index  |  next>>

SUMMARY

In March 2003, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) adopted a new country strategy for Uzbekistan, less than two months before it held its annual meeting in Tashkent, the Uzbek capital. In its strategy, the EBRD expressed “serious concern” over the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, citing “[s]ystematic violations of the freedom of religion, expression, association and assembly,” and problems of “arbitrary arrests and torture of detainees.”¹ To address these and other concerns the Bank adopted a series of benchmarks for the Uzbek government to fulfill, making continued investment in Uzbekistan contingent on satisfactory progress in these areas and setting a one-year deadline for compliance. Three of the benchmarks pertain specifically to human rights: (1) greater political openness and freedom of the media; (2) registration and free functioning of independent civil society groups; and (3) implementation of the recommendations issued by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture), Theo van Boven, following his country visit to Uzbekistan in November-December 2002.

A broad campaign launched in 2002 by Human Rights Watch and over fifty partner nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) urged the EBRD to use the leverage provided by the May 2003 annual meeting to press for concrete progress in human rights in advance of it. While the Bank did not attach the holding of the annual meeting to improvements in human rights, the approach the Bank took in the country strategy was significant in that it made clear that the Bank expects reforms in exchange for its engagement with the government. An important statement regarding Uzbekistan was also made by EBRD President Jean Lemierre, who in his press conference at the conclusion of the May 2002 annual meeting in Bucharest made clear that holding the annual meeting in Tashkent was “not an endorsement” of the Uzbek government’s human rights record, but rather “an incentive to make progress.”²

One year after the adoption of the country strategy, it is clear that the benchmarks did not trigger the necessary reforms. This failure is attributable, first and foremost, to the Uzbek government’s flagrant disregard for human rights and democracy, an attitude exhibited even during the EBRD annual meeting, when police detained or placed under house arrest human rights defenders to prevent them from attending public demonstrations, restricted media coverage of the event, and harassed and intimidated civil society activists participating in the meeting.

In Uzbekistan, opposition political parties and independent civil society groups cannot function without fear of interference, harassment, confiscation of materials, and detention and ill-treatment. The government continues to harass human rights defenders, has not registered independent political parties or human rights groups, and has imposed additional, more burdensome registration requirements on international NGOs. Informal censorship of the media persists. Finally, Uzbekistan has not made substantial progress on eliminating the systematic practice of torture in Uzbekistan.

The EBRD must also bear some responsibility for the failure of the benchmarks to trigger reforms, as it rejected pressuring the Uzbek government, through public engagement, as a tool for pressing it to meet the benchmarks. Since the publication of the country strategy and the annual meeting in Tashkent, the EBRD has, to our knowledge, not made a single public statement reaffirming its reform demands, evaluating Uzbek government progress, encouraging the government to take the steps necessary to meet the benchmarks, or even commenting on the significance of the benchmarks for further engagement with the Uzbek government.

Finally, for any leverage exercised by a multilateral body to be effective, the individual governments affiliated with it must be committed to making the established calls an integral part of their bilateral relations with the target government. It is far from clear whether the EBRD’s shareholder governments took this step.

The Uzbek government’s failure to make credible progress in meeting the benchmarks must carry real consequences. Human Rights Watch recommends that the EBRD suspend all public sector lending to the Uzbek government until such time as the government demonstrates a genuine willingness and makes substantial, measurable progress toward meeting the benchmarks. Exceptions could be made for projects that directly affect the health, education, and well-being of the general population. Projects falling into these categories, however, should be closely monitored to ensure that they serve their intended purpose.

At the same time, it is imperative that the Bank continue to use the benchmarks as policy tools for reform. We firmly believe that if properly supported by resources and political will, these benchmarks have a real potential to trigger human rights reforms in Uzbekistan. The EBRD should make the most of its political mandate and use the benchmarks to press for tangible reforms. It should ensure that a coherent system of sustained monitoring of Uzbekistan’s progress in meeting the benchmarks is set up, and publicly call for change.

At the end of the country strategy period, in March 2005, the EBRD should revisit Uzbekistan’s progress; if the government meets the benchmarks, the Bank should reconsider engagement with the public sector. If the government again fails to implement the necessary reforms, the Bank should seriously consider putting a halt to all lending to Uzbekistan, again with a narrowly-drawn and closely-monitored exception for essential services to the general population.

In July and November 2003, Human Rights Watch published fact sheets providing updates on human rights developments in each of the three benchmark areas. ³ The present briefing paper summarizes the Uzbek government’s performance since the publication of the March 2003 country strategy, providing detail first and foremost on developments since November 2003.