THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

"What further proof is demanded by the world? Why have African leaders-heads of states and revolutionary veterans-failed until now to halt Abacha's repetitious game or to challenge his transparent ploy of purchasing time? Take the regime's elaborate charade called `transition to civilian rule.' Even as it becomes clearer by the day that Abacha, ever the ludicrous imitator of his predecessor Ibrahim Babangida, is seeking to perpetuate himself as a civilian president, foreign governments continue to say let's wait a little longer."

Wole Soyinka172

Sanctions imposed on Nigeria by western governments following the annulment of the 1993 elections and the military coup which followed, and strengthened after the November 10, 1995 executions of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists, have remained in place over the last two years. Nevertheless, international attention on Nigeria has lessened, as Nigeria's major trading partners have returned to protecting their short-term economic interests and have taken no further concrete measures to speed the return of civilian rule. Meanwhile, the Nigerian government has increased its contacts with states such as China, North Korea, Libya and Iran.

The Commonwealth

The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (chogm) that was taking place in Auckland, New Zealand at the time of the executions immediately demonstrated its outrage by suspending Nigeria from the Commonwealth, the first time that this step had been taken. Nigeria was given two years within which to comply with the terms of the 1991 Harare Commonwealth Declaration, which commits Commonwealth members to democratic governance, failing which it would face expulsion.173 At the same meeting chogm adopted the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Commonwealth Declaration, which included a commitment to take measures in response to violations of the Harare principles. A Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (cmag), which was appointed to deal with persistent violations, committed itself to examining, in the first instance, the cases of Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gambia, the three Commonwealth countries without democratically elected governments.174 Both Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth and the mandate of cmag must be considered by chogm in Edinburgh in October 1997.

On April 23, 1996, following its second meeting, cmag recommended that Commonwealth members implement various measures against Nigeria, including visa restrictions on and denial of educational facilities to members of the Nigerian regime and their families, withdrawal of military attachés from Nigeria and cessation of military training, an embargo on the export of arms, a visa-based ban on sporting contacts, and the downgrading of diplomatic and cultural links. It was also recommended that the Commonwealth consider, in consultation with the E.U., U.S. and other members of the international community, a ban on air links and additional economic measures, including freezing the financial assets and bank accounts inforeign countries of members of the regime and their families. At a further meeting on June 24-25, 1996, however, the imposition of the sanctions agreed upon in April, which had been delayed to give Nigeria time to engage in dialogue with cmag about its human rights record, was further postponed, although existing measures consequent on Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth remained in place.

A mission from cmag finally visited Nigeria for two days in November 1996, although the Nigerian government insisted that the visit was not a "fact-finding" mission, which had already been undertaken by the U.N., but a continuation of dialogue and discussion.175 The government refused to allow members of the mission to visit political prisoners or members of the pro-democracy and human rights movement, ensuring that all meetings were with government supporters. The Canadian delegation did not join the mission, after the Nigerian government refused to grant visas to two security officers, in apparent retaliation at Canada's hard line against Nigeria within cmag.176 Three political detainees (Gani Fawehinmi, Femi Falana and Femi Aborisade) were, however, released at the time of the visit.

cmag met several times during 1997. In July, cmag held public hearings on the situation in Nigeria-a first for the Commonwealth-to which Nigerian human rights and opposition groups, as well as international groups including Human Rights Watch, were invited to make submissions. In September, cmag met again to finalize its recommendations to chogm. Although no official statement was issued, comments by foreign ministers attending the meeting indicated that the group would recommend to chogm that Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth be continued. It was unclear whether additional sanctions would also be recommended.

In February 1997, African heads of government from Commonwealth countries-except for Nigeria-met in Gaborone, Botswana at a "Roundtable on Democracy and Good Governance in Africa." The concluding statement stated that: "Heads of Government reaffirmed their commitment to the principles contained in the Harare Commonwealth Declaration, which included the protection and promotion of democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances. They stressed in particular the universally accepted ingredients of democracy which included the right of a people to elect freely their government; the primacy of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; the rights of freedom of expression and association; and the transparency and accountability of government." The heads of government also noted that "with only one exception, all African member countries had now moved away from military or one-party rule" (the meeting took place before the coup in Sierra Leone).

The United Nations

In April 1996, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution in which it requested two thematic special rapporteurs (on the independence of judges and lawyers, and on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions) to submit a report at the next session of the Commission in 1997 and an interim report to the General Assembly in 1996.177 Extended negotiations with the Nigerian government for the special rapporteurs to undertake a mission to Nigeria finally collapsed shortly before the 1997 session, due to the Nigerian government's failure to agree to their standard terms of reference.

Despite the Nigerian government's lack of cooperation, the special rapporteurs eventually published a report on the basis of information supplied by other organisations. The hard-hitting report concluded, among other things, that "the rule of law is on the verge of collapse, if it has not already collapsed" and that Nigeria was in violation of a number of its international obligations.178 The report made a series of recommendations, in particular urging the Commission to appoint of a country specific rapporteur on Nigeria.

On April 7, 1997, the Commission adopted a resolution (number 53 of 1997) expressing its deep concern at continuing human rights violations in Nigeria and inviting the chair of the commission to appoint a special rapporteur on Nigeria. Professor Tiyanjana Maluwa, a Malawian based at the University of Cape Town, was initially appointed but later stated he was unable to undertake the workload. Delays in appointing a replacement have reportedly been due to energetic lobbying of the Czech chair of the Commission by the Nigerian delegation in Geneva, which objected to alternative suggestions put forward by the Western European and Other group at the United Nations.

The European Union and its Member States

By Common Positions of the Council of the European Union dated November 20, 1995, and December 4, 1995, European Union member states agreed to impose visa restrictions on members (including civilians) of the Nigerian Provisional Ruling Council and the Federal Executive Council, and their families (in addition to members of the Nigerian military and security forces and their families, on whom restrictions were imposed in 1993); to expel all military personnel attached to the diplomatic missions of Nigeria in member states and to withdraw all military personnel attached to diplomatic missions of E.U. members in Nigeria; to deny visas to official delegations in the field of sports and to national teams; to introduce a prospective embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment (allowing existing contracts to be fulfilled); and to suspend development cooperation except to projects through nongovernmental organizations and local civilian authorities. These sanctions, renewable every six months, remain in place and will be reconsidered and extended or modified in early December 1997.

The acp-E.U. Joint Assembly (at which representatives of the European Parliament and of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (acp) Countries meet twice a year) has repeatedly adopted resolutions condemning human rights violations in Nigeria and calling on E.U. member states to put pressure on the Nigerian government. In March 1997, after hearing representatives of exiled Nigerian opposition groups, including Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka and nadeco leader Chief Anthony Enahoro, the Assembly called upon the European Council to introduce an embargo on Nigerian oil. The European Parliament also adopted (in November 1996) a resolution supporting an international oil embargo.

The historical relationship between Britain and Nigeria makes the British government stance of particular importance, both bilaterally and in international fora. Following May 1 elections in Britain, and in line with a statement that human rights would be "at the heart" of its foreign policy, the new Labour government immediately began to take a much stronger line on Nigeria than the Conservatives had done, leading the Nigerian government to criticize "hostile and definitely unhelpful" statements by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook.179 In July 1997, Tony Lloyd, the minister responsible for Africa, commented on thetransition program, stating that "the process of establishment of political parties has been so one-sided as to guarantee that there will be one serious candidate ... [resulting in] the transition of General Abacha to President Abacha. We cannot accept that."180 Britain has strongly supported Nigeria's continued suspension from the Commonwealth, and has also indicated that it has argued within cmag for the additional sanctions suggested in April 1996 to be imposed, though it did not call for expulsion.181

In contrast, a new socialist government elected in France in May 1997 continued to take a conciliatory line towards Nigeria, including ruling out the possibility of excluding Nigeria from playing in the 1998 World Cup soccer tournament due to be held in France (despite E.U. measures banning sporting links). General Abacha attended the December 1996 Francophone summit in Burkina Faso and in January 1997 announced that French would become a second "official language" of Nigeria. The French government has on several occasions granted visas "on humanitarian grounds" to members of the Nigerian government theoretically covered by the ban on visas: it has been reported that the French are planning to oppose renewal of visa restrictions, and possibly other sanctions, when the E.U. Council is reviews measures in place in early December 1997. As a result of the softer French line, Nigeria has moved the European office of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to Paris from London.

The Dutch government has also faced criticism for allowing a Nigerian delegation entry in March 1997, when the Netherlands, holding the presidency in the E.U., invited Nigeria to attend a meeting in Maastricht of government leaders from the fifteen-member E.U. bloc and its seventy acp partners. The European Parliament objected to the invitation, but the Dutch foreign ministry said that the visa restrictions only applied to "Nigerian authorities traveling to Europe for private reasons." A Dutch spokesman went on to say that the boycott was not intended to hinder important political discussions on the future relations between the acp and the E.U. The Dutch were of the opinions that "Nigeria is a very prominent member of the acp group: without Nigeria, the talks between the acp and the E.U. would be less significant."182

The United States

In November 1995, the United States broadened pre-existing restrictions on military links (which included the termination in July 1993 of all military assistance and training) by banning the sale and repair of military goods. It broadened a pre-existing ban on the issue of visas to senior military officers and senior government officials and their families to cover "all military officers and civilians who actively formulate, implement or benefit from policies that impede Nigeria's transition to democracy," and introduced a requirement that Nigerian government officials visiting the U.N. or international financial institutions in the U.S. remain within twenty-five miles of those organizations. It also stated that it would begin consultations immediately within the Security Council on appropriate U.N. measures.183 In 1997, Nigeria was once again denied counter-narcotics certification under Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act,184 requiring the U.S.to vote against loans to Nigeria in six multilateral development banks, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the African Development Bank, and to cease all Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Control Export Act assistance to Nigeria. The government has also cut the U.S. Agency for International Development (usaid) budget, while reprogramming all usaid assistance exclusively through the nongovernmental sector. Direct flights to Nigeria are banned due to safety concerns about conditions at Nigerian airports.

The U.S. government, both in Washington D.C. and in Nigeria, has repeatedly condemned human rights violations by the Nigerian government, calling in particular for the release of political prisoners. No further concrete measures to put pressure on the Nigerian government have, however, been adopted or proposed by the administration. At various points during the past year, the Clinton administration has indicated that it is reviewing its Nigeria policy. Thomas Pickering, under-secretary of state for political affairs and a former ambassador to Nigeria, has been charged with this review.185 No conclusion has been announced yet. It has been stated that the government's commitment to human rights and democracy in Nigeria remained firm; nevertheless, there have been some worrisome indications that the U.S. government might be prepared to make concessions in matters related to human rights in return for access to the Nigerian government to discuss "technical" issues relating to drug trafficking and civil aviation.

Relations between the U.S. and Nigeria hit a low point in September 1997, when armed soldiers and riot police broke up a farewell party being given by Nigerian human rights and pro-democracy groups for outgoing U.S. ambassador Walter Carrington. Carrington had won the admiration of the human rights community for his outspoken stand against the Nigerian government's abuses, and in return the Nigerian government had alleged that he was involved in the series of bombings for which a treason trial against Soyinka and others was instituted in March 1997. These allegations have been angrily denied by the U.S. government, which also protested vehemently at the disruption of the farewell party. Nigerian special duties minister, Wada Nas, chose to blame Carrington for poor relations between the U.S. and Nigeria, commenting that "as we celebrate the end of Mr. Carrington's four wasted years, we should hope that his unceremonious departure signals the beginning of the task of restoring the good relationship and friendship he has wilfully and recklessly destroyed."186

A draft "Nigeria Democracy Act" first introduced in November 1995 was re-introduced in Congress in June 1997 by Representative Donald Payne, proposing sanctions beyond those already in place, including a ban on air links and on new investment in the energy sector and a freeze on assets of members of the Nigerian government held in the United States.187 In September 1997, the House Committee on International Relations held hearings on U.S. policy toward Nigeria.

A number of U.S. cities have adopted resolutions that bar local governments from buying from suppliers with businesses in Nigeria (affecting in particular the U.S. oil companies Mobil and Chevron),188 and in June a conference of mayors meeting in San Francisco adopted a resolution welcoming such measures in support of democracy in Nigeria.189 Independent missions to Nigeria by ex-president Jimmy Carter and especially by the American Baptist Convention were heavily criticized by Nigerian human rights groups for taking at face value the government's stated intentions to restore Nigeria to democratic government. A thirty-eight member monitoring team observing the March 1997 local government elections led by the inaptly named Americans for Democracy in Africa failed to denounce any of the multiple defects of the transition process.

The Nigerian government has continued its efforts to launder its image in the U.S. with a high profile lobbying campaign. These efforts have included sponsorship of tours by the leaders of the five political parties contesting the transition and by the widows of the four murdered men for whose killings Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight others were executed.

The Organisation of African Unity (oau) and its Member States

African countries remained generally reluctant to condemn Nigeria's human rights record in strong terms during 1997. In October 1996, an oau spokesperson stated in response to proposals by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher during an African tour that "we have to be very careful about isolating Nigeria," preferring "diplomatic pressures" to sanctions; also in October, an assessment team from the oau came to evaluate Nigeria's peacekeeping capability.190 During the oau summit in Harare in June 1997, Nigeria's internal problems were not mentioned either by oau Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim or by newly elected oau chair Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. This reticence may have been influenced by the fact that Nigeria is one of the largest financial contributors to the oau, while Salim was seeking re-election.

Some African countries maintained close relations with Nigeria: Nigeria and Ethiopia signed cooperation agreements in October 1996, for example; while a high level delegation of Nigerian military officers traveled to Namibia in March 1997 for a one week "familiarization visit."191 Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi of Libya visited Nigeria in May 1997, and was made a Grand Commander of the Federal Republic, Nigeria's highest honor (much to the annoyance of the U.S. government). The outgoing Tunisian ambassador to Nigeria, at a farewell dinner given for him by the Nigerian government, advised the Nigerian government to ignore "the rantings of the West."192 West African countries, despite their unwillingness to endorse Nigeria's intervention in Sierra Leone, were not prepared to speak out against Nigeria in other areas.

Nevertheless, the intransigent position of Nigeria toward the U.N. special rapporteurs did lead to sufficient irritation among the African group at the 1997 session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to bring support (even if tacit) for the appointment of a country rapporteur on Nigeria, without which the resolution would have been unlikely to pass. Of the African members of the commission, South Africa and Uganda voted for the resolution and the others abstained. African countries also supported the acp-E.U. Joint Assembly resolution calling for an oil embargo on Nigeria.

At the chogm meeting in New Zealand in November 1995, South Africa led the call for strong action against Nigeria; but South Africa's policy toward Nigeria since then, while including expressions of concern at violations of human rights, has generally been conciliatory. South Africa supported the appointment of a U.N. special rapporteur on Nigeria and made some other comments supportive of human rights during 1997. In July, Nigerian Minister of Information Walter Ofonagoro responded by referring to South Africa as "a white country with a black head," accusing unnamed western countries of "driving a wedge" between South Africa and Nigeria in order to weaken the continent.193 Yet, though President Mandela called the statement "unfortunate and ill-informed," he appeared to wish to make as little of it as possible, and emphasized instead the "brotherly cooperation" with Nigeria over regional mediation efforts in the former Zaire, stating that he believed that the information minister "may not be aware of the close contact and cordial exchanges that have recently been taking place between him [Mandela] and General Sani Abacha."194 Ofonagoro later claimed to have been misquoted by the press. In September 1997, Nigerian Foreign Minister Tom Ikimi met with Mandela and delivered a private letter from Gen. Abacha; South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki is scheduled to visit Nigeria in turn. The negotiations are rumored to be in connection with the possible release of some political prisoners in Nigeria in advance of chogm.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the human rights organ of the oau) finally sent a fact finding mission to Nigeria in March 1997, having originally resolved to do so in December 1995. The mission took place while the U.N. special rapporteurs were negotiating their own entry to Nigeria (ultimately unsuccessfully); but, in contrast to the U.S. special rapporteurs, the Commission did not itself insist on any terms of reference. It did not, for example, visit any of the political detainees held by the Nigerian government other than the "Ogoni 20," and it did not individually interview these detainees in private. The mission agenda was organized by the Nigerian government, and its members were much criticized by Nigerian human rights organizations for failing to allocate sufficient time to meet with human rights and pro-democracy groups to obtain information about human rights abuses. The mission did not submit a written report to the next session of the Commission in April, although one was expected at the following session, in November 1997.

Other Countries

Nigeria has compensated for its diplomatic isolation from the west by increasing its links with other "pariah" countries. In May 1997, Minister of Information Walter Ofonagoro stated: "The sooner the West reverses the current trend the better for them because we are moving to China and other nations for support," adding that "we believe everything is planned racial prejudice against Nigeria.195 Delegations from China have visited Nigeria several times over the last year and signed cooperation agreements in several areas, including the oil industry, following other trade agreements signed in 1995 and 1996; China is reportedly engaged in rehabilitating of Nigeria's railway system. The North Korean vice-premier stated in March thathis country was impressed with the "steady implementation of the transition program," and pledged continued support.196 Chief of Defense Staff Maj. Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar visited China and North Korea in August 1997, exploring possibilities of military cooperation and arms deals.197

In June, Nigeria was one of eight Islamic countries meeting in Turkey to form the "D8," or group of eight developing countries, signing the "Istanbul Declaration," which defines a broad area of economic cooperation.198 Turkey's Islamist prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, had visited Nigeria in October 1996. In May 1997, the Iranian chargé d'affaires in Nigeria urged the Nigerian government "not to yield to the pressure and blackmail of western imperialism."199

A number of significant contracts have recently been awarded to Israeli companies, and the Israeli ambassador to Nigeria announced in March that "Israel is convinced that the transition program is very much on course and that sanctions are unnecessary. . . . Washington cannot enthrone democracy in Nigeria because their action is not in consonance with the desire of the Nigerian people."200