Antivehicle Mines with Sensitive Fuzes or Antihandling Devices
Human Rights Watch Backgrounder
February 25, 2002
PART III: ANTIHANDLING DEVICES
There are many types of and terms for devices, features, and characteristics designed to "protect" AVM. Some AVM can be expediently equipped with an AHD in the field using common ordnance items such as firing devices (igniters). Some AHD are built into the mine and no deliberate action is necessary to activate them during the mine's employment. Other AHD are the result of deliberate modification, attachment, or activation during the emplacement of the mine. In this instance, the mine itself has either a primary or secondary feature that allows the deliberate modification of the mine for antihandling purposes. Additionally, several AVM have sensitive fuzes resulting from intended and unintended design consequences that may serve as a de facto AHD (sensitive fuzes are addressed and analyzed in the previous section).
Participants in the ICRC seminar had trouble developing recommendations on the best practices for AHD. Experts noted the difficulty in distinguishing or quantifying the differences in physical stimuli between an intentional attempt to tamper or neutralize an AVM with an AHD and an unintentional act. No recommendations were agreed upon for best design practices to minimize the risk to civilians from AVM with AHD while still preserving the military function of the AHD. The experts called upon states to examine the sensitivities of their AHD with the goal of establishing a minimum level needed to fulfill their function.
States Parties have been reluctant to report on the measures taken to insure that AVM with AHD are compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty. Some States Parties have simply indicated that their AVM with AHD are compliant with the treaty. Unfortunately, States Parties have not provided technical detail to support this determination.
Firing Devices and Manually Emplaced AHD
Most AVM with auxiliary fuze wells can be fitted with AHD by the attachment of a firing device and activator. Anti-lift and anti-removal fuzes, designed to deter military countermine clearance, can also be built into the primary fuze. The sensitivity of these devices may also be dependent on whether the mine is placed on the surface or buried.
Some firing devices work on the same principle as a mousetrap and are activated by the release of as little as 2.25 kilograms of pressure. Lifting or removing a restraining weight releases a hinged striker to fire it. Other types of firing devices can function by the application of pressure (11 kilograms or more), release of pressure (between 2 and 67 kilograms), application tension (3 kilograms or more), or the release of tension. Activators are detonator boosters that magnify the explosive force generated by a firing device. The activator also performs the function of an adapter for attaching the firing device to the mine.
States Parties that are reported to have produced anti-lift, anti-disturbance, or anti-removal fuzes include the Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. The former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union produced and widely proliferated these devices, which can be fitted to many types of mines because of the common screw threading in auxiliary fuze wells.
Summary of Practice by States Parties on Firing Devices or Anti-Lift Fuzes
· Belgium has banned pressure and tension release firing devices (igniters) as booby traps.
· France has destroyed a number of unspecified pressure and tension release fuzes.
· Germany states that the DM-39 anti-lift device is no longer in the inventory.
· Slovakia destroyed all of its PT-Mi-K antivehicle mines with anti-lift firing mechanisms.
|
Inherent Antihandling Features
Several types of AVM have an AHD installed at the time of manufacture. Often, there is no observable indication for presence of the AHD on these types of mine. There is insufficient data to render judgment regarding the stimuli or forces necessary to activate the mine's kill mechanism for these AHD.
Prototype AVM were often marketed by the manufacturers as having an antihandling capability, but it is not publicly known whether a state produced or purchased the mine with the feature. International reference publications and databases often list the AVM as having some kind of inherent antihandling feature without indication whether the feature was included in the mines currently in stockpile. For example, according to Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance 2000-2001 the anti-disturbance feature of the FFV-028 was discontinued, but States Parties have not explicitly clarified if the FFV-028 procured and stockpiled by them possess the feature.
Certain AVM are factory equipped with an AHD called a "ball in cage" mechanism. Detonation of the mine occurs when the mine is moved and a metal ball bearing inside a metal housing (cage) moves to complete a simple electrical circuit. This mechanism is dependent on a battery to provide power and will become inert once the battery expires. AVM reported to have a "ball in cage" antihandling mechanism include the SB-81/SB-81AR and the AT2.
Practice by States Parties on AVM Reported to have an Inherent AHD
Mine Type
|
Stockpiling Country
|
Notes
|
ACPRF1
|
France
|
· France acknowledges in the 2001 CNEMA report, that the ACPRF1 does possess an auxiliary fuze well for a pull type AHD, but it is forbidden to use the mine in this way.
|
AT2
|
Germany, Italy, Norway, United Kingdom
|
--
|
Disp F1
|
France
|
· France has stated that the Disp F1 is not produced with a device specifically conceived as an anti-lifting system.
|
FFV-028
(DM-31)
|
Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden
|
· Some have raised questions about the FFV-028 and the possibility that it can explode when swept by a mine detector.
|
HPD F2
|
France, Belgium, Switzerland
|
· Belgium acknowledged stocking the HPD F2, but states that the forces necessary to activate are greater than those of an unintentional act.
· France has stated that the HPD F2 is not produced with a device specifically conceived as an anti-lifting system.
· France states that any attempt to remove the HPD F2 could not be considered an unintentional act as the mine is buried.
· Switzerland acknowledged owning AVM fitted with AHD.
|
PT-Mi-D1M
|
Czech Republic,
Slovakia
|
· The Czech Republic confirmed it produced and supplied to its army a remotely delivered AVM with AHD
|
Pz 88
|
Austria
|
· Austria has confirmed that the Pz-88 has an AHD but states that the amount of disturbance necessary to initiate the mine would be greater than an unintentional act.
|
SB-81
SB-81AR
|
Portugal, Spain
|
· Spain confirmed that it stockpiles some versions of the C-5 (SB-81) that have antihandling devices.
· Portugal reportedly produced the M453 (SB-81), but the Portuguese Ministry of Defense declared it does not possess a stockpile of the mines.
|
TMD-1
|
Bulgaria
|
--
|
Sources
Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, 2000-2001; "Report on the Technical Expert Meeting on anti-vehicle mines with sensitive fuses or with sensitive anti-handling devices, hosted by the ICRC in Geneva, 13-14 March 2001," prepared by Robert Gravett, April 2001; ORDDATA II, Version 1.0 CD-ROM; MINEFACTS, Version 1.2 - a CD-ROM; Landmine Monitor Reports (1999,2000,2001) published by the ICBL; and, materials contained in Human Rights Watch's files.
ATTACHMENT 1: Types and Characteristics of Antivehicle Mines Reported to be Stockpiled by States Parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty
Country
|
Mine
|
Emplacement Method
|
Primary Fuzing Mechanism
|
Antihandling Capability
|
Argentina
|
FMK-3
|
Manual
|
Pressure (150-250 kg)
|
--
|
FMK-5
|
Manual
|
Pressure (300 kg)
|
--
|
Austria
|
Pz 75
|
Manual
|
Pressure
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Pz 88
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Reported
|
Belgium
|
HPD F2
|
Mechanical
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Reported
|
Brazil
|
AE T1
|
Manual
|
Pressure (60-140 kg)
|
--
|
T-AB-1
|
Manual
|
Pressure (200 kg)
|
--
|
Bulgaria
|
PTM-80P
|
Manual
|
Pressure (150-600 kg)
|
--
|
TM-46
TMN-46
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (120-400 kg), Tilt Rod (21 kg lateral)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
TM-57
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (120-400 kg), Tilt Rod (21 kg lateral)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
TM-62M PZ
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (150-600 kg), Magnetic Influence
|
Fuze dependant
|
TMD-1
|
Remotely Delivered
|
Contact, Magnetic Influence
|
Reported
|
NV-PDTM Fuze
|
--
|
Contact, Magnetic Influence
|
--
|
Canada
|
FFV-028
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Reported
|
Chile
|
APVL 83 F4
|
Manual
|
Pressure
|
Unknown
|
M-15
|
Manual
|
Pressure (158-338 kg) Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
M-19
|
Manual
|
Pressure (157-225 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
MAT-80 F5
|
Manual
|
Pressure
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
MAT-84 F5
|
Manual
|
Pressure
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Colombia
|
M-19
|
Manual
|
Pressure (157-225 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Croatia
|
TMRP-6
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (150-360 kg)
Tilt Rod (1.5kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
Tilt Rod has trip wire capability
|
Czech Republic
|
PD-Mi-PK
|
Manual (Off Route)
|
Contact Wire, Tripwire
|
--
|
PT-Mi-BA (three variants)
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (200-450 kg)
|
Compatible with Anti Lift and Removal Fuzes
|
PT-Mi-D1M
|
Remotely Delivered
|
Contact, Scratch Wire
|
Reported
|
PT-Mi-K
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (330 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
PT-Mi-P
|
Manual
|
Tilt Rod (5 kg)
|
--
|
PT Mi-U
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure, Tilt Rod
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
RO-3 Fuze
|
--
|
Anti Lift Fuze
|
--
|
RO-4 Fuze
|
--
|
Anti Lift Fuze
|
--
|
RO-7-III Fuze
|
--
|
Anti Removal Fuze
|
--
|
Denmark
|
M/52
|
Manual
|
Pressure
|
Unknown
|
M/75 Pansermine
(Barmine)
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure, Additional Fuzes (Contact, Magnetic, Seismic)
|
M/88 Fuze adds anti-disturbance capability
|
M/88 Fuze
|
--
|
Anti Lift Fuze
|
--
|
France
|
ACPR F1
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (153 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Disp F1
|
Mechanical, Remotely Delivered
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Reported
|
HPD F2
|
Mechanical
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Reported
|
HPD F3
|
Mechanical
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Reported
|
MIACAH F1
|
Manual (Off Route)
|
Breakwire
|
--
|
MIACAH F2
|
Manual (Off Route)
|
Breakwire
|
--
|
Country
|
Mine
|
Emplacement Method
|
Primary Fuzing Mechanism
|
Antihandling Capability
|
Germany
|
AT-2
|
Vehicle Scattered, Remotely Delivered
|
Scratch Wire
|
Reported
|
DM-11
|
Manual
|
Pressure (150-400kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
DM-12
(PARM-1)
|
Manual (Off Route)
|
Breakwire
|
--
|
DM-21
|
Manual
|
Pressure (180-350 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
DM-31
(FFV-028)
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Reported
|
MIFF
|
Remotely Delivered
|
Acoustic, Magnetic Influence
|
Unknown
|
MUSPA
|
Remotely Delivered
|
Acoustic, Contact, Random Self-Destruct
|
Unknown
|
Italy
|
AT-2
|
Vehicle Scattered, Remotely Delivered
|
Scratch Wire
|
Reported
|
MATS/1.4
|
Manual, Remotely Delivered
|
Pressure (180-310 kg)
|
--
|
MATS/2
|
Manual, Mechanical, Remotely Delivered
|
Pressure (180-310 kg)
|
--
|
MATS/2.6
|
Manual, Mechanical, Remotely Delivered
|
Pressure (180-310 kg)
|
--
|
SB-81
SB-81 AR
|
Manual, Remotely Delivered
|
Pressure (150-310 kg)
|
Feature in Electronic Fuze
|
SH-55
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (180-220 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze --
|
TC/3.6
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (180-310 kg)
|
--
|
TC/6
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (180-310 kg)
|
--
|
VS-SATM VS-SATM-1
|
Manual, Remotely Delivered
|
Magnetic Influence
|
--
|
Honduras
|
M-15
|
Manual
|
Pressure (158-338 kg) Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
M-19
|
Manual
|
Pressure (157-225 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Hungary
|
UKA-63
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure, Tilt Rod
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Japan
|
Type 63/63B
|
Manual
|
Pressure (200 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Jordan
|
M-15
|
Manual
|
Pressure (158-338 kg) Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Mali
|
TM-57
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Tilt Rod (21 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Netherlands
|
FFV-028
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Reported
|
NR29
(MIACAH F1)
|
Manual (Off Route)
|
Breakwire
|
--
|
Norway
|
AT-2
|
Vehicle Scattered, Remotely Delivered
|
Scratch Wire
|
Reported
|
HPD F2
|
Mechanical
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Reported
|
M-15
|
Manual
|
Pressure (158-338 kg) Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Peru
|
MGP.31
|
Manual
|
Pressure
|
--
|
Portugal
|
M453
(SB-81 AR)
|
Manual, Remotely Delivered
|
Pressure (150-310 kg)
|
Anti-Removal Feature in Electronic Fuze
|
Romania
|
MAT-46
|
Manual
|
Pressure
|
--
|
MAT-62B
|
Manual
|
Pressure (200 kg)
|
--
|
MAT-76
|
Manual
|
Pressure (200 kg)
|
--
|
MAT-87
|
Manual
|
Pressure
|
--
|
MC-71
|
Manual
|
Tilt Rod (10-20 kg)
|
--
|
Slovakia
|
PD-Mi-PK
|
Manual (Off Route)
|
Contact Wire, Tripwire
|
--
|
PT-Mi-D1M
|
Remotely Delivered
|
Pressure, Scratch Wire
|
Unknown
|
PT Mi-U
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure, Tilt Rod
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Slovenia
|
TMRP-6
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (150-360 kg)
Tilt Rod (1.5kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
Tilt Rod has trip wire capability
|
Country
|
Mine
|
Emplacement Method
|
Primary Fuzing Mechanism
|
Antihandling Capability
|
Spain
|
C-3-A
C-3-B
|
Manual
|
Pressure (275 kg)
|
--
|
C-5
(SB-81 AR)
|
Manual, Remotely Delivered
|
Pressure (150-310 kg)
|
Antihandling Feature in Electronic Fuze
|
Sweden
|
FFV-016
|
Manual (Off Route)
|
Command, Infrared, Breakwire
|
--
|
FFV-028
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Reported
|
M/41-47
|
Manual
|
Pressure (200-400 kg)
|
--
|
M47-52B
|
Manual
|
Tilt Rod (14.5 kg)
|
--
|
M/52
M/52B
|
Manual
|
Pressure (250 kg),
Tilt Rod (14.5 kg)
|
--
|
Mine Fuze 15
|
--
|
Tilt Rod
|
--
|
Mine Fuze 16
|
--
|
Magnetic Influence
|
--
|
Switzerland
|
HPD F2
|
Mechanical
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Reported
|
Thailand
|
M-15
|
Manual
|
Pressure (158-338 kg) Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
M-19
|
Manual
|
Pressure (157-225 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Tunisia
|
M-19
|
Manual
|
Pressure (157-225 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
United Kingdom
|
AT-2
|
Vehicle Scattered, Remotely Delivered
|
Scratch (Contact) Wire
|
Reported
|
Barmine
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure, Additional Fuzes Available (Contact, Magnetic, Seismic)
|
RO-150 Fuze adds anti-disturbance capability
|
L35A1 Shielder
|
Vehicle Scattered
|
Magnetic Influence
|
--
|
RO 150 Fuze (Danish M/88 Fuze)
|
--
|
Anti Lift/Disturbance
|
--
|
ATTACHMENT 2: Types and Characteristics of Antivehicle Mines Produced by Other Countries and Known to Have Been Exported
|
|
|
|
|
CHINA
|
Mine
|
Emplacement Method
|
Primary Fuzing Mechanism
|
Antihandling Capability
|
Notes
|
Type 69
Type 72
Type 81
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (300-800 kg)
|
--
|
Used in Angola, Bosnia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Somalia, Zambia
|
|
|
|
|
|
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
|
Mine
|
Emplacement Method
|
Primary Fuzing Mechanism
|
Antihandling Capability
|
Notes
|
TMA-1
TMA-1A
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (100 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Used in Bosnia, Croatia
|
TMA-2
TMA-2A
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (100 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Used in Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, Namibia, Zambia
|
TMA-3
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (180 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Used in Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Namibia, Zambia
|
TMA-4
|
Manual
|
Pressure (100-200 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Used in Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, Lebanon, Namibia, Zambia
|
TMA-5
TMA-5A
TAM-5
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (100-300 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Used in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Chad, Croatia, Lebanon, Namibia, Zambia
|
TMD-1/2
|
Manual
|
Pressure (200 kg)
|
--
|
Used in Bosnia, Croatia
|
TMM-1
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (130-420 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Used in Bosnia, Croatia
|
TMRP-6
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (150-360 kg)
Tilt Rod (1.5kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well; Tilt Rod
|
Used in Bosnia, Croatia
|
Yu-S-AT
(KB-2)
|
Remotely Delivered
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Possible
|
Unknown
|
|
|
|
|
|
FORMER SOVIET UNION
|
Mine
|
Emplacement Method
|
Primary Fuzing Mechanism
|
Antihandling Capability
|
Notes
|
PTM-1S
|
Remotely Delivered
|
Pressure
|
--
|
Similar in principle to PFM-1 AP mine Used in Afghanistan
|
TM-46 TMN-46
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (120-400 kg)
Tilt Rod (21 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Used in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
|
TM-57
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (120-400 kg)
Tilt Rod (21 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Used in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Somalia, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe
|
TM-62 B
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (120-750 kg)
|
--
|
Used in Afghanistan, Angola
|
TM-62 M
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Pressure (150-550 kg)
Magnetic Influence
|
Possible
|
Used in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Somalia, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe
|
TM-72
|
Manual, Mechanical
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Possible
|
Used in Afghanistan
|
TMK-2
|
Manual
|
Tilt Rod (8-12 kg)
|
--
|
Used in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia
|
PAKISTAN
|
Mine
|
Emplacement Method
|
Primary Fuzing Mechanism
|
Antihandling Capability
|
Notes
|
P2 Mk. 2
|
Manual
|
Pressure (180-300 kg)
If pressure plate removed, can be initiated with 10 kg
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Uses P2 Mk. 2 AP mine as fuze/booster, packed with detector ring for recovery, used in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tajikistan
|
P2 Mk. 3
|
Manual
|
Pressure (180-300 kg)
If pressure plate removed, can be initiated with 10 kg
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Uses P4 Mk. 1 AP mine as fuze/booster, packed with detector ring for recovery, used in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia
|
P3 Mk. 1
|
Manual
|
Pressure (180-300 kg)
If pressure plate removed, can be initiated with 10 kg
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Uses P4 Mk. 1 AP mine as fuze/booster, used in Afghanistan, Somalia
|
P3 Mk. 2
|
Manual
|
Pressure (200 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Uses P4 Mk. 1 AP mine as fuze/booster
|
|
|
|
|
|
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
|
Mine
|
Emplacement Method
|
Primary Fuzing Mechanism
|
Antihandling Capability
|
Notes
|
M-15
|
Manual
|
Pressure (158-338 kg)
Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Used in: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Cyprus, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia
Exported to: Chile, Greece, Honduras, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey
|
M-19
|
Manual
|
Pressure (157-225 kg)
|
Auxiliary Fuze Well
|
Used in: Angola, Chad, Iran, Iraq, Korea, Lebanon, Zambia
Also Manufactured by: Chile, Iran, South Korea, Turkey
Exported to: Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Honduras, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey
|
M-21
|
Manual
|
Pressure (130.5 kg)
Tilt Rod (1.7 kg)
|
--
|
Four exported to the United Kingdom in 1992
|
M87A1
|
Vehicle or Remotely Delivered
|
Magnetic Influence
|
--
|
Exported to United Kingdom.
|
RAAMS
|
Remotely Delivered
|
Magnetic Influence
|
Percentage have Integrated Antihandling Device
|
Exported to: Greece, South Korea, Turkey
|
M-5 Firing Device
|
Auxiliary Fuze
|
Pressure Release (2.25 kg)
|
--
|
Can be fitted to M-15 and M-19 mines
|
M-142 Firing Device
|
Auxiliary Fuze
|
Pressure (11 kg)
Pressure release (2-67 kg)
Tension (3 kg)
Tension Release
|
Acts as antihandling device when attached in fuze well
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ATTACHMENT 3: The Diplomatic History Regarding Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices
Prepared by Stephen Goose, deputy head of the official ICBL delegation to the Oslo Diplomatic Conference
On September 1, 1997, the opening day of the Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban of Anti-personnel Landmines in Oslo, President Selebi formed five working groups to work on difficult articles. One was the Working Group on Article 2 (Definitions), chaired by Ambassador Thomas Hajnoczi of Austria. Ambassador Hajnoczi was the person mainly responsible for producing the draft treaty that formed the basis for the negotiations.
The Article 2 Working Group first met on September 3, with some 28 governments participating, as well as the ICBL and ICRC. The United States made a proposal to permit its "mixed mine" systems (with both antipersonnel and antitank mines in a single canister) under the definition of antihandling device - a proposal that was eventually rejected by the negotiators. Among its arguments, the United States maintained that its mixed mine systems were less dangerous to civilians than the antivehicle mines (AVM) with antihandling devices (AHD) permitted under the draft treaty. Canada and Norway responded that AVM with AHD that functioned as antipersonnel mines that exploded from an innocent act were not permitted under the treaty. Further discussion was deferred until the following day.
On September 4 the Working Group met again, and discussed Article 2(3), the definition of antihandling device. The language in the draft treaty was identical to the CCW Protocol II: "`Anti-handling device' means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with the mine."
The United Kingdom offered an amendment: "...tamper with OR OTHERWISE DISTURB the mine." Norway then proposed to add the word "intentionally": "...tamper with OR OTHERWISE INTENTIONALLY DISTURB the mine." A discussion ensued, with Canada, Belgium, Zimbabwe (on behalf of the OAU), Chile, ICBL and ICRC supporting Norway, and Sweden supporting the language proposed by the United Kingdom. Those supporting Norway repeatedly emphasized that the word "intentionally" was needed to establish that if an AVM with an AHD explodes from an unintentional or innocent act, it is an antipersonnel mine, and banned under the treaty. The chair, Ambassador Hajnoczi, stated the Norwegian proposal had the most support and asked for consensus. The United Kingdom asked for additional time to consider the Norwegian proposal. The following day the chair again asked for consensus on the issue, and the United Kingdom said it would accept "intentionally." The United States reserved the right to raise the issue again.
On Monday, September 8, Ambassador Hajnoczi reported to the Committee of the Whole the deliberations and recommendations of the Definitions Working Group, including a summary of the discussion on the UK and Norway proposals, and the agreed upon Norwegian language. No comments or objections were made from any delegation. That afternoon, President Selebi went back through articles in the Committee of the Whole, asking for comments, objections, or amendments to the recommendations of the working groups, and seeking agreement on each. In the Article 2 discussion, Australia noted the importance of a record of proceedings to assist in interpretations, and asked for recognition of a clear consensus on a number of things, including that antivehicle mines functioning as antipersonnel mines are prohibited by the convention. No dissent or objection was raised by any delegation.
President Selebi left the article open due to a controversy over another matter. The following day that controversy was solved and the Committee of the Whole agreed to all of Article 2. No attempt was made to re-open Article 2 by any delegation during the rest of the negotiations, and the convention was formally adopted on September 18. In its closing remarks, the ICBL noted the importance of the clear understanding of the negotiators that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that explode from an unintentional act are to be considered antipersonnel mines and banned by the convention.
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