· The Revolutionary Command Council:
The highest formal authority in Iraq is the ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), headed by President SADDAM HUSSEIN. While Saddam involved himself personally in operational aspects of Anfal through the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, supreme powers for handling Kurdish affairs between 1987-1989 were vested in his cousin, ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID.
· The Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party:
Anfal was a Ba'ath Party operation, commanded by the party's Northern Bureau, buttressed administratively by the Northern Bureau Command and the Northern Affairs Committee of the RCC. Under RCC decree no.160 of March 29, 1987, the Northern Bureau's Secretary General, Ali Hassan al-Majid, was given extraordinary powers over all other state, party, military and security agencies. Al-Majid's co-signatory on Northern Bureau Command orders was TAHER TAWFIQ AL-ANI, secretary of the RCC's Northern Affairs Committee. Deputy Secretary of the Northern Bureau Command was RADHI HASSAN SALMAN.
Under al-Majid's command, the following were the other main agencies involved in Anfal.
· The Iraqi Army and Air Force (including commandos, special forces, chemical weapons units, engineering corps): all field combat operations; village burnings and destruction; mass transportation of detainees. The Iraqi Defense Minister at the time of Anfal was Gen. ADNAN KHAIRALLAH (later deceased). The Army Chief of Staff was Brig. Gen. NIZAR ABD-AL-KARIM AL-KHAZRAJI. Most Anfal operations were handled by the Kirkuk-based First Corps (commander Lt. Gen. SULTAN HASHEM) and the Erbil-based Fifth Corps (commander Brig. Gen. YUNIS MOHAMMED AL-ZAREB).
Lt. Gen. Hashem was also the field commander of the First Anfal operation; Brig. Gen. AYAD KHALIL ZAKI and Brig. Gen. BAREQ ABDULLAH AL-HAJ HUNTA commanded the Second and Third Anfals respectively. The field commanders of other Anfals are not known.
· Republican Guard: elite combat operations during the First and Second Anfals.
· General Military Intelligence Directorate (MUDIRIYAT AL-ISTIKHBARAT AL-ASKARIYEH AL-AMEH): supervision of initial holding facilities such as the Qoratu and Nizarkeh forts; some interrogation; matters affecting draft dodgers and deserters; field command of the jahsh. Two of Istikhbarat's four regional commands played key roles in Anfal. The commander of Eastern Sector Istikhbarat was KHALED MUHAMMAD ABBAS; the commander of Northern Sector Istikhbarat was FARHAN MUTLAQ SALEH.
· General Security Directorate (MUDIRIYAT AL-AMN AL-AMEH) (including the special units of Kurdish agents known as Mafarez Khaseh): case-by-case intelligence-gathering and surveillance of the population; interrogation of prisoners at Topzawa and other detention camps; supervision of informers; tracking down escapees and those sheltering them; monitoring of complexes. The director of Amn for the Kurdistan Autonomous Region was ABD-AL-RAHMAN AZIZ HUSSEIN.
· Emergency Forces (QUWAT AL-TAWARE'): Units under Ba'ath Party command, including members of the jahsh and Amn and police agents, in charge of urban intelligence and counter-terrorism and supervision of initial detention facilities in the city of Suleimaniyeh, and perhaps other locations.
· National Defense Battalions (JAHAFEL AL-DIFA' AL-WATANI, or jahsh): auxiliary role in combat operations; roundups and surrender of prisoners; guard duty at collection points.
· Popular Army (JAYSH AL-SHA'ABI): guard duties at principal transit facilities (Topzawa, Dibs etc.)
· Inter-Agency Committees: a number of inter-agency groups were in charge of discrete aspects of the Anfal operation and associated anti-Kurdish campaigns during the 1987-1989 period. Normally chaired by a Ba'ath Party official, most included representatives of Amn, the Army's First and Fifth Corps and/or Istikhbarat, the Iraqi Police, and civilian authorities. The most notable were the following:
· Returnee Reception Committees (LAJNET ISTIQBAL AL-A'IDIN): responsible for those "returning to the national ranks" under the General Amnesty between September 6 and October 9, 1988 and other later amnesties;
· Security Committees (LAJNET AL-AMNIYEH) and Committees to Fight Hostile Activity (LAJNET MUKAFAHAT AL-NASHAT AL-MU'ADI): organized to combat the peshmerga at the governorate and local level respectively; and a number of ad hoc committees which monitored the economic blockade of the "prohibited areas," controlled food rationing and attempted to prevent smuggling;
· Follow-up Committees (LAJNET AL-MUTABA'A): charged with ensuring compliance with laws governing returnees, tracking down escapees and otherwise tying up the loose ends of the campaign.
In addition, a number of civilian ministries played supportive roles in Anfal: For example, the Agriculture Ministry harvested and disposed of the abandoned 1988 crop; the Finance Ministry administered the confiscated property of "saboteurs" and oversaw house demolitions; while the Real Estate Bank arranged loans for new housing in the complexes.