Summary
Human Rights Watch acknowledges that “A Review of the Crimes of Unlawful Possession of Mines and Unlawful Possession of Cluster Munitions” (the Review) raises legitimate concerns regarding Sweden’s national interests in today’s geopolitical environment. The Review’s proposed response, however, threatens core obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, both of which have saved countless lives around the world.[1]
Human Rights Watch opposes the Review’s recommendations to adopt overly broad exceptions to the prohibitions on antipersonnel landmine and cluster munition-related activities during joint military operations. Such amendments could have grave humanitarian consequences and are not necessary to achieve Sweden’s desired ends. Alternative, less problematic solutions are available, and Human Rights Watch identifies several at the end of this submission. Sweden can protect its troops from unpredictable criminal liability and participate in joint military operations while upholding its long-standing commitment to humanitarian disarmament.
The Humanitarian Context
Sweden has been a state party to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 and the Convention on Cluster Munitions since 2012 and adopted domestic penal sanctions to implement the instruments’ prohibitions at the time of its accession. In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the withdrawal of some of Sweden’s allies from those treaties, the Review has argued for amending certain legal provisions related to joint military operations, also known as international military operations or cooperation.[2] The Review contends such amendments would clarify national law, protect Swedish troops from unpredictable criminal liability in joint military operations, and facilitate participation in such operations.[3]
Human Rights Watch recognizes Sweden’s national interests and the value of legal clarity, but upholding the norms of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions is a humanitarian imperative. States adopted these treaties to prevent and remediate the human suffering caused by antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions, both of which can harm civilians and soldiers alike. Protecting international humanitarian law is particularly important during times of armed conflict. As the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross said in 2024, “International Humanitarian Law is not made for the hopeful days of peacetime. It is made for humanity’s darkest days, when armed conflict rages and people are in grave danger.”[4]
The key elements of the Review’s proposal risk weakening the general obligations and run counter to the object and purpose of the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions. While certain proposed amendments are unproblematic, the most fundamental changes undermine core prohibitions of the two treaties and extend beyond what is necessary to achieve Sweden’s goals.
Human Rights Watch’s in-depth and multifaceted expertise make it well suited to comment on the Review. For more than 25 years, Human Rights Watch has done extensive documentation of the use of antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions, and the immediate and long-term effects the weapons cause civilians. Human Rights Watch was also actively involved in the negotiations of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions and, through monitoring and legal analysis, has informed implementation and interpretation since adoption. It has served as an editor of the annual Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitors from the publications’ inception.[5] In addition, Human Rights Watch has produced in-depth reports examining interoperability under the Convention on Cluster Munitions and identifying key elements of strong national implementation legislation.[6] The Convention on Cluster Munitions coordinator on national implementation measures, the convention’s Implementation Support Unit, and the Cluster Munition Coalition have all cited Human Rights Watch’s elements of legislation as a useful model for states developing new law.[7]
Prohibitions on Use, Stockpiling, and Transfer (Proposed Chapter 22, Sections 6b and 6d, Paragraphs 3–4)
The Review proposes creating significant exceptions to the prohibitions on antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions during joint military operations. The current language in Penal Code Chapter 22, Section 6b establishes penal sanctions for mine-related activities except when they are “permitted under the Convention.” The proposed amendment goes further than what the treaty permits and states:
It shall not constitute an offense to use, stockpile or transfer anti-personnel mines within the framework of international military cooperation, provided that the dealing does not constitute the laying of anti-personnel mines…. Only a person who has participated [in the laying of anti-personnel mines] to a substantial extent shall be held liable.[8]
Human Rights Watch opposes the amendment because it permits activities that are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. The treaty absolutely bans the use, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines, along with other activities, “under any circumstances.”[9] Section 6b’s proposed new language, however, specifically states that use, stockpiling, and transfer are not offenses in certain circumstances, namely in the context of joint military operations, unless the activities constitute the laying of antipersonnel mines. A person can even participate in the laying of antipersonnel mines as long as the person does not participate to “a substantial extent.”
Human Rights Watch also opposes the Review’s recommended amendments related to cluster munitions because they raise substantially the same concerns. Proposed Penal Code Chapter 22, Section 6d, which would replace Sweden’s current stand-alone legislation implementing the Convention on Cluster Munitions is almost identical to Section 6b on antipersonnel mines and would create comparable exceptions for use, stockpiling, and transfer during joint military operations.[10] Given that the prohibitions in the Convention on Cluster Munitions parallel those in the Mine Ban Treaty, the exceptions are equally problematic under Article 1’s general obligations. The Convention on Cluster Munitions differs from the Mine Ban Treaty due to its Article 21 on relations with states not party, but that article does not fundamentally alter the critique of Section 6d.
Article 21 is closely linked to Article 1 but should be understood as a clarification not a qualification of the obligations of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Article 21(3) states that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties, their military personnel or nationals may engage in military cooperation and operation with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.
Some states have argued Article 21(3)’s opening “notwithstanding” phrase creates an exception to Article 1, and its prohibition on assistance in particular.
The majority view, and that of Human Rights Watch, however, is that Article 21(3) serves primarily to remove any doubt that mere participation in joint military operations is allowed.[11] The latter interpretation makes sense given it is consistent with the convention’s object and purpose, which is to “put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions.”[12]
Furthermore, paragraph 3 should be read in the context of the rest of Article 21, including paragraphs 1 and 2, which require states parties to promote the convention’s norms and make their best efforts to discourage use of cluster munitions. It would be internally contradictory for an article to at once require a state party to discourage use and allow it to assist with use in certain circumstances.[13] To read Article 21(3) as an exception would weaken the convention’s normative framework.
Ultimately, one’s views on Article 21 do not fundamentally change the analysis of the proposed amendments. Proposed Chapter 22, Section 6d allows for the use, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions during joint military operations, yet Article 1 prohibits those activities “under any circumstances.” Even if Article 21(3) is understood as creating an exception to parts of Article 1, Article 21(4) explicitly prohibits a state party from itself using, stockpiling, or transferring the weapons during joint military operations with a state not party.
Prohibition on Assistance, Encouragement, and Inducement (Analysis of Sections 6b and 6d)
The Review identifies exceptions to both treaties’ prohibition on assistance, encouragement, and inducement, which further threaten the treaties’ norms. It enumerates several examples of activities that it contends should “not be able to lead to criminal liability.”[14] They include:
- Transporting another state’s antipersonnel mines or cluster munitions;
- Guarding or staying at a base where antipersonnel mines or cluster munitions are stored;
- Joint stockpiling antipersonnel mines or cluster munitions on a common base;
- Commanding a foreign military force that is equipped with and ultimately uses antipersonnel mines or cluster munitions if the Swedish commander does not have exclusive control over the choice of ammunition;
- Planning military operations with states not party as long as Swedish personnel do not encourage or actively contribute to the use of antipersonnel mines or cluster munitions;
- Protecting a foreign unit that receives an order to lay antipersonnel mines or fire cluster munitions; and
- Benefiting indirectly from the antipersonnel mines laid or cluster munitions used by others.
The Review also narrowly interprets “participated to a substantial extent,” the phrase it uses to clarify what is unlawful under paragraph 4 of Sections 6b and 6d. The Review specifies that under that test, Swedish troops could, for example, lawfully take part in “transporting or guarding units that possess and subsequently lay anti-personnel mines.”[15]
The Review further claims that the transit, i.e., the moving of antipersonnel mines or cluster munitions through Swedish territory, is permissible since it is not a form of transfer. The Review does not address the alternative argument that transit can be a form of assistance with a prohibited activity, including transfer or use.[16]
Human Rights Watch opposes allowing such a wide range of assistance because this kind of permissive approach is out of step with most states’ interpretation of the prohibition on assistance under the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions. According to the Landmine Monitor, for example, at least 44 states parties have specified that they would not participate in the planning or implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint military operations with a state not party.[17] At least 33 states have prohibited transit through or foreign stockpiling on their territory.[18] The Landmine Monitor and Human Rights Watch have also found there to be a “general, albeit informal, understanding” that other activities prohibited during joint miliary operations include providing security, storage, or transportation for antipersonnel mines.[19]
The Review analyzes the practices of several states parties that are good models for Sweden because of their own participation in joint military operations or their geographic proximity. In some, albeit not all, cases, these states’ positions diverged from the Review’s proposed interpretation of what Sweden should permit under the Mine Ban Treaty. Like Sweden, Canada has expressed a desire to protect its troops from criminal liability.[20] Nevertheless, it has stated that its forces would “not be allowed to participate in the use of, or planning for the use of anti-personnel mines” during joint military operations, even if Canadian personnel were part of a multinational staff or commanded by foreign officers.[21] In addition, joint forces may not use antipersonnel mines when Canada is in command.[22] The UK and Denmark have similarly stated that their forces, when engaged in joint military operations, are prohibited from planning with others for the use of antipersonnel mines.[23] The UK has also prohibited its troops from providing security or transport for the weapons and clarified that its forces may not lawfully gain benefit from antipersonnel mines laid by another actor.[24]
The activities enumerated in the Review also go beyond the majority view of what is permissible under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. According to the Cluster Munition Monitor, at least 38 states parties and signatories have agreed that Article 21(3) does not allow states to avoid their “obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.” In addition, at least 34 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.[25]
Unnecessary and Ineffective Amendments (Proposed Sections 6b and 6d)
Human Rights Watch finds that the proposed overly broad amendments and interpretation are not necessary to achieve the goals laid out in the Review. First, it is widely accepted, and the Review acknowledges, that the treaties permit “mere participation” in joint military operations with states not party.[26] Six states issued declarations when they ratified or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty to make their positions on this front explicit, and others, including Sweden, have expressed similar views in national statements.[27] Article 21 leaves no doubt that mere participation in joint military operations with states not party is allowed under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Therefore, nothing in the treaties or Sweden’s current law prohibits Sweden’s participation in joint military operations such as Forward Land Forces (FLF) Latvia, FLF Finland, or operations with NATO.
Second, troops can only be held criminally liable if they had knowledge of their participation in or assistance with a prohibited activity. The Swedish Penal Code states that acts only rise to the level of crimes if they are “committed intentionally,” and the Review confirms that rule applies to crimes related to antipersonnel mines.[28] Under Swedish law, there are three different levels of intent—direct, indirect, and reckless—but even the lowest level requires that the perpetrator possessed some knowledge.[29] Under one interpretation of reckless intent, the defendant “foresees the result [of an act] as being reasonably probable,” and accepts it.[30] At this level of intent or higher, troops should have the opportunity to protect themselves from liability by preventing or refusing to engage in a prohibited activity as soon as they become aware of it. For example, if they learn that allies who are not party intend to use antipersonnel mines or cluster munitions, they should discourage that use and then remove themselves immediately from any planning of the operation if antipersonnel mine or cluster munition use will proceed. Therefore, concerns about unpredictable liability are overstated.
Finally, the proposed amendment does not by itself bring the legal clarity sought, and the Review’s analysis does not resolve uncertainty. For example, the proposed new language permits “use” other than the laying of antipersonnel mines or firing of cluster munitions, but the commentary does not clarify what such use would entail. It only explains that use does not encompass benefiting from the laying of antipersonnel mines or use of cluster munitions by someone else. In addition, the analysis in the Review goes further than the proposed amendment to create exceptions for the prohibition on assistance, which could lead to confusion. Rather than resolving questions, the Review explains that what activities should be considered significant participation and thus amount to unlawful assistance should “ultimately be determined in the application of the law based on the circumstances of the individual case.”[31]
Dual Criminality (Chapter 2, Sections 4–5)
The third major amendment proposed in the review relates to jurisdiction. Human Rights Watch does not oppose this change as long as it is understood to retain existing exceptions.
The Review recommends requiring “dual criminality” for its Penal Code provisions on antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. Under dual criminality, Swedish courts only have jurisdiction if an act is also criminal in the territory where it took place. While this requirement in some ways narrows the courts’ jurisdiction, the section includes numerous exceptions, including for members of the Swedish armed forces and agents of the Swedish government. The commentary makes clear that these exceptions are unaffected by the proposed amendments and still apply to antipersonnel mine and cluster munition activities. Human Rights Watch considers it critical that if Sweden makes changes to its courts’ jurisdiction, the current understanding on this point remains.
Recommendations
To address these concerns, while taking into account the goals laid out in the Review, Human Rights Watch recommends that Sweden:
- Retain the original language of Penal Code Chapter 22, Section 6b, paragraph 3, which is consistent with the Mine Ban Treaty.
- Amend Penal Code Chapter 22, Section 6b, paragraph 1, as the Review proposes, i.e., change “possesses” to “stockpile[s]” and “retains” to more closely reflect language of Mine Ban Treaty.
- Maintain its original law implementing the Convention on Cluster Munitions, or adopt proposed Penal Code Chapter 22, Section 6d except paragraphs 3 and 4. Paragraphs 3 and 4 should be replaced with language adapted from Penal Code Chapter 22, Section 6b, paragraph 3 and read: “Such dealing with cluster munitions as is permitted under the Convention referred to in the second paragraph does not constitute an offense.”
- If the Review’s proposed jurisdictional changes are made, ensure that dual criminality does not apply to crimes related to antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions when the offenses are committed by members of the Swedish Armed Forces or someone employed by the Swedish authorities to participate in a joint military operation or in international civilian crisis management, as stated in current Penal Code Chapter 2, Section 5, paragraph 2.
To clarify its understanding of the law, Sweden could also:
- Issue an interpretive declaration and/or adopt an amendment to Penal Code Chapter 22, Sections 6b and its current or amended cluster munition legislation that makes explicit that “mere participation” in joint military operations is allowed. It could look for models in the legislation and declarations of other states, such as Canada and the UK regarding the Mine Ban Treaty,[32] and New Zealand and Norway regarding the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[33]
- Address, in the Review’s commentary or another appropriate forum, the importance of the intent requirement as a means to avoid unpredictable criminal liability for troops.
[1] “A Review of the Crimes of Unlawful Possession of Mines and Unlawful Possession of Cluster Munitions,” 2026 (unofficial translation) (on file with Human Rights Watch).
[2] Ibid., p. 15.
[3] Ibid., p. 71.
[4] “In times of insecurity and conflict, states must work together to uphold and strengthen international humanitarian law,” International Committee of the Red Cross news release, July 18, 2024, https://www.icrc.org/en/news-release/times-insecurity-and-conflict-states-must-work-together (accessed November 4, 2026).
[5] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, https://the-monitor.org/ (accessed November 12, 2026).
[6] Human Rights Watch and the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC), “Staying True to the Ban on Cluster Munitions: Understanding the Prohibition on Assistance in the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” June 2009, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/23/staying-true-ban-cluster-munitions#; Human Rights Watch and IHRC, Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation, September 2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/03/staying-strong/key-components-and-positive-precedent-convention-cluster-munitions.
[7] See, for example, Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Tools for National Implementation Measures,” https://www.clusterconvention.org/national-implementation/ (accessed November 5, 2026).
[8] “A Review of the Crimes,” pp. 11–12 (proposed Chapter 22, Section 6b, paras. 3–4).
[9] Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty), adopted September 18, 1997, entered into force March 1, 1999, art. 1(1).
[10] The only differences between the proposed Chapter 22, section 6d on cluster munitions and section 6b on landmines are the names of the weapon, the name of the treaty, and the reference to firing of cluster munitions rather than laying of landmines. The majority of the Penal Code proposal is comparable to the current cluster munition law so the change in format is not in itself a matter of significant concern.
[11] Human Rights Watch and IHRC, “Staying True to the Ban on Cluster Munitions”; Cluster Munition Coalition, Cluster Munition Monitor 2026, September 2026, https://the-monitor.org/reports/cluster-munition-monitor-2026 (accessed November 12, 2026), pp. 48–49.
[12] Convention on Cluster Munitions, adopted May 30, 2008, entered into force August 1, 2010, pmbl., para. 2.
[13] Human Rights Watch and IHRC, “Staying True to the Ban on Cluster Munitions.”
[14] “A Review of the Crimes,” pp. 54–55.
[15] Ibid., pp. 54–55, 58–59, 76–77, 79.
[16] Ibid., p. 56; Human Rights Watch, “Promoting the Prohibitions: The Need for Strong Interpretations of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” November 6, 2010, https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/06/promoting-prohibitions.
[17] International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2010, https://icblcmc.org/assets/reports/full/Landmine_Monitor_2010_lowres.pdf (accessed November 5, 2026), p. 10. More recent Landmine Monitors have stopped updating the numbers in this paragraph.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Human Rights Watch, “The Prohibition on Assistance in the Mine Ban Treaty (Article 1),” Landmine Monitor Fact Sheet, May 2009, https://archives2.the-monitor.org/media/1418393/Assistance_Articleplus1_Mayplus09.pdf (accessed November 5, 2026).
[20] International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2000, August 2000, https://icblcmc.org/assets/reports/full/lmmon2k.pdf(accessed November 5, 2026), p. 244.
[21] International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2001, August 2001, https://icblcmc.org/assets/reports/Landmine-Monitors/2001-Full-Report.pdf (accessed November 5, 2026), p. 294.
[22] International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2001, August 2001, https://icblcmc.org/assets/reports/Landmine-Monitors/2001-Full-Report.pdf (accessed November 5, 2026), p. 294.
[23] Human Rights Watch, “The Prohibition on Assistance in the Mine Ban Treaty (Article 1)”; International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2002, August 2002, https://icblcmc.org/assets/reports/Landmine-Monitors/2002-Full-Report.pdf (accessed November 5, 2026), p. 18.
[24] Human Rights Watch, “The Prohibition on Assistance in the Mine Ban Treaty (Article 1).”
[25] Cluster Munition Coalition, Cluster Munition Monitor 2026, pp. 48–49.
[26] Human Rights Watch, “The Prohibition on Assistance in the Mine Ban Treaty (Article 1)”; Stuart Casey-Maslen, “Article 1—General Obligations,” in The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention: A Commentary, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), pp. 76–77; Torfinn Rislaa Arntsen, “Article 21. Relations with States Not Party to this Convention,” in The Convention on Cluster Munitions: A Commentary, Gro Nystuen and Stuart Casey-Maslen, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 595–596.
[27] “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction,” United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=26&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=XXVI-5&src=TREATY#EndDec (accessed November 4, 2026).
[28] Swedish Criminal Code, https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/brottsbalk-1962700_sfs-1962-700/#K1, Chapter 1, Section 2; “A Review of the Crimes,” p. 35.
[29] Ebba Lekvall and Dennis Martinsson, “The Mens Rea Element of Intent in the Context of International Criminal Trials in Sweden,” Scandinavian Studies in Law, vol. 66 (2020), https://www.open-access.bcu.ac.uk/11832/1/PUBLISHED%20VERSION.pdf, p. 105.
[30] Ibid., p. 103.
[31] “A Review of the Crimes,” p. 54.
[32] For example, Canada’s understanding issued upon ratification stated: “It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that, in the context of operations, exercises or other military activity sanctioned by the United Nations or otherwise conducted in accordance with international law, the mere participation by the Canadian Forces, or individual Canadians, in operations, exercises or other military activity conducted in combination with the armed forces of States not party to the Convention which engage in activity prohibited under the Convention would not, by itself, be considered to be assistance, encouragement or inducement in accordance with the meaning of those terms in article 1, paragraph 1 (c).” The UK’s declaration issued upon ratification stated: “It is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom that the mere participation in the planning or execution of operations, exercises or other military activity by the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces, or individual United Kingdom nationals, conducted in combination with the armed forces of States not party to the [said Convention], which engage in activity prohibited under that Convention, is not, by itself, assistance, encouragement or inducement for the purposes of Article 1, paragraph (c) of the Convention.” United Nations Treaty Collection, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction,” https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=26&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=XXVI-5&src=TREATY#EndDec (accessed November 4, 2026).
[33] New Zealand legislation includes the following provision: “A member of the Armed Forces does not commit an offence against section 10(1) merely by engaging, in the course of his or her duties, in operations, exercises, or other military activities with the armed forces of a State that is not a party to the Convention and that has the capability to engage in conduct prohibited by section 10(1).” Norway’s analysis of its legislation states: “Article 21 also confirms that States Parties may participate in military cooperation and military operations with States not party to the Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party. The exemption for military cooperation does not authorise the States Parties to engage in activities prohibited by the Convention.” Human Rights Watch and IHRC, Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation, pp. 24–26.