lost much weight and was consequently very weak. Han went into hiding on June 4 but was unable to remain underground for long; he turned himself in to the authorities in Beijing in the latter part of June and has been held incommunicado ever since. Previously held in solitary confinement in Paoju Lane Detention Center in Beijing, Han reportedly was in March 1990 transferred to Banbuqiao Detention Center and charged with the crime of "counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement." (Attached to Beijing Prison No.1, Banbuqiao is a notorious detention facility where several leading figures from the Democracy Wall movement were held in the late 1970s.) Shortly after his transfer to Banbuqiao, however, Han was reportedly told that he would eventually be tried not as a political prisoner but as a "common criminal."

The Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation was formed by a group of workers on May 19, 1989, the eve of the declaration of martial law; it was labeled as "counterrevolutionary" by the authorities on June 2, but was not formally declared illegal until June 8. Apart from a small, short-lived workers group which was set up in Taiyuan, Shanxi Province, in the winter of 1980, Han Dongfang's BWAf was the first independent labor organization in China since the founding of the People's Republic. The BWAf's *Provisional Charter*, adopted in Tiananmen Square on May 28, 1989, made clear the organization's intent to operate openly and in full conformity with the laws and constitution of the PRC. Shortly before the crackdown, Han Dongfang said: "I'm not afraid. One can always find ways to survive. I just want us to be able to build an organization that can truly speak for the workers."

The BWAf tent-headquarters in Tiananmen Square were the first target of attack by the massive PLA force which arrived in the square in the early hours of June 4. Many of the BWAf's members and leaders, together with those of similar workers' organizations in other cities throughout China, were rounded up and arrested in the subsequent crackdown, and the authorities appear to have reserved their harshest treatment for this category of detainees. Before his arrest, Han Dongfang led protest demonstrations against the secret detentions of three members of the BWAf in late May, 1989. He successfully negotiated for their release, but was later accused on this count as being a "leading instigator of attacks on the Public Security Bureau." On June 14, Han's name headed the government's "most wanted" list of pro-democracy workers.

■ Liu Gang, 29, a 1987 physics graduate (M.S. degree) from Beijing University, first employed at Chen Ziming's Beijing Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute (SERI) in late 1988 and No.3 on the "21 Most Wanted" student leaders, may also have been indicted and be about to go on trial. Liu was arrested in Baoding, Hebei Province, south of Beijing on June 19, 1989, while trying to buy a railway ticket. According to a *UPI* report, local residents turned him in to the police after noticing that he did not have calloused hands as would have been expected from someone who wore worker's clothing such as Liu had on. On June 20, 1989, Liu was sent back to Beijing and was shown on Chinese Central TV. In May

1990, Liu reportedly was moved to solitary confinement in Qincheng Prison as punishment for trying to organize a prisoners' hunger strike commemorating the massacre of June 4, 1989 (*Reuters*, July 19, 1990).

After graduation, Liu, a Liaoning native, eschewed study abroad or work in Beijing. Instead, he accepted a position in a new technology development center in Ningbo, hoping that since the center was new it would be less mired in bureaucracy and ideology and his education and ideas could be better utilized. However, Liu found the environment too confining and returned to Beijing in 1988 and became involved in student activism, speaking out repeatedly for freedom of the press, the need for multiparty elections and human rights. Liu believed students had a special role in shaping the course of China's political development. Liu was criticized in *People's Daily* (July 25, 1989) as an organizer of a "democracy salon." The article cited statements purporting to show that the "real purpose" of the salon had been to "overthrow the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system." As a leader of the 1986-87 student movement, Liu was active in a campaign to get Li Shuxian, Fang Lizhi's wife, back on a ballot for election to the National People's Congress. Her name had been removed just prior to election time.

■ Liu Suli, 30, a lecturer in public administration at the University of Politics and Law, Beijing, and senior associate at SERI, has been charged with instigating and spreading counterrevolutionary propaganda. According to friends of Liu's family, his wife received official notification dated November 24, 1990 from the Beijing Procuratorate. Liu and Chen Xiaoping (see above) had gone into hiding in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province on June 10, but returned to Beijing ten days later. Liu was arrested shortly thereafter, according to an Asia Watch source. Liu served as head of the Liaison Department of the Beijing United Consultative Committee on Tiananmen Square. According to his wife, who expressed concern for his health, her husband "insisted on principles of peace, reason and non-violence." Liu is the father of a three-year-old son.

■ Liu Xiaobo, 35, a prominent literary critic, faces trial on the charge of spreading counter-revolutionary propaganda. One of the intellectual leaders of the Tiananmen Square protests, he had returned to China in April 1989 from the United States where he had been a visiting scholar at Columbia University.

He was arrested on June 6, 1989, although the arrest was not announced until June 23. His wife received official notice of the arrest on November 17, 1990, and his trial began in Beijing on January 16, 1991.

At the time of his arrest, state radio, television and print media said Liu had close ties to Hu Ping, head of the U.S. based organization Chinese Alliance for Democracy, which publishes the journal *China Spring*. Although it is known that Liu did not advocate violence, and indeed that he urged students and others to return weapons obtained on the night of June 3-4, 1989, he is accused by the authorities of "instigating and participating in the rioting" and of supporting armed resistance.

In an article entitled "The 'Black Hands' Make Clear Their Position - Exposing the Fugitive 'Elite' of Turmoil," reprinted in *People's Daily*, Liu is accused of returning to China under the auspices of the "China Democracy and Unity League" (presumably, a reference to the Chinese Alliance for Democracy) in order to "participate in plotting the turmoil." He is further accused of having stated, in an "instigation" speech at Beijing Teachers College, "I am not afraid of being blamed as a 'black hand.' On the contrary,

I feel proud of it...²⁵

A native of Jilin province and a graduate of Jilin University, Liu was a faculty member in the Chinese department at Beijing Normal University. He finished his doctoral dissertation there on the aesthetics of Chinese literature in 1988. When Liu arrived in New York in 1989 to take up a year's appointment at the East Asia Institute of Columbia University, he published an article, "Contemporary Chinese Intellectuals and Politics" in which he strongly criticized some of the older Chinese intellectuals.

When the student demonstrations began in Beijing following Hu Yaobang's death on April 15, he decided he had to return and left for China on April 26. Over the next several weeks, he became deeply involved in the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation based in Tiananmen Square, leading discussions, writing pamphlets and helping raise funds.

By the time of his arrest, Liu, like many other activists, was advocating multiparty democracy, freedom of expression and association and strict implementation of the Chinese constitution, which guarantees most basic rights.

Liu and three other activists began a hunger strike on June 2, 1989 at the base of the Monument to the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square. In a declaration issued that night, the four stated: "Through our hunger strike, we want also to tell the people that what the government media refers to as a small bunch of troublemakers is in fact the whole nation. We may not be students, but we are citizens whose sense of duty makes us support the democracy movement started by the college students..." The four successfully negotiated the withdrawal of students from Tiananmen Square just before dawn on June 3, 1989. The other three hunger strikers, Gao Xin, Zhou Dou and Hou Dejian, have all been released; Hou was expelled to Taiwan.

Liu is held at Qincheng prison where his family was permitted a visit during the Chinese New Year, late January, 1990. He is married to Tao Li, a teacher at the Beijing Language Institute. They have a young son.

■ Liu Zihou, 34, a staff member at the Beijing Aquatic Products Company, went on trial on January 11, 1991 according to a notice posted outside the Beijing Intermediate People's Court (*Associated Press*, January 11, 1991). Liu is charged with the potentially capital offense of "gathering crowds and [engaging in] armed rebellion" (*Reuters*, January 11, 1991). He was arrested on June 18, 1989 together with 15 others, described as "mostly vagrants and idlers", who were trying to flee China (*Xinhua*, in *FBIS*, June 19, 1989). Liu Zihou is alleged by the authorities to have been the head of the "Capital Workers Special Picket Corps," an offshoot of the "Beijing Citizens Hunger Strike Corps." The group, which set up "freedom camps" of tents at Tiananmen Square, is accused of burning military vehicles, setting up roadblocks to stop the army from enforcing martial law and helping erect the "Goddess of Democracy" statue. According to a Beijing radio broadcast, the group's members had tried to flee Beijing after troops moved into the Square on June 3-4, 1989.

■ Lü Jiamin, 42 or 43, an associate professor of politics at China Labor College, an institution for training cadres of the official labor organization, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, has been charged with counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation. According to friends, the family is seeking a lawyer to defend him (*Reuters*, December 2, 1990). His wife, Zhang Kangkang, the well-known writer,

²⁵ *Renmin Ribao*, July 22, 1990, in *FBIS*, July 26, 1990

has protested Lü's indictment. According to her, Lü, an editor of the unofficial *Beijing Spring* during the 1978-79 Democracy Wall movement, has been held in Qincheng Prison, Beijing, since July 11, 1989. He reportedly was allowed visits from relatives during the 1990 Spring Festival.

According to a *Shijie Ribao* report (December 4, 1990), the warrant for Lü's indictment was issued by the Beijing People's Procuratorate and delivered by the Beijing Public Security Bureau. Lü was due for release prior to the start of the Asian Games in late September, according to the report, but his unrepentant attitude, evident in his alleged statement that he would never regret his participation in the pro-democracy movement, reportedly resulted in his indictment.

■ MA Shaofang, a 25-year-old native of Jiangsu Province, a student at the Beijing Film Academy and an associate of student leader Wuer Kaixi in the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation, reportedly turned himself in to the authorities on June 17 in Canton. He is probably detained in Qincheng prison. Ma allegedly made speeches during the protests, and with three other student leaders held a May 21, 1989, meeting with government representatives. Ma, one of the "21 most wanted" student leaders, was tried in early January 1991 and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

■ Ren Wanding, a 45-year-old accountant from Beijing, went on trial on January 8, 1991, charged with counterrevolutionary offenses. He is one of the few activists from the Democracy Wall period (1978-79) who took an active role in the 1989 pro-democracy movement. During the movement, Ren made numerous public speeches, as he had since late 1988, calling for the release of political prisoners. He also wrote and distributed articles calling for freedom of expression and the rule of law. Ren was accused in Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong's June 30, 1989 speech, as one of the people who "spread a lot of fallacies" at a 1989 Democracy Salon at Beijing University.

After June 4, 1989, Ren reportedly sought sanctuary at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, but was turned away. He was arrested five days later on June 9. He is probably being held in Qincheng prison. According to his wife, Zhang Fengying, who was an accountant at the Sociology and Economics Research Institute, Ren was notified in March 1990 that he would be charged with "counterrevolutionary incitement" and could face a sentence ranging from five years to life imprisonment. Zhang has been denied permission to see her husband though she has been permitted to send books and clothing. Ren Wanding is the father of a 12-year-old girl.

When the crackdown on the Democracy Wall movement came in 1979, Ren, as founder of the China Human Rights League, was denounced by the authorities as a non-Marxist, as was Wei Jingsheng, China's most famous imprisoned dissident. Ren was arrested for the first time in April 1979 and spent four years in prison, his initial sentence having been extended when he refused to make an acceptable self-criticism. In 1988, on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Democracy Wall, Ren wrote an article for the *New York Times* in which he called upon activist students to speak out for those in prison and on the business community to make any investment in China conditional on an end to the government's suppression of dissidents.

■ Wang Dan, 22, one of the top student leaders of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing, is believed to be awaiting trial on charges of "instigating counterrevolutionary propaganda." The charge has been confirmed by official sources at Beijing University, where Wang formerly was enrolled in the history department, but officials at the Beijing Intermediate Court refuse to confirm or deny the story, according to a *UPI* account. The same article noted that according to family friends, a notice of indictment was sent by the Beijing Public Security Bureau to Wang's family on November 23, 1990, at which time they were

informed that only family members would be permitted to attend his trial. Wang's family is seeking a lawyer for his defense.

Wang, a native of Jilin Province, was arrested on July 2, 1989 after meeting a Taiwanese journalist to ask for help in fleeing from China; his arrest was officially acknowledged in August 1989. He reportedly is in solitary confinement in Qincheng Prison and is required to write confessional materials every day. He is permitted to write letters and friends are permitted to deliver clothes. One friend of Wang's reportedly received a postcard from him in early 1990 urging him to "keep up the effort." In February 1990, a U.S. State Department official reported that Wang's family had "recently" visited him.

Before the crackdown, Wang studied recent political developments in Eastern Europe and wrote an article advocating similar reforms for China. In 1988-89, he was a key organizer of open-air democracy salons during which those attending were urged to discuss controversial subjects.

■ Wang Peigong, 45, a renowned playwright, was arrested in Guiyang, probably on June 30, 1989 (*Wen Wei Po*, July 3, 1989.) Wang was reportedly charged on June 7, 1990, with "counterrevolutionary activity and the harboring of student leader Wuer Kaixi" (Hong Kong Asia Television, June 7, 1990; in *FBIS*, same day.). Wang, who publicly renounced his membership in the Communist Party to show support for the democracy movement, wrote a play called "WM" about the Cultural Revolution which was banned in 1985. According to *Reuters* (May 8, 1990), Wang, who is being held in Qincheng prison, is emaciated and in poor health.

■ Wang Youcai, at one-time the general-secretary of the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation, was arrested sometime between June and September 1989 and tried in early January 1991 and sentenced to four years in prison. His name appeared on the list of 21 "most wanted" students issued by the authorities in June 1989, then again on another list issued in September as one of those "already caught." Wang had attempted to organize continued student resistance in Shanghai after the June 3-4, 1989, crackdown in Beijing, according to *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*, September 24, 1989). He was also mentioned in "Facts about the Shanghai Riot", an article published in *Wen Hui Bao* on June 28, 1989.

■ Xiong Yan, 25, a post-graduate law student at Beijing University and a Beijing Students Autonomous Federation member, whose name appeared on the 21 "most wanted" list, was arrested on a train outside Datong, northeast of Beijing in Shanxi province on June 13, 1989. According to the *South China Morning Post* (June 15, 1989), Xiong Yan was one of a number of student leaders who met with Premier Li Peng on May 18, 1989. At that meeting, he was quoted as saying, "We believe, no matter whether the government does or not, that history will recognize this movement as a patriotic and democratic movement...The people want to see whether the government is really a people's government or not." Xiong, a native of Shuangfeng, Hunan Province, has not been heard of since his arrest but is probably being held in Qincheng prison. It is thought likely that he will be put on trial soon on charges of counterrevolution.

■ Yu Zhenbin, 28, a cadre at the Qinghai Provincial Archives Bureau, was sentenced in January 1991 to 12 years in prison for organizing a "counterrevolutionary clique" there. He is accused of writing and distributing leaflets calling for a revision of the Chinese Constitution, the establishment of a new central government and an end to one-party rule.

■ Zhai Weimin, a student leader who ranked sixth on the Chinese government's list of "21 most wanted" students was arrested in May 1990. His arrest was confirmed by an official at the Student Affairs Office of the Beijing Economics Institute, according to a July 19, 1990, Hong Kong Television broadcast (FBIS, May 10 and July 19, 1990). He reportedly is held at Qincheng Prison, and may be brought to trial soon. Zhai Weimin, 22, from Henan Province, went into hiding after June 4, 1989, and managed to evade arrest for almost a year. While in hiding, he continued his work on behalf of the democracy movement through an underground group, the *Democratic Front for the Salvation of China*, organized in early 1990. Details of the underground group were disclosed by Zhai to Western journalists in a secret news conference which he gave in Beijing in March 1990. Zhai said that more than sixty people had participated in a secret conference held by the Democratic Front for the Salvation of China in Beijing in February (Time, March 26, 1990.)

■ Zhang Ming, 24, a Qinghua University automobile engineering student and Zheng Xuguang, 21, an engineering student at the Beijing Aeronautics Academy and a member of the Standing Committee of the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation, reportedly went on trial November 27, 1990. In early January 1991 the authorities announced that Zhang had been sentenced to three years in prison. Zhang, No.19 on the June 1989 list of "most wanted" student leaders and Zheng, on the same list, are the first two "most wanted" student leaders to be tried. According to an official notice seen posted outside Beijing Intermediate Court on November 28, 1990 (Reuters, November 28, 1990), Zhang, a Jilin native and a key figure in the Beijing Student Autonomous Federation, was charged with counterrevolutionary agitation and propaganda and trying to escape from China, according to the official notice of his indictment posted on November 27, 1990 (Reuters, November 29, 1990). Zhang reportedly was arrested before September 13, 1989 in Shenzhen while trying to escape to Hong Kong and is held in Qincheng Prison. He was sentenced on January 5, 1991 to three years in prison.

■ Zhang Weiguo, 43, a journalist and head of the Beijing office of the *World Economic Herald*, was seized on June 20, 1989 in Jingshan near Shanghai, and formally arrested September 20, 1989 on charges of counterrevolution. He reportedly played a key role in organizing and feeding information to the *Herald*. Zhang also reportedly tried to institute legal proceedings to protest the way in which the newspaper had been closed down in late 1989 (it had been banned from publishing in May 1989 after several pro-democracy articles appeared.) Zhang is believed held incommunicado at the Shanghai No.1 Detention Center, where he reportedly undertook a one-week hunger strike at a time when he expected to be sentenced in secret without a trial. Zhang's continued detention was confirmed by Zhu Rongji, the Mayor of Shanghai, on September 10, 1990, when Zhu announced the release of seven other pro-democracy detainees (whom he did not name) from Shanghai jails (Reuters, September 10, 1990.)

■ Zheng Xuguang, 20, a student at the Beijing Aeronautics Academy and a member of the Standing Committee of the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation, was arrested, probably in late July 1989 in Guangzhou (Canton) while attempting to escape from the country, and was tried in late 1990 and sentenced to two years' imprisonment for counterrevolution. Zheng, a native of Mi District in Hunan Province, was one of China's "21 most wanted" student leaders. He reportedly is held in Qincheng prison. According to unofficial sources, Zheng's friends were permitted to deliver supplies to him in October 1989, but were not permitted to see him. It is not known whether Zheng has had any visits from his family during his incarceration.

■ Zhou Yongjun, formerly a fourth year student at the University of Politics and Law in Beijing, arrested sometime in June 1989, reportedly has now been charged with carrying out counterrevolutionary

propaganda. A 23-year-old Sichuan native, he reportedly is imprisoned in Qincheng Prison in Beijing. Zhou was a founding member of the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation. He was one of three students who on April 22, 1989 knelt for several hours on the steps of the Great Hall of the People and asked to be allowed to hand over a petition to the authorities. On April 23, 1989, Zhou was elected the first chairman of the Beijing Students Autonomous Federation, which represented 21 universities and colleges in the capital. He was dismissed from this post on April 28 after he declined to support the April 27 demonstration march protesting the *Renmin Ribao* editorial of the previous day, which condemned the student movement as "turmoil" and a "planned conspiracy." The protest march drew massive public support. Zhou continued to play an active role in the pro-democracy movement, however, taking part in the Tiananmen Square hunger strike and later serving (under the name Wan Tie) as a legal adviser to the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation.

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