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As noted above, both the RUF rebels and the government Civil Defense Forces (CDFs) in Sierra Leone have a history of recruiting and using child soldiers in the thousands. Refugee children in Guinea, particularly those in camps closer to the border, remain at risk of being used in armed forces. Human Rights Watch has not documented active recruitment or abduction of children from the camps by the RUF rebels, although children risk being abducted during cross-border attacks.173 Human Rights Watch has, however, documented a significant presence of Kamajors, a civilian defense force that fights on behalf of the Sierra Leone government, in the camps, with children in their ranks, a situation which UNHCR has proven unable or unwilling to address.174
Presence of
Combatants
Many Kamajors have registered with UNHCR
in at least two refugee camps and, in early to mid 1999, were using the
camps as bases to support their military activities, which were conducted
in border areas.178 During the February
1999 registration exercise in one camp, a Kamajor commander reportedly
announced, "I have a group of Kamajors here. Can we please register them
immediately so that they can return to the front?" Other refugees cheered
for the Kamajors and permitted them to pass them in line. The census administrator
for the camp, as well as the refugees waiting to register, agreed.179
In another camp, the census administrator told a group of Kamajors that
he could not register them as Kamajors, but later registered the
same individuals as civilians.180
The exact number of Kamajors in the camps is not clear, but substantial numbers are involved. One Kamajor commander in the Fangamadou camp informed Human Rights Watch that there were 1,400 Kamajors operating with the Guinean military in the border area near the camps.181 An international aid worker estimated that there were 300-400 Kamajors based in the Kundou-Lengo-Bengo camp alone.182 Human Rights Watch also received reports that the Kamajors maintained a presence in Fangamadou, Koulomba, Konin, and Sowedu camps.183
Several other sources also told Human Rights Watch that Kamajor civil defense forces operating in Guinea worked in conjunction with the Guinean military. One international aid worker told Human Rights Watch, "this is a country friendly to Sierra Leone, there is almost an official relationship between the Kamajors and the Guinean authorities."184 A Kamajor commander told Human Rights Watch that he took orders from Guinean military commanders, as well as from the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Defense.185 Kamajors have reportedly often served as scouts for Guinean troops because they are familiar with the border area, and have also served in combat at the front lines on both sides of the border. They have also played a significant role in assisting the Guinean government in separating suspected RUF rebels from the refugee population.
UNHCR's office in Guinea has repeatedly disregarded reports by headquarters staff, field staff, and international NGOs indicating the presence of Kamajors and child soldiers in some of the camps and has yet to develop a strategy to deal with the problem. Some staff members are ignorant about the situation and need to be informed and told to take action. Others are or should be aware of the situation but have chosen to ignore it. Still others understand the problem but need more direction and support in addressing this difficult situation.195
Many refugees and aid workers told Human Rights Watch that they found the presence of Kamajors in the camps acceptable because the Kamajors were on the "right" side of the war.196 Aid workers also expressed the view that the Guinean Government may have been legitimately concerned that the Sierra Leonean conflict could spill over its borders and, consequently, was justified in taking actions such as collaborating with the Kamajors to prevent this.197 Because the Kamajors appeared to be operating in conjunction with the Guinean government, as noted above, UNHCR action on this issue could be in direct conflict with the host government. In addition, in at least one case, Kamajors made a thinly veiled threat by "informing" a U.N. employee that they were responsible for his personal security.198
Nevertheless, the Guinean government and UNHCR have a responsibility to address this problem. The only action UNHCR has taken is to move a small number of refugees away from the border, where it would be more difficult for active combatants to use the new camps as a base. Despite knowledge that the Kamajors are present among the refugee population, neither UNHCR nor the Guinean Government has taken steps to screen or separate active pro-government combatants from civilians in the camps. UNHCR chose not to use one recent opportunity to do so, the refugee census in February 1999, and told Human Rights Watch that it did not have plans to screen for combatants in the foreseeable future.199 Nor have UNHCR or the Guinean government taken any concrete actions to prevent the Kamajors from recruiting, initiating, or using children as soldiers.
As has been noted above, UNHCR employs only two protection officers and one community services officer in Gueckedou and seven field staff for more than 300,000 refugees. Only three of the field staff maintain a regular presence in the border areas. Neither the Guinean government nor UNHCR provide security guards in the refugee camps. Human Rights Watch is not aware of any efforts by UNHCR in Guinea to publicly condemn the use of child soldiers or to educate the public or community leaders not to recruit or use child soldiers. Here, as with other issues, Human Rights Watch urges UNHCR to implement its existing guidelines on refugee children and on preservation of the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements in order to protect the human rights of refugee children.
See above. At least seven refugees were
abducted during the RUF attack on Koulou-Bengu, but (probably by chance)
they were all adults. UNCHR told Human Rights Watch that refugee children
have been abducted from Guinea. Correspondence November 24, 1998.
This militia should be distinguished from,
but draws upon, the traditional Sierra Leonean society known as the Kamajors.
(See above.) Kamajor militia have actively participated as combatants throughout
the conflict and it is in this role that their presence in the camps is
scrutinized.
Conclusion on Military or Armed Attacks
on Refugee Camps and Settlements, No. 48 (1987), para. (b). See also Conclusion
on Refugee Children and Adolescents, No. 84 (1997), para. (a)(ii); Conclusion
on Refugee Children, No. 47 (1987), para. (e); Conclusion on Personal Security
of Refugees, No. 72 (1993), para. (b); and Conclusion on Safeguarding Asylum,
No. 82 (1997), para. (d)(vii).
UNHCR has taken the position that eighteen
should be the minimum age for child soldiers in international negotiations
to draft an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
raising the minimum age for combat. However, this position is not currently
reflected in its guidelines on Refugee Children. UNHCR, Refugee Children,
pp. 8, 24, 85-6.
178 A Kamajor commander in Fangamadou told Human Rights Watch that he succeeded in registering all but seven of the Kamajors in the camp. He was confident that he would nevertheless be able to provide for those seven and their families in the camps. Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou, February 19, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interview, February
18, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interview, February
19, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou,
February 19, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interview, Kundou-Lengo-Bengo
camp, February 19, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interview, Gueckedou,
February 17, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interview, Kundou-Lengo-Bengo
camp, February 19, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interviews, Fangamadou,
February 19, 1999 and February 24, 1999.
The Government of Sierra Leone, on behalf
of the regular armed forces as well as the Kamajors and other CDFs, made
a commitment to the special representative of the U.N. secretary-general
for children and armed conflict that it would refrain from recruiting or
using children under the age of eighteen, demobilize all children in government
forces, and facilitate the reintegration into society of children demobilized
from all sides. The government has also made commitments in this regard
to the government of the United Kingdom.
Boys and men must go through a ritual
initiation to join the Kamajors, which is based on a traditional hunting
society. Many Sierra Leoneans apparently believe that, once initiated,
Kamajors become immune to bullets.
Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou,
February 24, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interview, Kundou-Lengo-Bengo
camp, February 19, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou,
February 24, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interviews, Fangamadou,
February 19 and February 24, 1999.
However, there is an inconsistency on
this issue in UNHCR's guidelines on refugee children. In interpreting article
12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which provides that children
capable of forming their own views should be able to participate in deciding
matters that affect them, the guidelines state "for example, under national
law adolescents may have the right to . . . join the army." UNHCR, Refugee
Children, p. 24. Insofar as adolescents may be under the age of fifteen,
this position is incompatible with article 38(3) of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. It is also inconsistent with guidelines in the same
book concerning military recruitment, and with the emerging international
norm prohibiting recruitment or use of children under the age of eighteen
in armed forces.
193 UNHCR, Refugee Children, p. 83. It should be noted, however, that the presence of any armed fighters, whether resistance fighters or otherwise, is incompatible with the humanitarian character of refugee camps.
194 UNHCR, Refugee Children, p. 86.
Human Rights Watch interviews with UNHCR
officers in Kundou-Lengo-Bengo camp, February 19, 1999; Fangamadou, February
19, 1999 and February 24, 1999; Gueckedou February 17, 1999; Conakry, February
26, 1999; and Geneva (telephone interview) June 2, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interviews in Fangamadou
February 19, 1999 and February 24, 1999; and in Kundou-Lengo-Bengo on February
19, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interview, Conakry,
February 26, 1999.
Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou,
February 19, 1999.
UNHCR's rationale for not using the census
for screening was twofold. First of all, the Guinean military has actively
screened suspected RUF rebels to keep them out of the refugee camps (although
this policy had not been applied to Kamajors or other CDFs). Second, the
Guinean students hired as census takers were not trained as protection
officers and, consequently, not qualified to conduct screening. Human Rights
Watch interview with UNHCR officer, Gueckedou, February 16, 1999. However,
UNHCR did not have any specific plans to screen for combatants following
the census. Moreover, UNHCR field staff actually registered Kamajors during
the census in two camps.