Background Briefing

<<previous  |  index  |  next>>

II. The Structure of the Intelligence Regime: the National Intelligence Bureau and The Intelligence Community

The draft establishes the National Intelligence Bureau (BIN) as the chief intelligence body in the country, under the direct authority of the President.8  Under the draft, the position of BIN Director is a ministry-level position.  The draft makes provision for a Vice-Director, a Secretary and five Deputies (Articles 5 & 6). 

BIN itself is defined as having both a national and a departmental presence (Article 4 (2)).9  The Elucidation states ambiguously that “while not explicitly called intelligence, [the departments] nonetheless fulfill intelligence functions.”10  The draft elsewhere describes the function of national intelligence as collecting intelligence in “all aspects of life,” including ideology, politics, economy, the socio-cultural sphere, defense and security.11 

Human Rights Watch is concerned that the draft’s articulations of the role of BIN’s departmental presence and the function of intelligence activities are both ambiguous and overbroad.  Without further clarification, we are concerned that the draft’s expansive language may be used as a justification for the violation of the civil and privacy rights of Indonesian civilians.  Human Rights Watch suggests that the role of BIN at the departmental level be clarified and carefully limited, and the official focus of intelligence activities be aimed at the investigation of potential threats to national security.

Article 22 empowers the BIN Director to form, lead and implement intelligence activities, including directing members of the “Intelligence Community” as defined in Article 39.12  Article 39 gathers together the national and departmental level of government intelligence in an Intelligence Community “forum” and restates BIN’s authority to “coordinate and direct” (mengkoordinasikan dan mengarahkan) activities conducted by members of the Intelligence Community.13 

The Elucidation includes a wide array of government actors in the Intelligence Community, including the BIN, military intelligence, police intelligence, attorney general’s intelligence, the director general of immigration and human rights, and the director general of customs.14 Article 43 (1) further suggests that the Intelligence Community encompasses police, military and ordinary citizens.15

 

Human Rights Watch believes that the role and scope of the “Intelligence Community” requires clarification.  Through the amorphous entity called the Intelligence Community, the bill in effect extends the BIN Director’s power into almost every branch of government, and potentially even into civil society.  This dangerously and unnecessarily extends the vast powers and the near total lack of accountability of BIN operatives to a potentially endless array of official and unofficial actors.  The inclusion of the Attorney General’s office, the police, and the military in the Intelligence Community threatens to undermine any mechanisms for accountability that may exist in current law governing the military and law enforcement.

i. The Power of the President and the Intelligence Chief

The draft places the BIN firmly “under” Presidential control and makes the BIN Director “responsible directly to the President.”16  Article 37 likewise establishes that the President is the “single client” of national intelligence activity.17  Future organization of the BIN structure is to be regulated by Presidential Regulation (Article 11 (2)).

Article 22 empowers the BIN Director in “special cases” (dalam keadaan khusus) to form, lead and implement intelligence activities.  It is not clear whether or not such activity always requires the approval of the President, nor is there anything in the Elucidation clarifying what constitutes a “special circumstance.”  Under Article 35, intelligence activities are to be reported in written form to the BIN Director. 

Human Rights Watch is concerned that the frequency and depth of disclosure to the President is not completely clear, nor is it clear when, if ever, the BIN Director can act without explicit presidential authority.

ii. The DPR and Budgetary Power

While Article 38 (1) gives the parliament (DPR) the right to exercise “control” over national intelligence activities,18 clause (3) defines the control narrowly as “supervision of the budget for intelligence and other matters related to national security.”19  Article 38 (2) also confines DPR authority to the DPR Committee on Intelligence, the members of which will be required to take a “special oath,” which the bill leaves undefined.20 While 17 (a) states that intelligence organizations will be funded through an allocation from the national budget,21 17 (b) provides for a special budget available directly from the President to pay for intelligence activities or operations.22

Human Rights Watch notes that while the principal of presidential control seems relatively well articulated in the bill, the DPR’s power to oversee intelligence activity is undercut by Article 17  If the President can at any time allocate funds directly for intelligence operations notwithstanding the DPR’s budget allocation, this could undermine the DPR’s role as a check on presidential abuse of the intelligence system  At a minimum, the bill might impose a requirement that use of discretionary funds be accounted for to a DPR committee, elected by the DPR, not appointed by the President



[8] Article 5 (2): Badan Intelijen Negara berada dibawah dan bertanggungjawab langsung kepada Presiden.

[9] Disamping penyelenggara intelijen tingkat nasional, terdapat penyelenggara intelijen tingkat departemental.

[10] Yang dimaksud inteligen tingkat departemental adalah intelijen yang merupakan unit sesuatu departemen atau unit yang ada di departemen, walaupun tidak secara eksplisit disebut intelijen; tetapi melaksanalcan fungsi intelijen.

[11] Elucidation to Article 12 (a): Semua aspek kehidupan meliputi bidang-bidang Idiologi, Politik, Ekonomi, Sosial Budaya, pertahanan dan Keamanan.

[12] Dalam keadaan khusus: Kepala Badan Intelijen Negara berwenang membentuk, memimpin dan menyelenggarakan aktifitas intelijen dengan melibatkan anggota-anggota Komunitas intelijen, sebagaimana dimaksud pasal 39;

[13] Badan Intelijen Negara berwenang mengkoordinasikan dan mengarahkan aktifitas intelijen yang dilakukan oleh anggota Komunitas Intelijen;

[14] Yang dimaksud dengan Komunitas Intelijen, yakni Badan Intelijen Negara, Badan Intelijen Strategis (BAIS) TNI, Asisten Intelijen Mabes POLRI, Jaksa Agung Muda Bidang Intelijen Kejaksaan Agung, Direktur Jenderal Imigrasi-Depkeh & HAM, Direktur Jenderal Bea & Cukai-Depkeu dan Direktur Jenderal Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa-Depdagri serta Direktur Jenderal Politik-Deplu.  

[15] Sumber tenaga penyelenggara intelijen berasal dari masyarakat, Mabes TNI, Mabes Polri dan anggota Komunitas Intelijen lainnya;

[16] Article 5 (2): Badan Intelijen Negara berada dibawah dan bertanggungjawab langsung kepada Presiden.

[17] Presiden merupakan pengguna tunggal (single client) intelijen negara.

[18] Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat berhak melakukan kontrol terhadap penyelenggara intelijen riegara (sic).

[19] Kontrol sebagaimana dimaksud ayat (2) pasal ini, dilakukan melalui pengawasan terhadap anggaran intelijen serta substansi yang berkaitan dengan keamanan negara.

[20] Kontrol sebagaimana dimaksud ayat (1) pasal ini, dilakukan oleh Komisi intelijen Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat yang keanggotaannya terdiri dari beberapa anggota Dewan yang telah disumpah secara khusus.

[21] Dalam mendukung keberhasilan tugas, penyelenggara intelijen negara berhak:

memperoleh alokasi anggaran yang memadai melalui Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara;

[22] memperoleh alokasi anggaran khusus dari Presiden dalam rangka pembiayaan kegiatan dan atau operasi-operasi intelijen yang dilakukannya.


<<previous  |  index  |  next>>August 2005