AFRICA WATCH OVERVIEW

Human Rights Developments

In 1993 the twin themes of peace-making and democratization, on the one hand, and descent into chaos and humanitarian disaster, on the other, continued to dominate human rights developments in Africa, presenting a mixed picture of precarious improvement in some countries, stalemate or deadlock in others and unmitigated catastrophe in a few cases. The political manipulation of ethnic tensions and conflicts also had serious human rights consequences in Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire and elsewhere.

In contrast to the tragic situations in Angola, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan, there was the somewhat positive and hopeful case of, for example, Mozambique. As both types of cases clearly indicated, however, some form of international intervention (multilateral peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations) was becoming an increasingly common, though highly problematic and controversial, factor in the status of human rights in Africa. Africa Watch was particularly concerned that unless human rights standards and mechanisms were fully integrated into the concept and implementation of intervention, if and when it occurred, it was unlikely to achieve its objectives. We have therefore always insisted on such integration, and called for rigorous monitoring and accountability for human rights violations in all cases and situations.

Calls for international intervention are made in a wide variety of situations, and rationalized in different ways. They may be made during peace-making negotiations to end a civil war and rationalized as necessary for regulating transitional processes, as in Namibia, Angola, Liberia and Mozambique. Intervention may also be called for at times of severe national crisis, as in Burundi after the failed military coup of October 21, 1993. However, the actual conception and implementation of an intervention initiative are conditioned by many factors, including the realities of international power relations, competing perceptions of national interest and the dynamics of domestic politics at any given point in time. This appears to be true whether the initiative purports to be global, as in the case of Somalia, or regional, as in the case of Liberia.

In this light, the precise outcome or consequences of intervention would be difficult to predict in advance with any degree of certainty. There will also probably enduring disagreement about its appropriateness, timing and implementation in any given case. It is beyond doubt, however, that the integration and rigorous observance of human rights norms is essential for the success of any intervention, if and when it is justified.

Africa Watch was also particularly concerned about mounting evidence that some governments were either actively engaged in the manipulation of so-called "ethnic violence" among their citizens, or at least failing to take necessary action to prevent and control it. As clearly shown in country reports below, and other Africa Watch publications, the governments of Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa and Zaire, as well as Angola, Liberia and Nigeria, have been implicated in either encouraging or condoning ethnic-based violence within their respective countries. All governments must be held accountable for their responsibility in this regard.

The Right to Monitor

As can be seen from the various country sections of this report, opportunities for human rights monitoring generally improved with greater democratization in many parts of Africa. There was also a growing body of independent African monitoring organizations and groups which could act in partnership with international NGOs in this regard. It was also encouraging to observe the development of inter-African networks of human rights monitors, like the Union Inter-Africain des Droits de l'Homme et des Peuples (Inter-African Union for Human and People's Rights), based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The Union participated with Africa Watch in an international commission which conducted a very successful mission to Rwanda in the early part of 1993.

There was, however, an urgent need to strengthen the capabilities of African human rights organizations, and to promote a culture of independent nonpartisan human rights monitoring and advocacy. African human rights groups also need to develop a stronger sense of consistency, continuity and accountability to their local constituencies. African human rights organizations must see consistency, continuity and local constituency building as essential elements of their right to monitor.

U.S. Policy

U.S. policy in Africa was dominated in 1993 by the issue of American military involvement in Somalia. What began as a humanitarian effort in early December 1992, when President Bush deployed some 25,000 U.S. troops to break the strangle-hold of Somali warlords over the country's food supply, by year's end had become a tangled military engagement costing American lives. Congressional outrage over some nineteen American casualties incurred as U.N./U.S. forces pursued factional leader Muhammad Farah Aideed forced President Clinton to promise to withdraw the American force by March 1994, and cast a shadow over the possibilities of U.S. humanitarian intervention elsewhere.

The disaster in Somalia may be traced to the lack of clear purpose by the U.S./U.N. in that country, and in late 1993 the Clinton administration's overall policy towards Somalia was no clearer than it was when the President took office in January. A lack of attention to human rights had characterized U.S. policy toward Somalia, which in turn ensured that the U.N. would not incorporate human rights guarantees into its operations there.

On a positive note, U.N. operations outside of Mogadishu appeared to be bearing fruit, with much of Somalia conflict-free and a large portion of the country's displaced people returning to their homes and villages. Regrettably, however, little headway was made by the U.S./U.N. effort in establishing mechanisms to bring those responsible for gross abuses against Somalis to account, and to build institutions of civil society that might help avert a repetition of the human rights disaster that cost some 300,000 Somali lives before the international intervention.

Elsewhere in Africa the Clinton administration's human rights policies were influenced by its emphasis on democratization and conflict resolution. Speeches about Africa by key figures in the administration-including National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Secretary of State Warren Christopher-were meant to signal a new commitment to Africa, especially in the areas of democracy and human rights. While this effort was most welcome, the effects were largely symbolic, and most of sub-Saharan Africa remained marginal for the Clinton administration.

In the area of conflict resolution, crises in Liberia, Angola, and Sudan continued despite the administration's diplomatic efforts. In Liberia, the administration recognized the need to provide financial support to the U.N. and African peace initiatives which resulted in some progress, however tentative, by year's end. In Angola, one of Africa's worst human rights disasters, the U.S. did not succeed in its mediation efforts. The upsurge in the civil war following UNITA's refusal to cede to the results of U.N.-sponsored elections in October 1992 resulted in tens of thousands of civilian deaths due to abuses by both UNITA and government forces. The Clinton administration, which recognized the MPLA government in May 1993, had the opportunity to use the occasion of recognition to press the government for human rights commitments. There was no evidence that administration did so, nor did it make any public statements about abuses by either side throughout most of the year. The announcement of the appointment of a special U.S. envoy to Angola by late October did indicate, however, a significant improvement in the level of U.S. involvement in that country.

U.S. human rights policy in Africa was more successful in the area of promoting democracy in several countries where governments attempted to thwart the will of their electorate. In Malawi, for example, the Banda regime, under pressure from the U.S. and other international donors, held a referendum on multiparty democracy in June. But the country's single political party, dominated by the Life President and his henchman, John Tembo, did everything in its power to guarantee a result in its favor: detaining the country's best-known political dissident, Chakufwa Chihana, and denying the pro-democracy movement access to the media. The U.S. played an important role in the process by strongly pressing the Malawian government to release political prisoners, and beaming independent news reports in the Chewa language through the Voice of America. The referendum was held in time and the electorate voted for multiparty democracy.

Nigeria was another country where the U.S. was helpful to the development of democracy. When Nigerian President Babangida refused to announce the results of the country's presidential election and then annulled the elections themselves, the U.S. immediately imposed sanctions on the regime, cutting off bilateral assistance, suspending commercial arms sales, and threatening opposition to Nigerian loans in the multilateral financial institutions. The strong American response encouraged some moderation on Nigeria's part, leading to the formation of an interim government headed byErnest Shonekan.

With regard to some African countries, the U.S. failed to exercise the leverage it possessed as effectively as it might have. In the case of Kenya, where the United States had the potential to exercise significant leverage, an important opportunity to pressure the Kenyan police was missed when the U.S. provided some $3.73 million in military assistance for border security. Certainly the Kenyan government faces a serious security problem on its Somali border, where Somali and Kenyan bandits committed all sorts of atrocities against both local and refugee populations in the area. But to have provided the assistance without first receiving a commitment on the part of the government of Kenya to discipline its own police-which has been responsible for rapes of Somali women in the area-was a lost opportunity to promote badly

needed reforms.

In Sudan, one of worst human rights trouble spots on the continent, the U.S. government had little leverage to exercise with the Al-Bashir regime. Bilateral assistance from the U.S. was limited to humanitarian assistance, and real leverage to encourage human rights improvements was not available. The Clinton administration, like the Bush administration before it, spoke out frankly about abuses in Sudan, but the Sudanese government, increasingly isolated in 1993, appeared undeterred by pressure from the West.

One area where the U.S. ought have been more effective was with the anti-government SPLA forces in southern Sudan. Both SPLA factions, the Garang (Main-stream) and Riak (United), engaged in gross abuses of human rights against civilians from each other's communities. Although the U.S. had criticized these abuses in a few public statements, it did not succeed in influencing the behavior of the SPLA factions in southern Sudan. Gross and systematic human rights abuses continued to be committed by both factions. Given the commonly assumed susceptibility of such groups to external pressure, it may be asked whether the SPLA factions were receiving mixed messages from the U.S. administration and Congress: condemnation of their human rights record in public and expressions of "understanding and support" in private.

The Work of Africa Watch

Throughout 1993, Africa Watch continued its work of monitoring and documenting human rights abuses in about a dozen countries in Africa. An effort was made to maintain a balance between the work on humanitarian disasters-Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, and Angola-and reporting on abuses in those countries claiming to be establishing democracy, including Nigeria, Zambia, Rwanda and Mauritania. It is only by illustrating the range of abuses, from violations of free expression to manipulation of ethnic conflict to massacres of innocent civilians, that a picture of Africa's diversity and complexity can emerge.

Not surprisingly, Africa Watch devoted considerable resources to work on the Horn of Africa, particularly the crises in Somalia and Sudan. Two separate missions were sent to both countries during 1993 in order to provide consistent information on the pattern of abuses and, in the case of Somalia, the role of the U.N.

A theme that was woven through much of Africa Watch's work involved the government's role in manipulating ethnic conflict. Publications examined the government's incitement of communal violence in Zaire and Rwanda, the ethnic clashes in Kenya, and the KwaZulu conflict in South Africa.

Africa Watch also conducted studies of the international peacekeeping operations in Africa, with particular emphasis on the U.N. operation in Somalia and the West African intervention in Liberia. In both cases, the lack of a human rights component was found to undermine the success of the missions.

During 1993, Africa Watch produced several joint projects with Human Rights Watch's Prison Project, Women's Rights Project and Arms Project. These focused projects enabled Africa Watch to conduct in-depth studies on prison conditions in Zaire and South Africa, the rape of Somali women refugees in Kenya, and the civilian toll from land mines in Angola and Mozambique.

As in the past, Africa Watch was called to testify before congressional hearings on Africa: before the Senate Foreign Relation's Subcommittee on Africa dealing with Liberia, and before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa dealing with Nigeria. In addition, Africa Watch continued to be an important source of information for the U.S. and international press, and provided numerous interviews about human rights conditions in Africa.