Inconsistent Support for Elected Government

Like its predecessor, the administration was often a strong proponent of elected government, but the absence of strong advocacy was notable in the case of several important countries. On the positive side:

· The administration's prompt and forceful response to Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano's "self-coup"-stopping foreign aid and threatening to suspend trade benefits and to oppose multilateral bank loans-contributed to reversing the coup attempt.

· The administration's reaction to the military's annulment of elections in Nigeria-including a rare suspension of licenses for commercial arms sales-was also tough, though, as of the end of November, less effective.

· In Malawi, Vice President Al Gore and other administration officials pressed for the release of political prisoners and the lifting of restrictions on civil society in advance of the June referendum on multiparty democracy, in which Malawians rejected the country's thirty-year dictatorship.

The administration's wavering support for elected government was most visible in its backing of Russian President Boris Yeltsin when he dissolved a parliament chosen in relatively free elections in 1990. President Clinton and Secretary Christopher justified this compromise of principle by reference to President Yeltsin's purported democratic commitment. It was difficult to dispute the enormity of the problems facing Yeltsin, and the importance to Washington of an orderly transition from Communist rule in Russia. But as President Yeltsin suspended the Constitutional Court, closed newspapers, banned political parties, vacillated on his pledge of early presidential elections, and allowed Moscow authorities to banish non-ethnic Russians from the city, the ends-justifies-the-means contentions that underlay U.S. policy looked increasingly dubious and dangerous. Indeed, they were disturbingly reminiscent of the Bush administration's unqualified backing of Mikhail Gorbachev. A similar tendency to back a leader, rather than human rights principles, could be seen in the Clinton administration's support for Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia.

The administration also did not allow its quest for elected government to interfere with its relations with major oil producers. Saudi Arabia's authoritarian monarchy remained beyond public criticism, as did Kuwait's royal family, which continued to sponsor abuses despite the election of a parliament with limited powers.

Progress toward acceptance of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provided an important opportunity to promote political freedom in Mexico. But evidently out of fear of jeopardizing the Congressional vote on NAFTA, the administrationlost its critical voice when it came to Mexican abuses, other than to speculate that NAFTA would improve Mexican human rights practices. We hope that with NAFTA approved by Congress, that voice will now be found.